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Preface
Terrorism remains a controversial topic both in academia and in the public discourse. Building on
previous social science research investigating the determinants of terrorism in a rational choice frame-
work, I analyze terrorism through an economist’s lens that assumes terrorist groups to be rational actors
that use violence as a tool in pursuit of tangible political or ideological goals.
In the first chapter, I develop an economic model for the formation of alliances between terror
groups, and why intergroup cooperation is more effective if the groups have a similar ideology. Groups
cooperate in order to increase access to resources while maintaining the advantages of decentralization
in the face of counterterrorism pressure. I empirically test the hypothesis that religious groups obtain
greater operational benefits from cooperation than secular groups on a panel dataset containing detailed
information on 255 terrorist groups between the years 1970 and 2014, finding that alliances formed by
religious groups are more effective than those of their secular counterparts.
In the second chapter, based on the so-called “club model of terrorism," which postulates that terror
groups may improve their capabilities by extracting sacrifices that screen out low commitment members
and thus mitigating defection and free riding costs, I estimate the effects of these “commitment devices"
on the incidence of terrorism. I do this by employing various observable proxies as exogenous shifters of
the marginal product schedules of the ability of groups to induce commitment from members. Using a
panel dataset containing all documented incidents of terror attacks from 2007-2013 at the state-year level,
I find that the effects of the commitment devices are significant, both on overall terrorism and on suicide
terrorism.
The third chapter examines the relationship between party politics and terrorism. Combining eco-
nomic theory with historical case studies of militant organizations in Lebanon, Turkey, Israel, Palestine,
Spain, Ireland, and South America, I analyze the interplay between terrorism and party politics. Within a
“market" framework that includes a supply side and a demand side, I describe how events affecting the
marginal costs and marginal benefits of violence may induce an entry into, or exit from, terrorism.
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Chapter 1
The Role of Ideology in Terrorist Alliance
Networks
Terrorist groups form alliances with one another in order take advantage of mutual gains from trade,
thereby increasing group capacity in pursuit of their goals. Based on a club model of terrorism, I argue
that the costs of forming alliances are heterogeneous by the ideological affiliation of the group, whether
religious or secular. Analyzing a panel dataset containing detailed yearly information of over 250 militant
organizations between the years 1970-2014, I estimate the benefits derived from alliances for both secu-
lar and religious groups. I find that, conditional on a given investment level, religious groups get higher
output from alliances than secular groups. For example, on average, the yearly fatality rate (measured
as the number of inflicted fatalities per attack) for a religious groups with 5 allies is predicted to be 56%
higher than a religious group with no allies. The fatality rate for a religious group with at least 10 allies is
expected to be more than twice as high as a religious group with no allies. On the other hand, I find that
while secular groups experience modest returns for the first few alliances formed, they then receive neg-
ative returns to cooperation beyond 5 alliances. These results suggest that to the extent counterterrorism
policies are aimed at disrupting terror networks, these policies should have the most significant impact
when religious terror networks are targeted.
JEL categories: D74; H41; H56; Z12; Z13
Keywords: Terrorism, social networks, club goods, religion, national security
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1.1 Introduction
One of the most difficult aspects of fighting terrorism is the fact that terror groups are generally small
and not centrally organized, so if one part of a group is shut down by authorities, the rest of the group can
continue functioning. This decentralization has a down side, however, in that it makes it harder for a terror
group to mobilize resources for large-scale or difficult operations. One of the methods terror groups use to
address this weakness is to use cooperation with other groups. This increases groups’ access to resources
while maintaining some of the advantages of small size and decentralization.
An important recent example of terror group cooperation is that between Hamas and Hezbollah. In
June 2018, it was divulged that Israel had recently appealed to the United Nations Security Council, insist-
ing that Palestinian terror group Hamas had been cooperating with Hezbollah in Lebanon to build missile
factories and train thousands of fighters (TOI (2018)). Israel also accused Saleh al-Arouri, the deputy head
of Hamas’s political bureau, of routinely visiting Lebanon and meeting with Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan
Nasrallah, for military and political coordination (Khoury and Landau (2018)). According to Israel’s Am-
bassador to the UN Danny Danon, “the cooperation between Hamas and Hezbollah crosses borders. We
are witnessing the results of the Hamas terror government in Gaza, and now Hamas is tightening its ties
with Hezbollah with the blessing and support of Iran, which is working to entrench its own forces also on
Lebanese soil".
Extending back into the early 1990s, the cooperative relationship between Hamas and Hezbollah is
illustrative because it reveals the increased operational effectiveness that a terrorist group may receive
through collaboration. When members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) returned to Israel
in 1993 following a year training alongside Hezbollah, the casualties per attack for these two groups in-
creased from about two to around ten (Horowitz and Potter (2014)). Between 1993 and 1999, Hamas car-
ried out 18 suicide attacks against Israel, and then 60 more during the Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada),
which began in September 2000 (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 92).1 In return for their support, Hezbollah was
able to boost its prestige and presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In April, 2001, for example, at
least two Hezbollah-style roadside bombs were detonated in the West Bank; Palestinian sources claimed
they were set by activists working directly for Hezbollah (Rees (2001)).
1For historical context, in December 1992, members of the Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, abducted
and killed an Israeli police officer. The Israeli government responded by deporting 400 leaders of Hamas and PIJ to Lebanon, and
it was here that they came into close contact with Hezbollah leaders (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 91-92; Pedahzur (2005)). This meeting
was especially consequential, because it was from these Hezbollah leaders that the Hamas militants received instruction on how to
effectively employ suicide tactics, knowledge which they imparted to their associates when they were permitted to return to Israel
the following year due to international condemnation of the expulsion.
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In this paper, I assess whether the benefits derived from cooperation between terrorist groups are
heterogeneous by the ideological affiliation of a group. In my empirical analysis, using a panel dataset
containing yearly information on hundreds of terror groups I measure the effects of cooperation on group
productivity, finding that alliances made by religious groups are more effective than those made by secular
groups. This study intends to make two contributions to the terrorism literature. First, I offer an economic
justification for the formation of alliances between terror groups. Second, I test for heterogenous effects
of coopoeration by ideology type.
The reason why organizations would seek to cooperate is intuitive: due to the difficulty in overcom-
ing a size disadvantage, clandestine micro-governments (such as terrorist groups) have an incentive to
achieve their goals by means of factors which are asymmetric and less capital-intensive (Nozick (2013)).
Brokering horizontal relationships with other groups is therefore a substitute for achieving economies of
scale through the normal method of vertical integration and growth.
The key distinction between the phenomenon of terrorism and other types of crime is the underly-
ing motivation. Unlike normal criminal gangs or crime syndicates, terrorists are generally motivated by
ideological or political objectives rather than financial interests (Enders and Jindapon (2010); National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)). Ideology can be defined as
the ideas or aims that constitute the basis of a worldview held by an individual or a group. Broad ideologi-
cal categories that have historically been major drivers of terrorism include religious extremism, national
separatism, and Marxism-Leninism. Ideology, as the raison d’être of terrorism, must then first and fore-
most be understood as the fundamental outcome pursued by a terror group, the main variable in a group’s
utility function that it seeks to maximize given a set of constraints.
Borrowing the methodological approaches found in models of rational choice theory and the eco-
nomic theory of clubs, in this paper I argue that in addition to being the pursued outcome of terrorism,
ideology also functions as a production technology that affects the quality of a terror group. For economic
analyses of terrorism, the rational choice framework suggests that actors (individual terrorists or terrorist
groups) have stable preferences over alternatives and chooses from among the best available alternatives
(van Um (2015), 2; Anderton et al. (2009), 28). According to the premises of a rational choice framework of
terrorism, then, I argue that a group’s ideological affiliation can be understood as a production technology
to the extent that it facilitates the transformation of inputs (e.g., labor and capital) into a final product,
typically violence against non-combatants in pursuit of a political agenda.
Extant literature analyzing the behavior of terrorism within the rational choice framework models
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terror groups as clubs that face high costs due to defection and free-riding which they mitigate by de-
ploying devices that screen out low-commitment members. To this end (assembling a coalition of highly
committed operatives), a religious ideology provides two key advantages to a terror group relative to a sec-
ular ideology. Iannaccone and Berman (2005), Berman and Laitin (2008), and Berman (2009) argue that
religion is an effective node around which to organize a militant sect because many common features of
religion–such as initiation rites, codes of behavior, and the provision of social services–are highly useful
mechanisms in screening out low-commitment individuals from the group, thus giving religious radicals
a comparative advantage in solving free-rider problems and assembling coalitions of highly committed
operatives. Building off of this club framework, Raynold (2018) takes this reasoning a step further, sug-
gesting that due to the supernatural nature of religion, the “commitment enhancement technologies" at
the disposal of religious terror groups are qualitatively superior to those of secular groups. It naturally
follows that religious terror groups should be more effective in producing political violence than secular
terror groups for any given investment level, a supposition that has found empirical support (Berman and
Laitin (2008)).
On a secondary level, because religious groups can screen out low commitment and ineffective
members more effectively than secular groups, we should expect them to be more desirable allies. In
other words, the ideology of a group (religious or secular) functions as a proxy for ally quality. In this re-
gard, secular ideologies are maladaptive as alliance-building technologies. Religious groups, on the other
hand, have a comparative advantage in forming alliances because, given their use of superior technolo-
gies at the club level to motivate commitment, all else equal they are seen as relatively valuable partners.
For this reason, alliances made by religious organizations are higher quality than those made by secular
types.
I empirically test the hypothesis that religious groups obtain greater benefits from cooperation than
secular groups on a panel dataset containing detailed information on 255 terrorist groups that existed
at any time between the years 1970 and 2014. My analysis focuses on distinguishing whether the bene-
fits from cooperation materialize at the extensive margin or at the intensive margin. The extensive mar-
gin refers to initial decision of a terrorist group to pursue alliances, while the intensive margin captures
whether there is a heterogeneous effect of cooperation as additional alliances are formed. This is a mean-
ingful distinction, and prudent counterterrorism policy ought to depend on which margin has the greatest
effect on terrorist productivity. At both the extensive and the intensive margins, I compare the benefits
derived from alliances for both types of groups, religious and secular. The primary outcome variable that
4
I use as a measures of a group’s ‘productivity’ is
fatalitiesi t
attacksi t
, that is, the average number of fatalities inflicted
by group i per attack, for each year t . This can be thought of as a group’s “fatality rate" (Berman and Laitin
(2008); Berman (2009)).
I find that the fatality rate for a religious group with 5 allies is predicted to be 56% greater than a
religious group with no allies. Religious groups with at least 10 allies are shown to have a fatality rate that
is 78% higher than religious groups with 5 allies. This implies that religious groups with at least 10 allies
are over twice as productive as those with no allies (a 133% boost in fatality rate). On the other hand,
my results suggest that secular groups experience negative returns to cooperation beyond 5 allies. The
implication of this study is that the optimal network size for secular groups is smaller than for religious
groups. The results also suggest different policy prescriptions for each type of organization. Because
religious organizations are shown to derive greater benefits from networks than secular organizations,
policy makers may wish to focus on crippling religious networks as well as try to undermine the ability
(i.e., raise the costs) of religious groups to form alliances.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 A Club Theory of Terrorism
The argument I put forth in this study, that the benefits of intergroup alliances are heterogeneous by
ideology type, is built upon the club theory of terrorism. Building off of Iannaccone (1992)’s and Berman
(2000)’s theory of religious clubs Iannaccone and Berman (2005), Berman and Laitin (2008), Berman
(2009) argue that militant religious clubs efficiently mitigate free-rider costs and defection concerns by
deploying devices that screen out low-commitment members. These screening techniques, referred to as
sacrifice and stigma Iannaccone (1992) or commitment inducement technologies (Raynold (2018)), raise
the costs of club membership sufficiently high so that low commitment individuals will not choose to
join.
Sacrifice and stigma techniques take the form of costly prohibitions, stigmatizing behavioral require-
ments, or required sacrifices. Restrictions on diet, distinctive clothing, sabbath laws, and regulations on
socializing with non-members are examples of seemingly gratuitous or “extremist" sacrifices required
by religious clubs that in practice raise the opportunity costs of membership and hence help solve free-
rider problems (Iannaccone (1992)). Both in the context of nonviolent conservative religious communities
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(such as the Amish and Ultra-Orthodox Jews) and in the context of militant religious terrorism, sacrifice
and stigma is designed to distort the incentives of members by reducing their outside options, thus serving
as barriers to membership ensuring that only committed and trustworthy individuals are admitted. For
militant religious groups, the sacrifices signal to the leadership that its members are trustworthy, giving
the group a comparative advantage in the joint production of political violence because it can undertake
logistically complex missions with minimal risk of defection.2
Clubs may also induce commitment through the provision of local social services which provides an
incentive to members not to defect. Terror groups such as Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Muqtada al-
Sadr’s Mahdi Army have proven to be proficient suppliers of local public goods in areas with weak central
government authority (Berman and Laitin (2008)). Public goods provision by a terror group functions as
a substitute for non-sect consumption and improves its credibility by signaling its competence. Most im-
portantly, as a complementary technology to sacrifice and stigma it induces commitment and mitigates
defection risks, giving a group a comparative advantage in producing violence (Iannaccone and Berman
(2005). Using data on terrorist activity in Israel in Lebanon between 1968 and 2006, Berman and Laitin
(2008) test the hypothesis that a religious extremist group is a more effective and efficient producer of
terrorism when the group provides local public goods, finding that the two social service providing orga-
nizations, Hamas and Hezbollah, are far more lethal than all the other terror groups operating in Israel
which do not offer social services (including Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine, Fatah, and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Morales et al. (2018) use
country-level data to estimate the effect of sacrifice and stigma and social service provision on the inci-
dence of terrorism using cross-sectional data, finding robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that
the deployment by terror groups of these commitment inducement devices increases the frequency and
lethality of terror attacks. Ray (2019) tests the same hypothesis using a panel dataset containing all docu-
mented incidents of terror attacks from 2007-2013 at the state-year level, finding that sacrifice and stigma
has a statistically significant impact on both the incidence of overall terror attacks and the incidence of
suicide terrorism in particular, while social service provision only has a significant effect on suicide ter-
rorism.3
2The costs associated with defection extend beyond the immediate threat that the defector will hand over secret information
to authorities. Defections also reinforce doubt in the minds of existing members of the worthiness of commitment to the group
itself, thereby leading to a lowering of the maximum amount of utility that members are willing to forgo to remain in the group. A
reduction in the average level of commitment within the group then follows, implying increased easy-riding and further reductions
in average commitment levels (Raynold (2018)).
3This latter result is striking because it validates one of the most compelling predictions made by Berman and Laitin (2008),
namely that terror groups have a comparative advantage in sending operatives on risky suicide missions when they provide social
services that create incentives mitigating defection.
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Raynold (2018) notes that just as for religious terror groups, defection poses an equally existential
threat for non-religious terrorist groups, who deploy their own commitment inducement technologies to
mitigate the risk. While sacrifice and stigma technologies are therefore essential inputs into the produc-
tion of violence for both religious and secular organizations, Raynold contends that religious groups have
a comparative advantage in commitment enhancement because of their ability to promise non-falsifiable,
supernatural rewards in return for commitment. This implies that to an extent, religious extremism ought
to be viewed as a distinct category of terrorism from secular extremism.
Adopting the intermediation framework developed by Raynold (2013), which holds that due the su-
pernatural motive for religiosity, religious sects ought to be modeled as faith intermediaries rather than
clubs, Raynold (2018) argues that religious terror groups have a fundamental advantage over their secu-
lar counterparts in inducing commitment from members.4 Aware that its adherents are motivated not by
secular rewards but by supernatural rewards that cannot be verified, leaders of religious sects have greater
flexibility to adjust the incentive structure within the group to align with its current preferences. Affilia-
tion to a religious sect is therefore ultimately based on trust without verification, an idea that has been
referred to as a “meta-credence good" (Ekelund Jr et al. (2006)). Non-religious terror groups, on the other
hand, do face a verifiability constraint, because members are generally able to independently evaluate the
credibility of the secular rewards promised by the leadership, thus limiting the magnitude and scope of
promises that the leadership is plausibly able to make. As such, the commitment enhancement technolo-
gies utilized by religious groups to motivate commitment will tend to be more potent than those utilized
by secular groups, leading to greater success in assembling coalitions of highly committed operatives.
There is empirical evidence to support this observation that religious groups consist of higher qual-
ity members than secular groups. Berman (2009) finds that between 1968 and 2007, religious groups
designated as terror organizations by the US State Department perpetuated 1,855 attacks that killed 9,689
people, a rate of 5.2 fatalities per attack. During this same time period, secular groups conducted 2,077
attacks, killing 2,668 people, a fatality rate of 1.3.5
Additionally, Berman and Laitin (2008) observe that between 1968 and 2006, Hamas and Hezbollah,
two organizations notable for social service provision, averaged 5.4 fatalities per attack from 1968-2006.
During this time period all other Palestinian groups, none of which are social service providers, averaged
4What makes a religious denomination a faith intermediary is the fact that the production of supernatural hope is its primary
motive.
5These statistics are quoted in Raynold (2018).
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only 2.3 fatalities per attack.6 During the time period Hamas and Hezbollah also conducted more suicide
attacks (63 and 44, respectively), and had an average fatality rate for these attacks (7.2 and 17.3, respec-
tively), than the other groups. Of the other groups, the PIJ conducted 37 suicide attacks, with a fatality
rate of 4.0. Berman and Laitin (2008) and Raynold (2018) attribute this relative efficiency of Hamas and
Hezbollah to its ability to ensure high levels of average member commitment.
1.2.2 Why Terrorist Groups Form Alliances
The reason terror organizations form alliances is in order to take advantage of scale economies with-
out assuming the vulnerabilities of scale. Accessing scale effects is generally costly for groups given their
clandestine nature and the risk of exposure to counterterrorism forces that scaling in size would im-
ply. Unlike a regular military that can efficiently expand the scope of its operations through a horizontal
‘merger’ between two infantry divisions, or a vertical ‘merger’ between, for example, an intelligence unit
and a combat unit, similar consolidations would undo the comparative advantage of a terrorist group
because of the increased exposure to counterterrorism forces that this would necessarily imply. Previous
scholarship has noted many potential benefits to cooperation, including improving group lethality (Asal
and Rethemeyer (2008), Horowitz and Potter (2014)) and longevity (Phillips (2014), Acosta (2016a)).
Organizations cooperate in ways such as conducting joint attacks (Karmon (2005)), exchanging tac-
tical and technological information and weaponry (Asal and Rethemeyer (2008); Horowitz (2010); Asal et
al. (2012); Phillips (2014); Horowitz and Potter (2014)), receiving funding, and sharing training grounds
(Horowitz and Potter (2014)). Sageman (2004) highlights role that networks play in success of global Salafi
jihad. Acosta and Childs (2013) emphasize the significance of terror networks in spreading influence
and perpetuating the phenomenon of suicide attacks, explaining that the quality of a group’s network
increases with the number of connections and relationships it has to other terror organizations, so that
the more connections a group has, the more successful it is at spreading its ideology to like-minded orga-
nizations and overcoming collective action problems.
6The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a group that shares the same theology of Hamas, averaged 2.9 fatalities per attack. The
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (a secular, socialist organization) averaged 2.8 fatalities per attack. Fatah/Palestine
Liberation Organization (secular group) averaged 2.7, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (secular, socialist
group) averaged 1.0.
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1.2.3 How Ideology Affects Alliances
Scholarly research has noted that cooperation tends to occur between ideologically-similar group
(Acosta and Childs (2013)), especially if the partners are both Islamic (Asal et al. (2011). Acosta and Childs
(2013) contend that the single most important characteristic that determines the ‘network expansion’ abil-
ities of a terrorist is ideological congruence within an existing network. But the mere fact that alliances are
established along ideological lines warrants a more refined explanation, because the precise mechanism
by which ideology influences alliance formation is not self-evident. One possible mechanism is that two
ideologically-congruent organizations that share a political objective cooperate in order to pursue that
objective by joining forces. Alternatively, two organizations may not necessarily care about the aspira-
tions or ideology of the other, but cooperate simply to take advantage of mutual gains from trade. For the
purpose of my model, I assume the latter, that cooperation occurs to exploit mutual gains from trade, and
hence I remain agnostic concerning the extent to which cooperation transpires on the basis of a shared
objective.
The theoretical framework described in Section 1.2.1 suggests that the ideology of a group sends a
signal to others regarding its quality. In other words, ideology functions as a proxy for ally quality. Based
on Equation ??, because a religious group is able to screen out low commitment and ineffective mem-
bers more efficiently than a secular group, it can be expected to be a higher quality ally, meaning that
conditional on a given level of investment in alliance-formation, religious groups are more valuable part-
ners than their secular counterparts. What this implies is that religious groups will be: 1) more effective
overall; 2) more effective as allies; and 3) more inclined to invest in alliance-formation as a way of taking
advantage of scale economies.
Testable hypothesis: Religious groups receive greater benefits from alliances than do secular groups.
1.2.4 al-Qaeda and the Global Salafi Jihad
An example of a sectarian movement that has spawned groups which have succeeded in exploit-
ing networks to great effect is modern radical Islamism. Islamic-based terrorism can take many forms,
but generally falls into one of two categories. The first is a localized form of jihad that typically targets a
foreign occupation in Muslims lands or a secular Muslim ruler. Examples of these straightforward, local-
ized jihads include: the jihad in the 1980s against Russian intervention in Afghanistan; the Bosnian jihad
from 1992-1995; the struggle for the liberation of Palestine; and jihads for the liberations of Kashmir and
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Chechnya, respectively. While all of these conflicts are religious wars, they are not global in scope and
many of the grievances expressed by the militants (e.g., persecution against minority groups, disputes
over territory) are similar to those expressed by secular militants engaged in insurgency against a state.
This type of localized jihadism–a religious war directed against a near enemy–must be contrasted
with the global brand of jihad that is associated with al-Qaeda. The global Salafi jihad–a struggle that
seeks not the simple overthrow of a single state enemy, but the total destruction of Western civilization as
a whole–was popularized by al-Qaeda no earlier than the late 1990s.7 Taking its roots from the ideology
of the Salafist movement, an ultra-conservative Sunni reform movement that developed on the Arabian
Peninsula in the 18th century, al-Qaeda’s basic motivation is to expel Western presence and influence
from the Muslim world, overthrow “apostate" regimes in Muslim countries, and to establish a worldwide
Islamic caliphate based on its own interpretation of sharia law (Rollins (2011)). 8
The spiritual founder of the militant Salafi jihad was Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), a leading member
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. An Egyptian, he insisted on the violent
overthrow of the secular Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. While Qutb had spent two years
in the United States from 1948-1950 and despised the West, he had no interest in waging war against it.
His goal was simply to wage war against the “near enemy," the apostate government in his own country
(Sageman (2004), 8-14).9
While Qutb’s direct influence was only on the Egyptian Islamic Salafi groups fighting the “near en-
emy" (the secular government in Cairo), his influence extended as well to the global jihad movement
through his student, the co-founder and current leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri al-Zawahiri is the
link between Qutb’s ideology of jihad against the “near enemy" and al-Qaeda’s ideology of jihad against
the “far enemy," the United States and Western civilization as a whole. An Egyptian, al-Zawahiri joined the
Muslim Brotherhood as a youth, and in the 1980s became the leader of the terror group “Egyptian Islamic
7In fact, the development of global Islamism initially highly controversial among many even within the militant Muslim revivalist
movements (Sageman (2004), 44-45).
8As an imperfect but convenient parallel, the essence of the Salafi Islamic revivalist movement may be compared to the 16th
century Protestant Reformation within Christianity. Like the Protestant reformers’ accusations against the Catholic Church, the
Salafists reject what they consider to be innovations that crept into the Muslim faith over the past 1,400 years and which, in their
view, oppose clear Quranic teachings. The Salafists promote an autodidact approach to the Quran and hadith and a return to the
purer teachings of the “forefathers" (the salaf). This entails a wholesale rejection of the centuries-old Islamic religious establishment
and a more literal, less compromising, and stricter interpretation of the Quran, similar to the way in which the Protestant reformers
advocated a Christianity that derived from Scripture alone without the novelties which they believed had developed within the
medieval Church. While all adherents to Salafism take a fundamentalist approach to Islam, not all Salafists support armed jihad.
9Qutb’s influence spread throughout Salafi groups in his country, and his disciples strategized on how to effectively implement
his vision of establishing an Islamic government in Egypt. In 1966, he was convicted of conspiracy to assassinate President Nasser
and was executed by hanging. Qutb’s influence cannot be understated; for example, it was one of his student’s, Muhammad Abd
al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982), who was the head of the Tanzim al-Jihad terror cell which assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981
(Sageman (2004), 15).
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Jihad" (EIJ) (Sageman (2004), 26). In the mid-1980s al-Zawahiri went to Afghanistan to fight alongside the
mujahideen against the Soviets, and it was in Afghanistan that he became close with Osama bin Laden,
the chief fundraiser for the jihad in Afghanistan (Sageman (2004), 35). Both men shared a vision for ex-
panding the notion of jihad and the “globilization" of martyrdom operations beyond that of a simple war
waged against a foreign occupying power or an apostate Muslim government (Moghaddam (2009)).10
Following the end of the Afghan war, al-Qaeda moved its headquarters to the Sudan. From the Sudan
the seeds of what would become a global network of terror operations began to take shape. Al Qaeda
had training camps in the Sudan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Yemen, and the Philippines, and was expanding
the network of its alliances (Sageman (2004), 44). For example, al Qaeda established relations with the
Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), which was led by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.11 The association with the
EIG was to prove consequential by linking bin Laden with jihadi Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who a decade
later would be the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks.
This historical narrative is relevant to this study because it reveals the incentives facing a terror move-
ment that is globally oriented. With transnational political goals that often involve waging war on mul-
tiple continents simultaneously, a Salafi jihadi group is able to most efficiently obtain scale benefits not
through horizontal or vertical merging with other groups, but rather through a decentralized global net-
work of alliances. Changes in the costs and benefits of two factors in particular encouraged al-Qaeda to
adopt decentralization as its guiding operational principle. First, heightened pressure from counterter-
rorism authorities, especially following 9/11, increased the costs to al-Qaeda of expanding its operations
in the manner of a regular army. For example, in the 1990s, prior to 9/11, it was common for bin Laden to
send his own operatives to various Muslim countries to assist and direct local Islamist groups (Zimmer-
man (2013)). This type of direct meddling became increasingly impractical for al-Qaeda as time went on,
and consequently it adopted a policy of exerting influence in local affairs by forming working relation-
ships with small, autonomous local groups.12
Second, the invention of the Internet gave al-Qaeda a platform by which it could, with low cost and
10See also Hoffman (2004) and Horowitz (2015).
11The EIG formed during a split within the ranks of the Egyptian Salafists after the assassination of Sadat: the Salafist faction
stationed in Cairo went on to establish itself as the EIJ, while the network centered in Upper Egypt became the EIG.
12Testifying in a hearing on the Worldwide Threat in 2000 before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February, 2000,
then-director of the CIA George Tenet remarked that “[al-Qaeda] and other terrorist groups are placing increased emphasis on de-
veloping surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection". In a 2004 testimony, before the Senate Select Committee,
Tenet warned of the growing threat posed by “small local groups, with limited domestic agendas, that work with international ter-
rorist groups in their own countries. These far-flung groups increasingly set the agenda, and are redefining the threat we face. They
are not all creatures of bin Laden, and so their fate is not tied to his. They have autonomous leadership, they pick their own targets,
they plan their own attacks. [al Qaeda] is a learning organization," and facing heightened counterterrorism pressure has induced it
to “transform the organization into a loose collection of regional networks that operate more autonomously" (Zimmerman (2013)).
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without the need for normal expansion, exert global influence and coordinate the activities of affiliates.13
In response to changes in these two constraints, al-Qaeda embraced a policy of contracting horizontally
with a worldwide network of dispersed cells, making decentralized networks a viable substitute for group
size.
Zimmerman (2013) details how the resilient, adaptive, and complex structure within which social
ties and informal, personal relationships between individuals across different groups strengthen the al-
Qaeda-centered network. Such informal human networks include relationships built in mosques and
madrasas (religious schools). These horizontal personal relationships, sustained by a sense of shared
experience and a shared worldview based on the ideology of Islamism, produce social capital which in
turn facilitates cooperation between loosely affiliated organizations within the decentralized network,
as well as between militants and non-violent ideological sympathizers.14 What my framework suggests is
that this cooperation occurs not because these affiliates necessarily have identical strategic objectives, but
rather because the ideology of Islamism, selected at the organizational level by various groups as a guiding
principle to both optimize commitment among members and lay out an agenda of organized political
violence, has the secondary advantage of generating social network externalities that allows disparate
groups to access scale benefits through mutual gains from exchange.
1.3 Research Design
1.3.1 Data
I test my hypothesis on a panel dataset containing detailed information on 255 terrorist groups that
existed at any time between the years 1970 and 2014. Titled the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations
Dataset (REVMOD), the data were compiled by Acosta (2016a).15 Tracking each group’s attributes over
13al-Qaeda was a pioneer in the use of social media by a terrorist group to pursue its goals. In a 2007 speech quoting Singaporean
diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates asked “How has one man (Osama bin Laden) in a cave man-
aged to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication society?" (Al-’Ubaydi et al., 2014)
14Over time the organization developed a sophisticated, self-sustaining business enterprise that no longer relied on the vast per-
sonal fortune bin Laden himself, but instead on diversified investments and numerous funding streams, most of which derive from
benign sources. Since 2004 the primary method of financing for the organization was through donations from sympathizers and
Islamic charities (Gandel (2011)). According to the 9/11 Commission,
[B]y 2004, al Qaeda financed itself by raising money from “witting and unwitting donors, mosques and sympa-
thetic imams, and nongovernment organizations such as charities," says the report. Intelligence reports reveal a
financial web that is nearly impossible to track, as the money is distributed as fast as it is raised by a network of couri-
ers. Each strand in the web is taken down and distributed as fast as it is woven. There is no war chest to discover and
no bank from which al-Qaeda draws funds (Benner (2011)).
15Acosta provides a detailed codebook accompanying the dataset, in which he defines each variable and notes the sources he
referenced in constructing each (Acosta (2016b)).
12
time, the unit of analysis is terror organization i in time t . The quantitative attributes tracked include
attacks, suicide attacks, inflicted casualties, suicide attacks, network ties, age, state sponsors and safe
havens.16 Each of these variables was constructed by cross-referencing numerous sources, such as the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (Database (2016)), RAND Corporation’s Database of World Terrorism Incidents (DWTI), and Na-
tional Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), among others. Table 1.1 provides summary statistics and shows
that over the entire sample, the mean number of inflicted casualties per year is 30.76, and the mean num-
ber of attacks per year is 10.16.
I test my hypotheses by comparing the relative productivity of religious and secular groups. Ideol-
ogy classifications are provided for each terror organization in my dataset. These ideology types include
Islamic, Ethnonationalist, Leftist, Right-wing, and Anarchist. These classifications are not mutually exclu-
sive; each ideology may potentially be compounded with a second ideology for a single group.17 Summary
statistics for all of the variables used in this study can be found in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Based on the definitions supplied Acosta (2016b), a group is considered Islamist if it subscribes to a
variant of political Islam. Ethnonationalism refers to groups pursuing an agenda involving secession, au-
tonomy, or the liberation of a specific identity group currently ruled by a different identity group. Leftism
is defined as subscribing to an ideology such as Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, or radical environmental-
ism. Anarchism is defined as seeking the collapse of a given political system, and right-wing denotes
groups that are ultranationalist, conservative, or seeking to preserve the status quo. In my analysis, I con-
sider a group to be religious if it subscribes to a form of political Islam. I also designate to be religious
groups that have both Islamist and ethnonationalist elements. My sample of secular groups therefore
consists of groups that are Leftist and ethnonationalist (excluding groups that are both Islamist and eth-
nonationalist).
1.3.2 Measures of Alliances
The most important explanatory variable used in my empirical analysis is the variable (network
size)i ,t−1 , which is a count variable denoting, for each group i in time t , the number of direct network
connections (allies) it maintains with other non-state organizations. Acosta (2016a) defines a tie as a “de-
16State sponsorship is defined as the intentional assistance–material or diplomatic–to a militant organization by a state. A note-
worthy example of state sponsorship of terror is the government of Iran, which sponsors both Hezbollah and Hamas.
17Only one group in the dataset, the ‘Eritrean Liberation Front’, is classified as holding three ideologies, Islamist, ethnonationalist,
and Leftist.
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clared formal alliance, affiliation, or partnership between two organizations." Other forms of documented
collaboration, like co-sponsored attacks and sharing a training camp, also demonstrate a network tie,
which is thus identified as a ‘conduit’ that link together two or more groups.18 A list of the organizations
with the highest number of mean ties over the entire sample is displayed, along with the associated ide-
ological affiliation for each, in Table 1.3. Ties ranges from 0 to 39, with an average of 2.81 and standard
deviation of 3.41. al-Qaeda is by far the most well-connected group, followed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,
and then Taliban. In its first year of existence, 1988, al-Qaeda had seven ties, with groups such as Haqqani
Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Its network connections increased each
subsequent year, so that by 1995 it had 20 established ties and reached its pinnacle in 2008 when it had
39 ties. Table 1.2 displays summary statistics for the allies variable, broken down by ideology type. His-
tograms showing the mean level of logged ties over the period 1970-2014 across all terrorist groups is
displayed in Figure 1.1.19 Figure 1.2 shows histograms of the mean level of ties broken down by the three
broad ideology types, and in Figure 1.3 I show histograms of ties for each specific ideology. Figure 1.4 then
shows the trend of alliances over time, separated by general ideology type (religious vs. secular).20
Of the general, overlapping categories, Islamists average the highest amount of yearly ties main-
tained at 3.92, followed by ethnonationalists and Leftists, with 3.21 and 2.60, respectively. However, when
al-Qaeda is removed from the sample, the mean level of ties for Islamists drops by almost 10%. Further,
the sub-category of Religious-ethno (those organizations which have both Islamist and ethnonationalist
motivations) averages about 16% more alliances than the Pure Islamist type even with al-Qaeda included
in the sample, and 38% when it is not included.
As opposed to a simple enumeration of allies, the concept of eigenvector centrality describes the
“quality" of the ties. Eigenvector centrality captures how well-connected a node’s connections are, so
that being connected to “popular" friends gives one a higher score than being connected to unpopular
friends. I anticipate that the costs of achieving economies of scale through cooperation decrease as more
consequential allies are obtained because connections to important actors in a network should permit
higher-quality information and resources to diffuse through the cooperative relationships. Previous stud-
18The sources which Acosta (2016b) referenced to construct this variable include: Alexander and Swetnam (2001); Byman (2005);
Gunaratna (2003); Hoffman (2006); Jones and Libicki (2008); Karmon (2005); Kushner (2003); Memorial Institute for the Prevention
of Terrorism (MIPT); Radu and Tismaneanu (1990); Salehyan et al. (2011); The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG);
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); Vice President’s Task Force on
Combating Terrorism (1988).
19In each histogram of allies, I use the log transformed value of this variable. I perform the transformation log(allies + 1) so that no
zeros are dropped. This transformed variable can be understood as a group’s network size, since every network must have at least
one node in it.
20I remove al-Qaeda, an extreme outlier, from the sample.
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ies have examined eigenvector centrality in the context of the productivity of terror groups. Horowitz and
Potter (2014) find that groups with higher quality allies are more lethal than groups with lower-quality
allies, but Phillips (2014) finds that the number of a group’s allies is more important to its longevity than
the quality of those allies.
While the dataset I employ for this study does not contain eigenvector centrality scores for each
group-year observation, it does provide a list of a group’s known allies for each year, and for each group-
year observation I compute an eigenvector centrality score.21. In Table 1.2 I present the respective mean
levels of this variable for each ideology type. This variable ranges from 0 to 0.612, with a mean of 0.03 and
a median value of 0.
I also generate diagrams of the global terrorism network, for each decade starting in 1970, shown
in Figures 1.6-1.11. The nodes displayed in the diagrams represent each terrorist group contained in my
dataset, and links between them denote network connections. 22 In the figures the size of each node
corresponds to its relative eigenvector centrality value. A key takeaway from these figures is how the rel-
ative influence of the main clusters fluctuates over time. In 2000, the Palestinian cluster was the most
substantial.23 The influence of the main Islamist cluster, centered around al-Qaeda, was minuscule in
comparison, but subsequently became the most dominant. Explained in Section 1.2.4, the natural eco-
nomic story that can be inferred from this is that counterterrorism pressure following 9/11 incentivized
al-Qaeda to embrace a strategy of expansion through decentralized networks of alliances rather than ex-
pansion through group size, hence accessing scale benefits without taking on the usual vulnerability of
scale through size.
1.3.3 Empirical Strategy
To test my hypotheses I estimate the benefits received from alliances for both religious and secular
terrorist groups using a panel dataset for the 1970-2014 period. I specifically consider whether it is the
first alliance that a group forms that is most consequential in increasing operational capacity, or whether
the effect of alliances varies depending on the level of alliances. This reflects the distinction between
whether to ally and how much to ally at the orgnaizational level, referred to as the extensive margin and
intensive margin, respectively. To this end, I run two sets of regressions. To test the effect of alliances at
21I compute these scores using the social network analysis software package UCINET (Borgatti et al. (2002))
22I include in the diagram only those groups who maintained at least one tie in the respective years; I therefore remove all “iso-
lates."
23The main actors among the Palestinians include the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Fatah, Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
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the extensive margin, I first utilize as my measure of alliances a simple indicator variable that takes a value
of 1 if a group has at least one ally in a given year, and 0 otherwise. To test for the effect at the intensive
margin, I include the count variable allies as an explanatory variable. To allow for a heterogeneous effect
of this variable (for example, diminishing marginal returns) I include a quadratic term, allies2.
I use as my primary outcome variable a measures of a group’s ‘productivity’:
fatalitiesi t
attacksi t
, that is, the
average number of fatalities inflicted by group i per attack, for each year t . This can be thought of as a
group’s “fatality rate" (Berman and Laitin (2008); Berman (2009)), and corrects for skewness in the overall
number of yearly fatalities that may result if a single attack inflicts a particularly large number of fatalities
(Horowitz and Potter (2014)).24 Henceforth I refer to this variable as (fatality rate)i t . In addition, I also
employ two other outcome variables: the number of yearly suicide attacks conducted by group i in year
t ; and, finally, the longevity of a group. Figure 1.5 displays the fatality rate trend over time, separated by
general ideology type. The slope of the religious fatality rate trend is greater than the slope of the secular
fatality rate trend, an interesting observation suggesting that religious groups have become relatively more
effective over time.25
In my regression analysis, I separate terrorist groups into two categories: religious and secular. Based
on the ideological classifications supplied by the author of my data (Acosta (2016a)), I denote as ‘religious’
all organizations that subscribe to a variant of political Islam. In this category I include both organizations
that are solely Islamist, and those whose Islamism is compounded with an ethnonationalist ideology as
well. Ethnonationalist and Leftist groups are the two main types of secular organizations.26 I explic-
itly include the religious indicator in my regressions, and leave out the secular category, which therefore
functions as the omitted ideology category.
To examine the effect of cooperation at the extensive margin (the participation decision) I estimate
yi t =β0+β1alliesi ,t−1
1/0
+β2religiousi +θXi ,t−1+δt +²i t , (1.1)
where alliesi ,t−1
1/0
is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if group i has at least one ally in year
24Horowitz and Potter (2014) refers to this measure as a terrorist group’s “efficiency."
25I remove the year 2001 from the sample, as this year’s fatality rate for the religious type is extraordinarily high due to the 9/11
attacks.
26Because I count groups that are both Islamist anad ethnonationalist under the religious category, only groups which are solely
ethnonationalist are placed in the secular category.
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t , and 0 otherwise. To examine the effect of cooperation at the intensive margin I estimate
yi t =β0+β1(network size)i ,t−1+β2religiousi +β3(network size)2i ,t−1+
+β4(eigenvector centrality)i ,t−1+β5(eigenvector centrality)2i ,t−1+θXi ,t−1+δt +²i t ,
(1.2)
where alliesi ,t−1 is a measure of the number of networks ties group i maintains in time t − 1, and
allies2i ,t−1 is a quadratic term that allows for a non-linear relationship between alliances and the outcome
variable. As an additional measure of cooperation,I also include linear and quadratic terms for the vari-
able eigenvector centrality, signifying how well connected a group’s allies are. In these equations, yi t is one
of the three outcome variables, (fatality rate)i t , (suicide attacks)i t , or longevity. religiousi is an indicator
variable denoting whether a group has a religious ideology. δt is a year fixed effect.
A omitted variable that is likely correlated with both the outcome variable yi t and the regressor al-
liesi ,t−1 is funding. Failing to account for this variable would therefore lead to a biased and inconsistent
estimator. Yearly measures of the funding obtained by the groups in my sample are obviously not avail-
able. My dataset does contain two variables which, I argue, can be viewed as potential proxies for funding.
Xi ,t−1 is vector of these two control variables, the number of state sponsors and the number of safe havens
for group i in time t −1. state sponsors marks the number of state sponsors that a group maintains. Pre-
vious literature has noted the strong connection between state sponsorship and a group’s funding (Carter
(2012); Asal et al. (2011); Phillips (2018)). Safe havens denotes the number of official harbors that state
sponsors offer, or the “unsanctioned sanctuary that many organizations enjoy in failed states and other
‘lawless’ regions" (Acosta (2016b)).This is another potential proxy for funding, as territory offers access to
exploitable resources.27
Another way that I attempt to address endogeneity concerns is to include an ideology dummy vari-
able, religiousi , that functions as a fixed effect controlling for all time-invariant trends between the ideol-
ogy types. A pertinent piece of information absent from my dataset, which this ideology dummy variable
may address to a limited extent, is a measure for group size. I am unable to directly control for group
size, however, because reliable yearly data on membership totals for covert militant groups simply do not
27Perhaps the most well-known case of a terrorist group exploiting its controlled territory for financial gain is Islamic State, which
at its peak in late 2014 controlled more than 100,000 km2 containing more than 11 million people (Jones et al. (2017)). The group
obtained considerable financial resources from these holdings, especially from selling oil (Piven (2014); Barrett (2014); Laub (2016);
Jones et al. (2017)), taxation (Jones et al. (2017)), extortion ( FATF Report (2015); Jones et al. (2017)), kidnapping for ransom (Cohen
(2014); FATF Report (2015)), and seizing bank holdings (Al-’Ubaydi et al. (2014); Force (2015)).
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exist.28
In order to test my main hypothesis, namely whether there is a heterogeneous effect of allies between
religious and secular terrorist groups, I next run an interaction model where the parameters of interest
are the respective coefficients on the interaction between the measures of cooperation and the religious
ideology indicator. At the extensive margin, I estimate
yi t =β0+β1alliesi ,t−1
1/0
+β2religiousi +α1(alliesi ,t−1
1/0
× religiousi )+θXi ,t−1+δt +²i t . (1.3)
In this equation, parameter α1 signifies the potential heterogeneous effect that ideology has on ben-
efits from cooperation at the extensive margin. At the intensive margin I then estimate
yi t =β0+β1(network size)i ,t−1+β2religiousi +β3(network size)2i ,t−1+β4(eigenvector centrality)i ,t−1+
+β5(eigenvector centrality)2i ,t−1+α1((network size)i ,t−1× religiousi )+α2((network size)2i ,t−1× religiousi )+
+α3((eigenvector centrality)i ,t−1× religiousi )+α4((eigenvector centrality)2i ,t−1× religiousi )
+θXi ,t−1+δt +²i t .
(1.4)
In this equation, parameters α1, α2, α3, and α4 signify potential heterogeneous effects that ideology
has on benefits from cooperation at the intensive margin.
The outcome variable (suicide attacks)i t is an event count, and hence a count model is a more suit-
able estimation technique to use than OLS when estimating those outcomes. Because I have panel data
and would like to control for time trends, I employ a Poisson regression; this estimator does not suffer from
the incidental parameters problem that may result from the inclusion of fixed effects, and hence provides
consistent estimates, unlike a negative binomial regression (Greene (2004), Cameron and Trivedi (2013)).
The outcome variable (fatality rate)i t is not an event count; for these regressions, I use OLS with the three
28In their study concerning the reasons why terror groups for alliances, Asal et al. (2011) collect cross-sectional data on group size
for the period 1998-2005. Their main data source was a now-defunct online portal called the “MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base"
that contained group-level information on 499 groups. While the group-level data contained on MIPT are now reportedly presented
on Database (2016), I am unable to confirm whether the data collected by Asal et al. (2011) is equivalent to those currently found
on the Global Terrorism Database. Asal et al. (2011) admit that they were only able to collect reliable information on group size for
a limited number of groups from MIPT, and for the observations with missing size data–over half of all organizations–resorted to
asking a panel of experts to provide a best size estimate based on a series of intervals. And even after this, the authors confess that
for 77 of the organizations they had only “low-confidence" size data.
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levels of fixed effects defined above. In each of the regressions I cluster the standard errors by terrorist
group.
A militant organization’s duration or longevity is a noted proxy for its durability (Carter (2012), Phillips
(2014).) The approach that I take to test for the effect of ties on longevity is a survival analysis using a Cox
proportional hazards model. This is a common method for modeling failure when the covariates vary
over time, as is the case with my data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), Acosta (2016a)). This model
assumes that the hazard ratios are constant over time. Diagnostic tests on my data suggest that this as-
sumption does hold.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 The Extensive Margin of Cooperation
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present results of the estimation of Equations 1.1 and 1.3 for the extensive margin
of alliance-formation (this is the participation decision of how engaging in intergroup cooperation affects
a group’s productivity, irrespective of how many actual alliances were formed). Hence, the key explanatory
variable is alliesi ,t−1
1/0
, denoting whether or not a group has any allies in a given year. To allay concerns of
reverse causality, I include a one-year lag on on this variable. The dependent variable in both model in
Table 2.3 is the logged value of (fatality rate)i t , which I define as fatalities per attack and should be seen
as a measure of overall efficiency.29
In model (1) of this table, I include only the basic explanatory variables without an interaction term
(corresponding to Equation 1.1). This column suggests that having at least one ally is expected to increase
a group’s fatality rate by about 63% (p < 0.1). The parameter estimate of 1.025 for Religiousi indicates that
irrespective of alliances, religious groups are over twice as productive in their attacks as secular groups
(p < 0.01). Additionally, the statistically significant estimate for state sponsors points to the operational
benefits that terror groups may receive when they have a governmental patron.
Corresponding to Equation 1.3, in model (2) I then add an interaction between Religious and alliesi ,t−1
1/0
in order to test for heterogeneous effects of cooperation by ideology type. In model (2), the parameter
estimate for the variable alliesi ,t−1
1/0
identifies the effect of alliances for the base ideology type (secular),
implying that a secular group is expected to obtain a 52.3% increase in its fatality rate when it has at least
one ally. The estimated effect for the religious type is found by adding the estimate for the base type plus
29I only include in these regressions observations where at least one violent attack was committed.
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the estimate on the interaction term alliesi ,t−1
1/0
× Religiousi , meaning a religious group is expected to im-
prove its fatality rate by 0.523+0.840=1.363, that is, it is predicted to increase its fatalities to attacks ratio
by about 136% when it has at least one ally.
I find little evidence of alliance effects of Column (2). The statistically insignificant estimate on
alliesi ,t−1
1/0
means that the hypothesis cannot be rejected that having at least one alliance has no effect on
group lethality. Additionally, while the estimate on the interaction term indicates that the religious type
is expected to obtain a greater benefit from alliances, a Wald test comparing the effects for each ideology
type reveals that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects are equal to one another.30
Table 2.4 reports Poisson regressions for the output variable suicide attacks. Figure 1.12 displays pre-
dictive margins based on the estimates from the interaction model in Column (2), showing that religious
groups increase their output of suicide attacks to 3.42 when they have allies, compared to an output of 0.76
without allies, a sizable effect of 2.67 suicide attacks per year (p < 0.01). The effect of alliances on suicide
attacks for secular groups, on the other hand, is negative but statistically zero. A post-estimation Wald
test indicates that we can reject the hypothesis, with 99% confidence, of no difference in these respective
predictive effects between ideology types.
I next conduct survivor analysis to test the effect of cooperation on the longevity of terrorist groups.
Figure 1.16 presents the survival function based on a fitted Cox proportional hazards model (regression
output not shown). The survivor function gives the probability of survival beyond a specified time. I
plot the survival trends for four groups: 1) religious organizations that have at least one ally, 2) religious
organizations that have zero allies, 3) secular organizations that have at least one ally, and 4) secular orga-
nizations that do not have allies. Alliances are shown to benefit religious groups significantly more than
secular ones. While the probability of survival for a 10-year old religious group with zero allies is about
55%, the corresponding probability of survival for an Islamist with ties is about 80%.
1.4.2 The Intensive Margin of Cooperation
Having found limited evidence to suggest a notable benefit to religious terrorists at the extensive
margin of alliances, I now test for the importance of cooperation at the intensive margin. Table 2.5 gives
results from the estimation of Equations 1.2 and 1.4, where the outcome variable is the logged value of
(fatality rate)i t , the yearly fatalities per attack. In the complete model (Column (6)), I include the the linear
30The estimate on the interaction term alliesi ,t−1
1/0
×Religiousi therefore represents not the overall effect of alliances for the religious
type, but the effect of alliances on the religious type relative to the secular type.
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term (network size)i ,t−1 as well as te quadratic term, (network size)2i ,t−1. In addition, I include a linear
and a quadratic term, respectively, for the variable eigenvector centrality, capturing how well-connected
a groups allies are. A Wald tests suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis with 99% that the point
estimate for the effect of alliances on fatality rate for the religious type is equal to the secular type, and we
can likewise reject the hypothesis, with 90% confidence, that the effect of increased eigenvector centrality
(measuring how well connected one’s connections are) is equal for the two ideology types.
The interaction and quadratic terms in these models makes direct interpretation of the coefficients
difficult; hence, I show the salient findings from this table in Figures 1.13, 1.14 and 1.15. Figures 1.13 and
1.14 display the predictive margins and marginal values, respectively, of the effect of the count variable
(network size)i ,t−1 for both religious and secular types based on the results of the full model in Column (6),
and Figure 1.15 then shows the corresponding plot for the continuous variable (eigenvector centrality)i ,t−1.
Figures 1.13 and 1.14 show that religious groups experience consistently positive returns to addi-
tional alliances, with only a very slight diminishing marginal effect. The fatality rate for a religious group
with 5 allies is predicted to be 56% greater than a religious group with no allies. Religious groups with at
least 10 allies are shown to have a fatality rate that is 78% higher than religious groups with 5 allies. With a
fatality rate predicted to be 133% higher than a group with no allies, organizations with at least 10 allies are
more than twice as lethal as unconnected ones. On the other hand, the results suggest that secular groups
experience negative returns to cooperation beyond 5 allies. Figure 1.15 shows a similar trend when I use
the eigenvector centrality measure of cooperation, implying that religious groups are predicted to exploit
consequential relationships to a greater degree than secular groups. These results demonstrate that the
optimal network size for secular groups is significantly smaller than for religious groups.
Results from a survival analysis, testing the effect on a group’s survivability of having different levels
of alliances, are displayed in Figures 1.17 and 1.18 (regression output not shown). Similar to the results
from the survival analysis testing for the impact of cooperation at the extensive margin (Figure 1.16), at
the intensive margin religious groups are again predicted to obtain markedly greater benefits from coop-
eration than secular groups. For a religious terrorist organization that is 20 years old, the survival rate is
over 90% when it has at least 8 allies, about 85% with 6 allies, and about 70% with 4 allies. With no al-
lies, the survivability rate is only 40% for a 20 year old organization. For a 20 year old secular group, the
differential between having multiple allies versus having none is relatively small.
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1.5 Conclusion
This study sought to explain why the costs and benefits of alliance-formation are heterogeneous by
the ideology type of a terrorist group. Motivated by previous scholarship that investigates the reasoning
behind intergroup cooperation, I approach the question from an economic framework that examines
the incentives facing groups that seek to scale up their operations through networks. Due to the costly
nature of scaling up by traditional means, such as increasing membership or merging with other groups,
organizations receive the benefits of scale economies by participating in networks that facilitate trade.
These networks tend to form along ideological lines. In my theoretical framework, I identify ideology as a
technology that helps groups mitigate defection and free-rider costs. At a secondary level, however, this
technology impacts a group’s ability to form alliances with others. Consistent with my expectations, in my
empirical analysis I find that religious organizations receive greater benefits from alliances than secular
organizations.
The conclusion that can be drawn from my analysis is that religious groups care more about forming
alliances than secular ones. Hence, to the extent that counterterrorism policies are aimed at disrupting
terror networks, these policies should have the most significant impact when religious terror networks are
targeted.
Further research may proceed by investigating the possibility that ideology is endogenous to net-
works. Another project could be a study of whether the success of certain groups (like al-Qaeda) has
induced new groups to form, or to what extent groups alter their objectives following network participa-
tion.
22
Bibliography
Abadie, Alberto, “Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism,” American Economic Review, 2006,
96 (2), 50–56.
Abu-Amr, Ziad, “Hamas: a historical and political background,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 1993, 22 (4),
5–19.
Acosta, Benjamin, “From bombs to ballots: When militant organizations transition to political parties,”
The Journal of Politics, 2014, 76 (3), 666–683.
, “Dying for survival: Why militant organizations continue to conduct suicide attacks,” Journal of Peace
Research, 2016, 53 (2), 180–196.
, “Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset (REMOD) 1980-2013 Codebook,” 2016.
and Steven J Childs, “Illuminating the global suicide-attack network,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
2013, 36 (1), 49–76.
Ahronheim, Anna, “IDF Annual Report: 1,000 Rockets Fired at Israel from Gaza in 2018,” The Jerusalem
Post, Dec 2018.
Al-’Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price, “The Group That Calls Itself a
State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State,” Combating Terrorism Centre
at West Point, 2014, p. 102.
Alexander, Yonah and Michael S. Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network,
Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001.
Anderton, Charles H, John R Carter, and Others, “Principles of conflict economics,” Cambridge UP, 2009.
Asal, Victor and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The nature of the beast: Organizational structures and the lethality
of terrorist attacks,” Journal of Politics, 2008, 70 (2), 437–449.
Asal, Victor H., Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections can be toxic: Terrorist orga-
nizational factors and the pursuit of CBRN weapons,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2012, 35 (3),
229–254.
, Hyun Hee Park, R. Karl Rethemeyer, and Gary Ackerman, “With Friends Like These: Why Terrorist
Organizations Ally,” International Public Management Journal, 2011, 19 (1), 1–30.
Azam, Jean-Paul and Alexandra Delacroix, “Aid and the delegated fight against terrorism,” Review of
Development Economics, 2006, 10 (2), 330–344.
and Véronique Thelen, “The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror,” Public Choice,
2008, 135 (3-4), 375–397.
23
Barrett, Richard, The Islamic State, Soufan Group, 2014.
Basuchoudhary, Atin and William F Shughart, “On ethnic conflict and the origins of transnational ter-
rorism,” Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, 21 (1), 65–87.
Benner, Katie, “Bin Laden’s gone, but what about al Qaeda’s finances?,” may 2011.
Berman, Eli, “Sect, subsidy, and sacrifice: an economist’s view of ultra-orthodox Jews,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2000, (115.3).
, Radical, Religious and Violent 2009.
and David D Laitin, “Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model,” Journal of public
Economics, 2008, 92 (10), 1942–1967.
Blomberg, S Brock and Gregory D Hess, “The Lexus and the olive branch: Globalization, democratization
and terrorism,” 2005.
Borgatti, S.P., M.G. Everett, and L.C. Freeman, “Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analy-
sis.,” 2002.
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M and Bradford S. Jones, Event history modeling: A guide for social scientists,
New York: Cambridge University Press., 2004.
Bruno, Greg, “Inside the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),” CFR. org, October, 2007, 19.
Byman, Daniel, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005.
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi, “Count Panel Data,” The Oxford Handbook of Panel Data, 2013.
Carter, David B, “A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups,” International Organization,
2012, 66 (1), 129–151.
Center for Systemic Peace, “State Fragility Index and Matrix 2016,” 2016.
Cohen, David S, “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen,”
oct 2014.
Database, Global Terrorism, “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror-
ism (START),” 2016.
de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno, “Conciliation, commitment and counterterrorism: A formal model,” Interna-
tional Organization, 2005, 59 (1), 145–176.
Ekelund Jr, Robert B., Robert F. Hébert, and Robert D. Tollison, The market for Christianity 2006.
Enders, Walter and Paan Jindapon, “Network externalities and the structure of terror networks,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 2010, 54 (2), 262–280.
Erlanger, Steven, “Hamas Routs Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process,” The New York Times, Jan
2006.
Eubank, William and Leonard Weinberg, “Terrorism and democracy: Perpetrators and victims,” Terror-
ism and political violence, 2001, 13 (1), 155–164.
FATF Report, “Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ( ISIL ),” Tech-
nical Report February, Financial Action Task Force 2015.
24
Force, Financial Action Task, “Financing of the Terrorist Organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL),” FATF, Paris, 2015.
Freytag, Andreas, Jens J Krüger, Daniel Meierrieks, and Friedrich Schneider, “The origins of terrorism:
Cross-country estimates of socio-economic determinants of terrorism,” European Journal of Political
Economy, 2011, 27, S5–S16.
Fund for Peace, “Fragile states index 2015,” 2015.
Gaibulloev, Khusrav, James A Piazza, and Todd Sandler, “Regime types and terrorism,” International
organization, 2017, 71 (3), 491–522.
Gandel, Stephen, “Will Osama’s Death Bankrupt al-Qaeda?,” may 2011.
Greene, William, “Fixed effects and bias due to the incidental parameters problem in the tobit model,”
Econometric Reviews, 2004, 23 (2), 125–147.
Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Berkley Books, 2003.
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, In the path of Hizbullah, Syracuse University Press, 2004.
Hoffman, Bruce, “The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 2004, 27 (6), 549–560.
, Inside Terrorism, revised an ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
Horowitz, Michael C, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations : The Case of Suicide Terrorism,”
International Organization, 2010, pp. 33–64.
Horowitz, Michael C., “The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing,” Ssrn, 2015.
and Philip B.K. Potter, “Allying to Kill: Terrorist Intergroup Cooperation and the Consequences for
Lethality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2014, 58 (2).
Huntington, Samuel P, “The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order,” 1996.
Iannaccone, Laurence R, “Sacrifice and stigma: reducing free-riding in cults, communes, and other col-
lectives,” Journal of political economy, 1992, 100 (2), 271–291.
, “Why Strict Churches Are Strong Author ( s ): Laurence R . Iannaccone Source : American Journal of
Sociology , Vol . 99 , No . 5 ( Mar ., 1994 ), pp . 1180-1211 Published by : The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL : https://www.jstor.org/stable/278114,” 1994, 99 (5), 1180–1211.
and Eli Berman, “Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly,” Public choice, 2005,
pp. 109–129.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas,” August
18, 1988.
, “HAMAS-The Islamic Resistance Movement,” January 1, 1993.
, “Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008: Overview,” June 2008.
, “The Hamas terror war against Israel,” 2013.
, “Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000,” 2014.
Jewish Virtual Library, “Terrorism Against Israel: Palestinian Suicide Attacks,” 2008.
25
Jones, Seth G. and Martin C. Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaida,” Tech-
nical Report, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 2008.
Jones, Seth G, James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher S Chivvis, Ben Connable, Jeffrey Martini,
Eric Robinson, and Nathan Chandler, Rolling Back the Islamic State, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corpo-
ration, 2017.
Joseph, J, Turkey and the European Union: internal dynamics and external challenges, Springer, 2006.
Karmon, Ely, Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists and Islamists,
Boston: Brill Academic Pub, 2005.
Karsh, Efraim, The Oslo Disaster, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2016.
Khoury, Jack and Noa Landau, “Israel Accuses Hezbollah of Helping Hamas Establish Military Presence
in Lebanon,” jun 2018.
Krieger, Tim and Daniel Meierrieks, “What causes terrorism?,” Public Choice, 2011, 147 (1-2), 3–27.
Krueger, Alan B, What makes a terrorist?: Economics and the roots of terrorism: Lionel Robbins Lectures,
Princeton University Press, 2007.
Krueger, Alan B., What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Princeton University
Press, 2008.
Krueger, Alan B and David D Laitin, “Kto kogo?: A cross-country study of the origins and targets of ter-
rorism,” Terrorism, economic development, and political openness, 2008, pp. 148–173.
and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, poverty, political violence and terrorism: is there a causal connec-
tion?,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2002.
Kuperwasser, Yossi, “Palestinian Payments to Incarcerated Terrorists and Martyrs’ Families Rise in 2017,”
jul 2017.
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, Mogens K Justesen, and Robert Klemmensen, “The political economy of free-
dom, democracy and transnational terrorism,” Public Choice, 2006, 128 (1-2), 289–315.
Kushner, Harvey W., Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2003.
Kydd, Andrew and Barbara F Walter, “Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence,” Interna-
tional Organization, 2002, 56 (2), 263–296.
LaFree, Gary, Laura Dugan, Min Xie, and Piyusha Singh, “Spatial and temporal patterns of terrorist at-
tacks by ETA 1970 to 2007,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 2012, 28 (1), 7–29.
Lai, Brian, ““Draining the Swamp": An Empirical Examination of the Production of International Terror-
ism, 1968-1998,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2007, 24 (4), 297–310.
Laub, Zachary, “The Islamic State,” aug 2016.
Letamendia, Francisco, Historia del nacionalismo vasco y de ETA, R & B Ediciones, 1994.
Martin, Gus, Understanding terrorism: Challenges, perspectives, and issues, SAGE publications, 2017.
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), “Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS),”
2008.
Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España, “Victims of ETA,” 2010.
26
Moghaddam, Assaf, “Motives for Martyrdom of Suicide Attacks,” Critique, 2009, 33 (3), 46–78.
Morales, Kendrick, Prosper Raynold, and Jing Li, “The empirical relationship between commitment en-
hancement devices and terrorism,” Applied Economics, 2018, 50 (50), 5366–5380.
National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel, “"Stats Show Anti-Terrorism Fence Highly Effec-
tive",” 2008.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Global Terror-
ism Database (Data file),” 2018.
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, state, and utopia, Basic books, 2013.
Palestine and Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Jewish Problems in Palestine, A survey of Pales-
tine, Vol. 1, government printer, 1946.
Pape, Robert Anthony, Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism, Random House Incorporated,
2006.
Pedahzur, Ami, Suicide terrorism, Polity, 2005.
, Leonard Weinberg, and Arie Perliger, Political parties and terrorist groups, Routledge, 2008.
Perliger, Arie and Leonard Weinberg, “Jewish self-defence and terrorist groups prior to the establishment
of the state of Israel: Roots and traditions,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2003, 4 (3),
91–118.
Pew Research Center, “Rising Restrictions on Religion,” 2011.
Phillips, Brian J., “Terrorist group cooperation and longevity,” International Studies Quarterly, 2014, 58
(2), 336–347.
, “Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances: Testing Competing Explanations,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 2018, (January), 1–23.
Phillips, David L, From bullets to ballots: violent Muslim movements in transition, Routledge, 2017.
Piazza, James A., “A supply-side view of suicide terrorism: A cross-national study,” Journal of Politics,
2008, 70 (1), 28–39.
Piazza, James A, “Incubators of terror: Do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism?,”
International Studies Quarterly, 2008, 52 (3), 469–488.
Piven, Ben, “Who, what and where is ISIL? Explaining the Islamic State,” sep 2014.
Plümper, Thomas and Eric Neumayer, “The friend of my enemy is my enemy: International alliances
and international terrorism,” European Journal of Political Research, 2010, 49 (1), 75–96.
Rabil, Robert G, “Hezbollah, The Islamic Association and Lebanon’s Confessional System,” The Levantine
Review, 2012, 1 (1), 49–67.
Radu, Michael and Vladimir Tismaneanu, Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods, New
York: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1990.
Ranstorp, Magnus, “The strategy and tactics of Hizballah’s current ‘Lebanonization process’,” Mediter-
ranean Politics, 1998, 3 (1), 103–134.
Ray, Alex, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorist Alliance Networks,” Doctoral dissertation, 2018.
27
, “An Empirical Analysis of the Club Good Model of Terrorism,” Doctoral dissertation, 2019.
Raynold, Prosper, “Fellowship, social network externalities, and management of religious risk,” Rational-
ity and Society, 2013, 25 (2), 229–260.
, “An Economic Theory of Violent Religious Extremism An Economic Theory of Violent Religious Ex-
tremism Prosper Raynold Associate Professor of Economics Department of Economics,” 2018, (June).
Rees, Matt, “How Hamas-Hezbollah Rivalry Is Terrorizing Israel,” apr 2001.
Reuters, “Basque separatist group ETA says it has ’completely dissolved’,” 2018.
Rollins, John, “Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S.
Policy,” jan 2011.
Sageman, Marc, Understanding terror networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining External Support
for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization, 2011, 65 (4), 709–744.
Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, “The persistence of nationalist terrorism: the case of ETA,” Violent non-state
actors in contemporary world politics. Columbia University Press, New York, 2009.
Shitrit, Lihi Ben, Righteous transgressions: women’s activism on the Israeli and Palestinian religious right,
Vol. 61, Princeton University Press, 2015.
START, “Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” 2015.
Tezcür, Günes¸ Murat, “Prospects for Resolution of the Kurdish Question: A Realist Perspective.,” Insight
Turkey, 2013, 15 (2).
The Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), “Violent Extremism Knowledge Base,” 2013.
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), “Terrorist Groups,” 2013.
, “Terrorist Profiles,” 2013.
TOI, “Israel says Hamas working with Hezbollah to train ‘thousands’ in Lebanon,” jun 2018.
Transparency International, Transparency International corruption perceptions index, Transparency In-
ternational, 1995.
Unzueta, Patxo, Los nietos de la ira: nacionalismo y violencia en el País Vasco, El País, 1988.
U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004,” 2005.
van Um, Eric, Evaluating the Political Rationality of Terrorist Groups, Springer, 2015.
Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, “Terrorist Group Profiles,” Technical Report, Su-
perintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC 1988.
Zimmerman, Katherine, “The al Qaeda Network,” Technical Report September, American Enterprise In-
stitute 2013.
28
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics, 1970-2014
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
Terrorist Group Characteristics, for group
i in year t
Any Alliances? 0.81 0.39 0 1 Binary variable, coded 1 if group has at least one alliance at any point during sample period.
Alliance Count (Network Size) 2.81 3.41 0 39 Alliance count for group i in year t .
Eigenvector Centrality 0.03 0.08 0 0.61 Eigenvector centrality score for group i in year t .
State Sponsors 1.29 1.64 0 9 Number of state sponsorships for group i in year t .
Age 16.52 14.27 0 96 Age of group i since founding, up to time t .
Attacks 10.16 48.90 0 1,114 Number of violent attacks by group i in year t .
Suicide Attacks 0.72 8.81 0 295 Number of suicide attacks by group i in year t .
Conducts Suicide attacks? 0.05 0.22 0 1 1 if at least one suicide attack if conducted by group i in year t , 0 otherwise.
Inflicted Casualties 30.76 262.11 0 10,000 Number of inflicted casualties by group i in year t .
Fatality rate (productivity) 3.55 15.96 0 599
Fatalitiesi t
attacksi t
Safe Havens 0.33 0.64 0 3 Number of foreign safe havens a group has. A safe haven is considered to be either the official
harbor that a state sponsor offers or the unsanctioned sanctuary within a failed state.
Observations 5813
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Table 1.2: Ideology Summary Statistics
Ideology Indicators % of Sample Mean Alliances Alliance sd Max alliances
Mean Alliance
Depth
Alliance Depth
sd
General Categories (not mutually exclusive)
Islamist ∗ 0.32 3.92 4.47 39 0.031 0.080
Islamist (without al-Qaeda) 3.56 3.25 20 0.029 0.070
Ethnonationalist † 0.38 3.21 3.21 15 0.033 0.085
Leftist unionmulti 0.48 2.60 2.69 15 0.042 0.082
Anarchist ⊗ 0.02 0.45 0.77 2 0.002 0.008
Right-wing ∓ 0.08 1.02 0.88 3 0.003 0.009
Specific Categories (mutually exclusive)
Purely Islam 0.19 3.77 5.09 39 0.035 0.085
Purely Islam (without al-Qaeda) 3.15 3.12 20 0.030 0.070
Purely Ethnonationalist 0.12 1.77 2.21 11 0.009 0.025
Purely Leftist 0.33 2.31 2.30 12 0.037 0.066
Religious-Ethno 0.12 4.36 3.33 15 0.028 0.073
Ethno and Leftist 0.14 3.40 3.34 15 0.055 0.112
Groups 255
Definitions derive from Acosta (2016b).
∗Group subscribes to a variant of political Islam (potentially compounded with other ideologies).
†Group pursues an agenda involving secession, autonomy, or the liberation of a specific identity group currently ruled by a different identity group. (potentially compounded with other ideologies).
unionmultiGroup subscribes to an ideology such as Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, or radical environmentalism (potentially compounded with other ideologies).
⊗Group seeks the collapse of a given political system.
∓Represents a status quo, ultanationalist, or conservative organization.
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Table 1.3: List of Organizations with Highest Yearly Mean Alliance Count, 1970-2014
Group Name Mean Ties Count Ideology
al-Qaeda 26.44 Islamist
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 14.22 Islamist
Taliban 10.75 Islamist
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 10.00 Leftist
Lashkar-e-Taiba 9.53 Islamist, Ethnonationalist
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 9.47 Islamist, Ethnonationalist
Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) 9.27 Islamist, Ethnonationalist
United Liberation Front of Assam 9.19 Nationalist, Leftist
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 9.06 Nationalist, Leftist
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen 8.65 Islamist, Ethnonationalist
Jema’a Islamiyya (JI) 8.64 Islamist
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 8.27 Islamist, Ethnonationalist
Hezbollah 8.15 Islamist
19th of April Movement 7.90 Leftist
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Table 1.4: The Extensive Margin of Cooperation
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
Dependent Variable: (ln) fatality rate (ln) fatality rate
Alliesi ,t−1 (1/0) 0.626* 0.523
(0.325) (0.356)
Religiousi 1.025*** 0.263
(0.251) (0.586)
(State Sponsors)i ,t−1 0.203*** 0.205***
(0.074) (0.074)
(Safe Havens)i ,t−1 -0.036 -0.049
(0.202) (0.201)
Alliesi ,t−1 (1/0) × Religiousi 0.840
(0.592)
Constant -1.989*** -1.908***
(0.332) (0.352)
Year FE? Yes Yes
N 2519 2519
R2 0.249 0.250
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All robust standard errors
are clustered by terrorist group. Dependent variable is the logged
value of (fatality rate)i t , which is defined to be
fatalitiesi t
attacksi t
. This
variable can be interpreted as a measure of attack ‘efficiency.’
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Table 1.5: The Extensive Margin of Cooperation
(1) (2)
Poisson Poisson
Dependent Variable: Suicide Attacks Suicide Attacks
Alliesi ,t−1 (1/0) -0.125 -0.961
(0.569) (0.677)
Religiousi 1.989*** -0.284
(0.538) (0.704)
(State Sponsors)i ,t−1 0.073 0.081
(0.324) (0.320)
(Safe Havens)i ,t−1 -0.650** -0.674***
(0.254) (0.254)
Alliesi ,t−1 (1/0)× Religiousi 2.472***
(0.929)
Constant -3.126** -2.357**
(1.431) (1.151)
Year FE? Yes Yes
N 2519 2519
Pseudo R2 0.455 0.460
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All robust standard er-
rors are clustered by terrorist group. Dependent variable is the
number of suicide attacks carried out per year.
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Table 1.6: The Intensive Margin of Cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable: (ln) fatality rate (ln) fatality rate (ln) fatality rate (ln) fatality rate (ln) fatality rate (ln) fatality rate
(Network Size)i ,t−1 0.084** 0.262** 0.038 0.069 0.336** 0.485***
(0.041) (0.125) (0.050) (0.054) (0.151) (0.157)
Religiousi 1.012*** 0.974*** 0.685** 0.710** 1.073** 1.146**
(0.242) (0.242) (0.341) (0.342) (0.468) (0.467)
(Eigenvector Centrality)i ,t−1 -1.627** -1.679** -2.263* -9.860***
(0.783) (0.826) (1.154) (2.644)
(State Sponsors)i ,t−1 0.196** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.201*** 0.209*** 0.209***
(0.077) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.070) (0.065)
(Safe Havens)i ,t−1 -0.066 -0.074 -0.115 -0.108 -0.148 -0.154
(0.208) (0.212) (0.211) (0.207) (0.211) (0.199)
(Network Size)2i ,t−1 -0.019 -0.033** -0.044***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Religiousi× (Network Size)i ,t−1 0.085 0.059 -0.271 -0.396
(0.063) (0.066) (0.238) (0.245)
Religiousi× (Eigenvector Centrality)i ,t−1 1.779 7.619
(1.727) (4.824)
Religiousi × (Network Size)2i ,t−1 0.039* 0.049**
(0.022) (0.023)
(Eigenvector Centrality)2i ,t−1 19.616***
(5.320)
Religiousi × (Eigenvector Centrality)2i ,t−1 -14.402
(11.291)
Constant -1.658*** -1.853*** -1.573*** -1.591*** -1.881*** -1.938***
(0.228) (0.271) (0.249) (0.249) (0.298) (0.298)
N 2519 2519 2519 2519 2519 2519
R2 0.100 0.104 0.099 0.103 0.109 0.120
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All robust standard errors are clustered by terrorist group. Dependent variable is inflicted fatalities per attack per year
(log). All regressions include year fixed effects.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of the logged mean level of allies per group, 1970-2014. I perform the transforma-
tion log(allies + 1) so that no zeros are dropped. This transformed variable can be understood as a group’s
network size, since every network must have at least one node in it.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of the logged mean level of allies per group, by general ideology type, 1970-2014. I
perform the transformation log(allies + 1) so that no zeros are dropped. This transformed variable can be
understood as a group’s network size, since every network must have at least one node in it.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the logged mean level of allies per group, by specific ideology type, 1970-2014.
I perform the transformation log(allies + 1) so that no zeros are dropped. This transformed variable can
be understood as a group’s network size, since every network must have at least one node in it.
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Figure 1.4: Yearly Mean Alliance Count, by ideology type, 1970-2014. al-Qaeda, an extreme outlier, is
removed from the sample.
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Figure 1.5: Yearly Mean Fatality Rate, by ideology type, 1970-2014. The year 2001, an extreme outlier, is
removed from the sample.
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Figure 1.6: 1970 Global Network of Terrorist Group Connections. A node’s relative size corresponds to its
eigenvector centrality measure.
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Figure 1.7: 1980 Global Network of Terrorist Group Connections. A node’s relative size corresponds to its
eigenvector centrality measure.
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Figure 1.8: 1990 Global Network of Terrorist Group Connections. A node’s relative size corresponds to its
eigenvector centrality measure.
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Figure 1.9: 2000 Global Network of Terrorist Group Connections. A node’s relative size corresponds to its
eigenvector centrality measure.
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Figure 1.10: 2010 Global Network of Terrorist Group Connections. A node’s relative size corresponds to its
eigenvector centrality measure.
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Figure 1.11: 2014 Global Network of Terrorist Group Connections. A node’s relative size corresponds to its
eigenvector centrality measure.
45
Figure 1.12: The effect of having at least one ally on suicide attacks per year, for both secular and religious
group types. Based on the results in Column (2) of Table 2.4.
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Figure 1.13: Predicted values of (fatality rate)i t (fatalities per attack per year) for each ideology type, based
on the results in Column (6) of Table 2.5. This represents the intensive margin of cooperation.
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Figure 1.14: Marginal values of (fatality rate)i t (fatalities per attack per year) for each ideology type at
different levels of Alliesi t , based on the results in Column (6) of Table 2.5.
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Figure 1.15: Predictive values of (fatality rate)i t (fatalities per attack per year) for each ideology type, at
different levels of (Eigenvector Centrality)i t , based on the results in Column (6) of Table 2.5.
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Figure 1.16: The effect of alliances at the extensive margin on the survivability for religious groups versus
secular groups.
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Figure 1.17: The effect of alliances at the intensive margin on the survivability for religious groups.
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Figure 1.18: The effect of alliances at the intensive margin on the survivability for secular groups.
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Chapter 2
An Empirical Analysis of the Club Good
Model of Terrorism
I empirically test the club good model of terrorism. Despite an extensive theoretical literature identify-
ing sacrifice and stigma and social service provision as key inputs into the production process by which
terrorist organizations induce commitment, solve free riding problems, and mitigate defection concerns,
the evidence in support of this hypothesis has been limited. Using a panel dataset containing all docu-
mented incidents of terror attacks from 2007-2013 at the state-year level, I empirically test the club good
model by employing various observable proxies as exogenous shifters of the marginal product schedules
of sacrifice and stigma and social service provision. This is based on the assumption that complying with
the demands imposed on members by terrorist groups is costly, and hence an increase in the marginal
product schedule will have the effect of screening out low-commitment members, improving group ca-
pacity in the production of violence. I examine the impact of the proxies on both overall terrorism and
suicide terrorism. I find that sacrifice and stigma has a meaningful effect on both, with a larger quantita-
tive impact on overall terrorism. However, I find that social service provision only has a significant effect
on suicide terrorism, providing perhaps the most conclusive validation to date of one of the most com-
pelling predictions made by club framework, namely that terror groups have a comparative advantage
in sending operatives on risky suicide missions when they provide social services that create incentives
mitigating defection.
JEL categories: D74; H41; H56; J1; O17; Z12; Z18
Keywords: Terrorism, club goods, counterterrorism policy, social institutions, conflict, corruption
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper I empirically test the hypothesis that terrorist groups are more effective at perpetuating
violence when they are able to extract signals of commitment from members. The theoretical literature
notes that the policy of many terror groups to require extreme initiation rites serves a valuable purpose,
namely as a costly signal of “commitment" that weeds out uncommitted members and mitigates defection
and free riding costs. Based on the economic theory of clubs (Iannaccone (1992); Iannaccone and Berman
(2005)), this “club model of terrorism" suggests that these commitment technologies typically take the
form of sacrifice and stigma (S&S) and social service provision (SSP). Sacrifice and stigma refers to costly
prohibitions and seemingly gratuitous resource expenditures that raise the cost of membership above that
which uncommitted members are willing to pay (Iannaccone (1992);Berman and Laitin (2008); Berman
(2009)). S&S can be viewed as the opportunity costs of compliance with sect demands, such as dietary
restrictions, dress codes, mandatory schooling, restrictions on work and socializing, and prohibitions on
medicine and technology.
The literature also emphasizes that the demands imposed on members by S&S devices make extrem-
ist groups efficient providers of benign local public goods, referred to in this study as social service provi-
sion (SSP) (Iannaccone (1992)). In other words, S&S and SSP are complementary inputs into the process
of organizing a terror group filled with committed members: in order to secure membership and obtain
access to the public goods provided by a group, a prospective member must be willing to fully abide by
certain prohibitions on behavior, undergo grueling initiation rites, and accept stigmatization that often
irreversibly destroy one’s outside options. SSP may take the form of local public goods such as law and
order, welfare services, education, and healthcare (Berman and Laitin (2008)).
These joint technologies of S&S and SSP mitigate the free-rider problem in two ways. First, the sac-
rifices required of members create a social barrier to screen out low-commitment individuals who, if ad-
mitted into the group, would hold preferences that would not align with the best interests of the group.
Second, these technologies change the shadow prices of group activities, as demand for internal club
goods rises with the cost of participation in external, non-club activities.
Using a panel dataset containing all documented incidents of terror attacks from 2007-2013 at the
state-year level, I empirically test the club good model by employing various observable proxies as exoge-
nous shifters of the marginal product schedules of S&S and SSP, respectively. I find evidence that sacrifice
and stigma matters generally to overall terrorist activity and suicide terrorism in particular. Based on the
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assumption that the marginal productivity of S&S in inducing commitment from members is positively
associated with tension between the group and the general society, I estimate the impact of S&S using
observable proxies which measure societal tension at the state level.
I also find that the other commitment inducement technology emphasized in the extant literature,
social service provision, matters to suicide terrorism but not overall terrorism. Since the provision of
public goods by terror groups is expected to provide a greater incentive to join when these goods are un-
derprovided by local and state governments, I employ proxies for SSP that inform on 1) the conditions of a
state’s market economy in efficiently delivering goods and services to the population, and 2) the reliability
and competence of government institutions in delivering service to constituents. To my knowledge, the
key finding in this study with regard to social service provision–that it is a determinant of suicide terrorism
specifically–is the first time the hypothesis put forward in Berman and Laitin (2008) has been supported
by econometric evidence.
This study makes two main contributions to the empirical literature studying the causes of terrorism.
First, I revisit the question of the effectiveness of S&S and SSP as predictors of terrorism using time-varying
data, in contrast to the previous two studies which study only cross-sectional data. Terrorism is a complex
phenomenon that is heterogeneous over time and space, and studies failing to account for time-varying
factors are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems that make it difficult to draw causal inference. While
Morales et al. (2018) include a set of six regional dummy variables in their cross-sectional regressions to
account for region-specific heterogeneity, this still leaves room for biased estimates, as terrorism can take
on different forms even in countries neighboring one another.
Second, this work employs superior empirical measures of terrorism than Morales et al. (2018), to
which this present study is most closely related. I employ as my measure of terrorism the precise annual
count of attacks inflicted on each country. In addition, I also examine a second measure of terrorism,
the annual count of suicide attacks carried out against a country. Because suicide terrorism may repre-
sent a different phenomenon than other types of political violence (Piazza (2008a)), especially within the
framework of the club theory of terrorism (Berman and Laitin (2008)), there is merit to examining suicide
terrorism as a distinct category of terrorism in this kind of empirical investigation. In sum, employing
these superior measures of terrorism, as well as using time-varying state-level data, I am able to the pro-
vide the most credible test of the club model of terrorism to date.
In Section2.2 I review the theoretical foundation and the empirical evidence, respectively, for the
club good model of terrorism. In Section 2.3 I describe the empirical strategy I use to test the club model,
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and in Section 2.4 I describe my data. Section 2.5 contains the results of my analysis, and Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the question of the determinants of terrorism has
been a contentious issue. Politicians, academics, and the general public have speculated about the causes
of radicalization and the factors that encourage participation in terrorism. The empirical literature on
terrorism determinants includes numerous studies examining potential aggregate country-level factors
that are thought to influence the behavior of terrorists through changes in the relative costs and benefits
to engaging in terrorism, by either raising or lowering the opportunity costs to terrorist activity. Krieger
and Meierrieks (2011) provide a summary of the empirical evidence of the various explanations put forth
in the literature, finding seven broad ‘global hypotheses’ of terrorism.1
The economic deprivation hypothesis, arguably the most famous and the most controversial of the
explanations of terrorism, is the idea that terrorism is rooted in poverty 2 This view suggests that poverty
and within-country inequality leads to high levels of terrorism by affecting the supply side: economically-
deprived people have low opportunity costs to involvement in terrorism. The evidence for this hypothesis
is conflicting. On the one hand, Blomberg and Hess (2005), Azam and Delacroix (2006), Azam and Thelen
(2008), and Lai (2007) find that wealthy countries (measured by GDP per capita) experience less terrorism.
In contrast, Krueger and Maleckova (2002), Krueger (2007), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), Basuchoudhary
and Shughart (2010), Plümper and Neumayer (2010), Krueger and Laitin (2008), Abadie (2006), and Frey-
tag et al. (2011) in general find little evidence pointing to a foundation for terrorism rooted in economic
or educational deprivation.34
1These hypotheses are: economic deprivation; modernization strain; institutional order; political transformation; identity con-
flict; global order; contagion.
2In the immediate wake of 9/11, many politicians and public figures insisted that terrorism is caused by poor economic con-
ditions and lack of education. Initially hesitant to draw a connection between poverty and terrorism, President George W. Bush
eventually announced on March 22, 2002 in Monterrey Mexico, “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror," with
Laura Bush adding, “A lasting victory in the war against terror depends on educating the world’s children." British Prime Minister
Tony Blair made the poverty-terrorism on many occasions, such as in the aftermath of the London transit system bombings in July
2005: “Ultimately what we now know, if we did not before, is that where there is extremism, fanaticism or acute and appalling forms
of poverty in one continent, the consequences no longer stay fixed in that continent." Other prominent figures, including the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, King Abdullah of Jordan, Turksh Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Elie Wiesel, and
terrorism scholar Jessica Stern have made similar connections. A notable government study that rejects this hypothesis is the 9/11
Commission Report, which insists that “terrorism is not caused by poverty" (Krueger (2007), p. 3).
3I, likewise, find no significant relationship between terrorism and GDP per capita in my empirical analysis, in Section 2.5.
4Another global hypothesis, related to the poverty thesis, suggests that a key driver of terrorism is modernization. The idea is that
economic, cultural, demographic, technological, and ideological changes in a society creates grievances among traditional elements
of society who feel disaffected and left behind by the modern order and turn to violence as a result.
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Another ongoing debate, studied in the literature since the 1980s, is the influence of regime type on
terrorism, specifically whether or not democracy fosters or deters terrorism. For a good overview of this
literature, see Gaibulloev et al. (2017), who note a general lack of consensus on the issue.5 While democ-
racies offer nonviolent means of participating in the political order, which on the surface would seem
to mean a relatively high opportunity cost to engaging in political violence, it has also been argued that
democratic regimes are more vulnerable to terrorism because their obligation to civil liberties constrains
counterterrorism tactics. On the other hand, while the ability of autocratic regimes to curtail civil liberties
would imply, all else equal, higher marginal costs to perpetuating terrorism relative to democracies (i.e.,
a decrease in the supply curve), the repressive nature of autocracies produces grievances and political
disenfranchisement that likely leads to an increase in the marginal benefit of terrorism relative to that of
peaceful political expression. The empirical evidence is mixed: Krueger and Maleckova (2002), Kurrild-
Klitgaard et al. (2006), Krueger and Laitin (2008), and Piazza (2008b) are examples of studies which find
democracies are prone to terrorism, whereas Eubank and Weinberg (2001) and Lai (2007) find the reverse
to be true. Gaibulloev et al. (2017) formulate a game-theoretic model which predict that political regime
type has an inverted U-shaped impact on terrorism, wherein the middle range between democracy and
dictatorship is most conducive to terrorism. Using a variety of empirical methods they then find a robust
inverted U-shape relationship between regime type and terrorism.
Of particular relevance to this present study is the civilization clash hypothesis of conflict, originally
expounded by Huntington (1996). The main idea is that differences between identity groups along reli-
gious, ethnic, tribal, or cultural lines is a primary source of conflict. This hypothesis would suggest that
terrorist groups can exploit identity tensions by appealing to tribal solidarity, leading to lower recruitment
costs and hence an increase in the supply of terrorism. Identity clashes may also increase the demand of
terrorism, as identity groups may use real or perceived persecution against their constituents as a jus-
tification for violence against other groups. The empirical evidence for the identity clash hypothesis of
terrorism is mixed. Piazza (2008b) and Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) find a positive link between
identity fractionalization and terrorism in states, although many other studies find weak links.6
To my knowledge, only two previous studies have empirically tested the club good model of terror-
5The mixed and inconclusive findings in the literature are due to reasons including a lack of uniformity in the sample countries,
time periods, terrorism indicators, and methodologies used across studies. Most studies fail to account for unobserved heterogene-
ity in their panel data regressions, and also fail to consider a potential nonlinear relationship between regime type and terrorism.
6Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) suggest that the lack of evidence in support of the theory may be due to a measurement issue, as
common variables used for identity clashes, such as ethnic, religious, or linguistic fractionalization within a country, may be poor
proxies for societal tension.
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ism. Using data on terrorist activity in Israel in Lebanon between 1968 and 2006, Berman and Laitin (2008)
test the hypothesis that a religious extremist group is a more effective and efficient producer of terrorism
when the group provides local public goods. As the club framework suggests, social service provision
by a terrorist group gives members extra motivation to not defect, making the group a relatively “strong
club." Out of all of the major terror organizations active in Israel and Lebanon over the sample, period,
only two of them, Hamas and Hezbollah, were social service providers, and Berman and Latin find that
these groups were significantly more lethal than the other, non-social service providing, groups. Over the
period 1968-2006, Hamas and Hezbollah averaged 5.4 fatalities over 160 attacks, killing 862 people, while
the other groups (Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah/PLO,
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and any unknown groups) averaged 2.3 fatalities per
attack, killing 519 people over 228 attacks.
The club good logic also predicts that groups providing benign local public goods have a compar-
ative advantage in conducting suicide attacks. When traditional “soft" targets are protected sufficiently
well by a state, regular terror tactics are often ineffective and militants may therefore choose to use sui-
cide terrorism, a tactic that remains effective against well-defended “hard" targets that have a relatively
high likelihood of apprehension or death of the terrorist. Suicide tactics are relatively rare, however, not
because (as is popularly assumed) it is necessarily difficult to recruit members willing to sacrifice them-
selves, but because in these high-stakes operations the perceived costs of potential defection make the
tactic prohibitively costly. Faced with the tactical problem of defection, “strong" clubs, whose members
have relatively low utility from defection due to worse outside options, have an advantage in sending
operatives out on suicide missions. Berman and Laitin (2008) find that the two “strong," social-service
providing groups in their data, Hamas and Hezbollah, carried out 63 and 44 suicide attacks, respectively,
while highest total among the non-social service providers was the PIJ, which conducted 37 such attacks.
Taken together, Hamas and Hezbollah averaged 11.4 fatalities per suicide attack, while the other groups
averaged only 3.3.
Berman and Laitin’s empirical study examining the relationship between commitment enhance-
ment technologies and terrorism is far from exhaustive or conclusive, however. Of principle concern,
inference from their analysis is based exclusively on an inspection of cross-sectional organization-level
summary statistics, leaving questions as to whether their findings would hold within a regression frame-
work in which various control variables are considered, especially time-varying factors. Further, by only
using organization-level data from Israel, their analysis is limited in scope and it is unclear if their find-
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ings are generalizable to other areas of conflict. Finally, their study only estimates the effects of SSP on
the incidence of terrorism, while not estimating the potential effects of the other crucial commitment
enhancement technology, S&S.
The other study to empirically measure the effects of commitment enhancement technologies on
terrorism is Morales et al. (2018), to which this present work is most closely related. Those authors use
cross-sectional, country-level data to estimate the effect of S&S and SSP on the incidence of terrorism.
Their research design is to employ certain observable proxies for S&S and SSP as explanatory variables,
using these proxies as exogenous shifters of the marginal product schedules of the S&S and SSP commit-
ment technologies. Using a country-level index measuring the impact of terrorism in 2010, these authors
find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that the deployment by terror groups of S&S and SSP
devices increases the frequency and lethality of terror attacks.
2.3 Research Design
In my empirical analysis I test whether the incidence of terrorism in a country increases as the
marginal product of commitment enhancement devices increases. Obtaining direct measures of the com-
mitment inducement technologies is of course impossible. However, Morales et al. (2018) note that ex-
ogenous variation in prevailing socio-political conditions can shift the marginal product schedules of a
terror group’s commitment enhancement technologies. This is because the efficacy of any sacrifice and
stigma technology (such as a group dress code or dietary restrictions) is a function of the cost that comply-
ing with the demand imposes on members. For example, the cost of complying with a mandate to wear
traditional Muslim garb is higher for group members when such garb is stigmatized (or even outlawed)
in the broader society. In general, then, as tension between a group and society increases, the marginal
productivity of these commitment inducing technologies should also increase. This in turn can be ex-
pected to make the average commitment level of group members relatively high, implying less defection
and greater overall group capacity. Observable proxies of tension between terror groups and society can
therefore be employed as exogenous shifters in an empirical analysis to measure the effects on terror ac-
tivity of commitment technologies.
Likewise, I also test the explanatory power of SSP in predicting terrorism. As a complementary input
to S&S, SSP serves as a credible signal for the competence of a terror group that incentivizes loyalty and
thus can also be expected to greater operational capacity.
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2.4 Data
2.4.1 Dependent Variable
This empirical study analyzes a panel dataset examining the impact of commitment inducement
technologies on the incidence of terrorism between the years 2007 and 2013, where the unit of analysis is
state-year. In my analysis I employ country-level data on violent terrorist acts committed as my depen-
dent variable. I derive these data on terror attacks from the Global Terrorism Database (National Con-
sortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)), a comprehensive, open access
panel dataset that includes detailed information on over 170,000 attacks from 1970 to the present. The
GTD team at START maximizes the accuracy and completeness of its database through a rigorous data
collection methodology involving both automated and manual data collection strategies. Each month,
the team uses machine learning techniques to sift through hundreds of thousands of media articles pub-
lished worldwide in order to identify the relatively small subset of articles relevant to describing terror
attacks. Once this initial automated step is complete, the GTD team then manually reviews a second sub-
set of articles (about 16,000 per month) to identify unique terror events, which are then researched further
and coded according to the GTD inclusion criteria.
The GTD defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a
non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimi-
dation." To be construed as a terror attack and included in its database, an incident must meet all three of
the following criteria:
• The incident must be intentional.
• The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence. Such violence may
include property violence and/or violence against people.
• The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. Hence, the database does not include
acts of state terrorism.
In addition to that basic definition, two of the following three criteria must also be met to be included
in the database:
• The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of eco-
nomic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit
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of more profound, systemic economic change.
• There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a
larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
• The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.
To test my hypothesis of the effect of commitment inducement technologies on the incidence of
terrorism, I employ two different variables from the GTD as dependent variables. The first variable is the
number of total terrorist attacks carried out in a particular country in a given year. I then run my models
using a second dependent variable, the number of total suicide attacks carried out in a particular country
in a given year. This latter variable is a subset of the variable denoting the number of total attacks carried
out: in the GTD this variable, suicide attack, is coded 1 in those cases where the GTD team finds evidence
that the perpetrator did not intend to escape from the attack alive, and 0 otherwise.
The primary advantage of my analysis over that of Morales et al. (2018), who conduct the only other
econometric study examining the relationship between commitment enhancement technologies and the
incidence of terrorism, is the longitudinal nature of my data. The analysis done by Morales et al. (2018)
is cross-sectional, using data from 158 to estimate the effects of S&S and SSP on the impact of terrorism
in the single year 2010. They employ as the dependent variable a composite score, the Global Terrorism
Index (GTI), which reflects the extent to which countries are impacted by both transnational and domestic
terrorism for the year 2010. The GTI, formulated by the Institute of Economics and Peace, is based on the
Global Terrorism Database, and scores each country on a scale from 0 to 10 with 0 representing no impact
from terrorism and 10 denoting the highest impact from terrorism.
2.4.2 Explanatory Variables
For my key independent variables I follow Morales et al. (2018)’s use of certain state-level indicators
as proxies for the commitment inducement technologies. I use two sets of proxies, one for exogenous
shifters of S&S and another for exogenous shifters of SSP. The proxies for S&S are 1) the Pew Forum’s
government restrictions index (GRI), 2) the Pew Forum’s social hostilities index (SHI), and 3) the Failed
State Index’s Group Grievance (GG) index. The three proxies I use for SSP are 1) the Failed State Index’s
Uneven Economic Development (UED) indicator, 2) the Failed State Index’s Refugees and Internally Dis-
placed Persons (RIDP) indicator, and 3) Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
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In Appendix C, I provide a summary of the methodology used to construct each of these variables (details
obtained from the respective sources of the variables).
The GRI and SHI indexes are designed to measure obstacles to religious expression and practice at
the national and local level, respectively (Pew Research Center (2011)). The GRI specifically measures
government laws, policies, and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices, including government
efforts to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one
or more religious groups. Comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, the GRI ranges from 0 to 10, with
10 signifying the highest level of government restrictions. Composed of 13 questions regarding social
hostilities and also on a 0 to 10 scale, the SHI measures acts of religious hostility by private individuals,
organizations and social groups, including mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious
reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The third proxy I use for S&S, the Failed State
Index’s GG index (Fund for Peace (2015)), focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in
society, such as divisions based on social or political characteristics. Ranging from 1 to 10, this indicator
can most easily be understood as a proxy for the state of tension and violence between groups in society.
The economic intuition for using these observable variables as exogenous shifters of the marginal
productivity of S&S rests on the assumption that terror groups deploy devices that effectively identify
high commitment members and screen out low commitment individuals. The marginal effectiveness
of these commitment tools can be assumed to increase with the cost imposed on members to comply
with the strictures; all else equal, an increase in costs of abiding by the sacrifices demanded by a group
screens out individuals for whom the opportunity cost to membership is sufficiently prohibitive, leading
to an increase in the higher average level of commitment among group members. Based on the theoret-
ical framework outlined in Section ??, these compliance costs can be expected to increase with societal
tension. As such, the observable measures described above are credible exogenous shift factors for the
marginal product schedule for the commitment inducement technologies used by terror groups.
I also employ three indicators as proxies for SSP. Raynold (2013) contends that SSP functions as a
credible signal for the competence of a terror group, serving as a complementary technology to S&S that
incentivizes loyalty. As noted by Iannaccone (1994) and (Berman and Laitin (2008), the reason terror
groups supply SSP is to gain credibility in their communities when government provision of social services
is relatively deficient. Offering public goods provides an opportunity for a group to induce loyalty and
commitment from its operatives and by extension improve its overall effectiveness. Hamas, Hezbollah,
the Taliban, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Iraq are notable
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examples of organizations that have a history of establishing social service network, offering services such
as medical clinics, school, charities, support for orphans, drug treatment centers, youth clubs, sports
clubs, and mosques (Berman and Laitin (2008).
My three proxies for SSP are the Failed State Index’s Uneven Economic Development (UED) and
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (RIDP) indicators, and Transparency International’s Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI). The UED considers structural inequality in a state’s economy, both real and
perceived, irrespective of the actual performance of the state’s economy. This indicator considers the
existence of structural inequality based on group identification (such as racial, ethnic, or religious), or
based on other factors such as education or region. The RIDP (referred to as ‘Refugees/IDP’ in my anal-
ysis) measures two phenomena: first, it measures pressure put upon states by population inflows of of
refugees (i.e., asylum states). This indicator also measures the Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees
by country of origin, recognizing that factors such as violence and health epidemics may increased pres-
sure upon a state to offer resources to its population. The UED and RIDP may each take on a value from
1 to 10, with 10 indicating a state with the highest degree of structural inequality or the highest degree of
pressure imposed by problems related to refugees or internally displaced persons. The CPI (Transparency
International (1995)), which takes on a value between 0 and 10 with 0 signifying the most corrupt and 10
the least corrupt, defines corruption as the abuse by public officials or public institutions for private gain.
Corruption is a credible proxy for SSP because it hinders the ability of market forces and governments
to deliver social services to citizens, and hence creating opportunities for terror groups to induce loyalty
from members through their own provision of basic public goods Raynold (2013).
In my analysis I also control for various other state-level attributes that may be correlated with my
main explanatory variables and my dependent variable. State-level controls that I use include popula-
tion and GDP per capita for a state in a given year. I do not include a direct control for regime type in
my main results because the best indicator for such, the Polity IV Project’s Polity variable which denotes
regime type on a scale from autocratic to democratic, is missing data over my sample period for many
conflict-ridden countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan. As an adequate substitute for
Polity score, I include indicators that measure state fragility, based on the “State Fragility Index and Ma-
trix 2016" (Center for Systemic Peace (2016)).7 These data consist of, for all independent countries in
the world where the total population is greater than 500,000 (167 countries), scores that measure state
7These data were originally produced in “Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 2007." In order to make the
indicators comparable across time, threshold values for each categorical fragility score based on cut-points derived in a baseline
year, 2004.
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vulnerability. A state’s fragility is “closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict, make and
implement public policy, and deliver essential services, and its systemic resilience in maintaining system
coherence, cohesion, and quality of life, responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining
progressive development" (Center for Systemic Peace (2016)). The dataset contains indicators along four
performance dimensions (security, political, economic, and social) that measure state fragility based on
specific criteria. The overall State Fragility Index score comprises an Effectiveness Score and a Legitimacy
Score, each of which comprises scores for each of the four performance dimensions. Each performance
dimension is rated on a four-point fragility scale, where 0 means “no state fragility," and 3 means “high
state fragility." I provide a complete description of these State Fragility variables in Appendix B.
The specific model which I estimate is
Terrorism j t =β0+β1S&S j t +β2SSP j t ++X ′j tθ+γ j +δt +u j t , (2.1)
where Terrorism j t is the amount of terrorism conducted in country j in year t , and X contains a set
of control variables. S&S j t and SSP j t denote, for country j in year t , the various proxies for the Sacrifice
and Stigma and Social Service Provisions proxies, respectively. γ j and δt are state and year fixed effects,
respectively. I cluster standard errors at the state level.
2.5 Results
Before discussing the regression results, I will first report basic summary statistics of my data. De-
scriptive statistics for all variables used are presented in Table 2.1. The unit of observation is state-year,
with a sample period 2007-2013. The average country in my sample experiences about 43 terrorist attacks
per year (standard deviation of 191), and 2.23 suicide attacks per year (standard deviation of 15). In Ta-
ble 2.2 I present, for each of the 147 countries in my sample, the scores for each of the six commitment
enhancement device proxies, averaged across the entire sample period, 2007-2013.
In Figures 2.1-2.6 I generate scatter plots showing the relationship between the logged value of terror-
ist attacks and each respective commitment enhancement device proxy for the 25 most populous coun-
tries. Although not sufficient to demonstrate any sort of causality, these graphs are nevertheless useful
in gauging the basic relationships between terrorism and the proxies for S&S and SSP. In general, I ob-
serve the expected correlation between terrorism and each proxy, both when the sample includes only
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the 25 most populous states and when the sample includes all states. Of the three proxies for S&S, I ob-
serve the strongest correlation with the Social Hostilities Index (corr=0.59), which measures acts of reli-
gious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. The correlation between terrorism
and the Group Grievance index, which focuses on discord between groups in society, is 0.40. Those two
proxies contrast to the comparatively low correlation (corr=0.18) between terrorism and the Government
Restrictions Index; this disparity is notable because on the surface it suggests that animosity and tension
between, and oppression of, various identity groups is a stronger determinant of terrorism when the per-
secution derives from the grassroots level than from the state level. This is all the more striking because
there is a high degree of correlation between each of the three proxies.8
The relationships between each of the SSP proxies and terrorism are almost identical, with correla-
tions around 0.27 for the 25 most populous states (note that for the Corruption Perception Index proxy,
0 indicates the highest level of corruption, so the negative trend between this variable and terrorism is
consistent with one’s intuition).
2.5.1 Effects of Commitment Enhancement Devices
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 display OLS results for coefficients based on Equation 2.1. The dependent variable
in Table 2.3 is the logged value of total violent attacks carried out in country j in year t , and the dependent
variable Table 2.4 is the logged value of total suicide attacks carried out in country j in year t .9
In each table, Columns (1)-(6) each contain a single S&S or SSP proxy, and Column (7) includes all of
the proxies. Accordingly, Specifications (1)-(3) provide separate estimates for the three S&S proxies, GRI,
SHI, and GG, respectively, and Specifications (4)-(6) give separate estimates for the three SSP proxies, CPI,
Economic Inequality, and Refugees/IDP, respectively. To simplify interpretation and comparison between
proxies, I follow Morales et al. (2018) by using a standardized index of each indicator in the analysis.10
Looking first at Table 2.3, the results suggest that two out of the three proxies for S&S have a statis-
tically significant, positive effect of terrorism, while none of the proxies for SSP are significant. This is in
contrast to Morales et al. (2018), who find that each proxy for S&S and SSP has the expected sign and is
statistically significant at conventional levels. Column (2) indicates that a one standard deviation increase
8The overall correlation between GRI and SHI is 0.65; between GRI and GG the correlation is 0.469; and between SHI and GG the
correlation is 0.59.
9Each of these variables is found to be highly right-skewed. To account for the zeros in the data, I use a log(x+1) transformation
for both outcome variables, total attacks and suicide attacks.
10For each index i in time t , the standardized index, SI , is defined to be SIi t = [Ii t −mean(Ii t )]/std dev(Ii t ), where Ii t is the raw
index.
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in the Social Hostilities Index increases terrorism in a country by about 35%, significant at the 1% level.
In Column (3), a one standard deviation increase in the Group Grievance index increases terrorism in a
country by about 85%, also significant at the 1% level. These results hold in Specification (7), which in-
cludes all S&S and SSP proxies. I find that the third proxy for S&S, GRI, is not statistically different from
zero, both in Column (2) and in Column (7).
Turning next to interpreting the proxies for SSP on the incidence of terrorism, Column (4) predicts
that a one standard deviation increase in CPI (signifying a decline in corruption) decreases terrorism by
33%, although this result is not statistically significant. Likewise, the coefficient on Refugees/IDP in the
Column (6) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a 24% in-
crease in terrorism. Although this is the expected sign, the estimate is not significant. Hence, while I find
explanatory power for the effect on terrorism of S&S in Table 2.3, I find no evidence that SSP is a strong
determinant of terrorism.
In some of the specifications in Table 2.3 I also find a positive effect, significant at the 10% level,
on terrorism for the State Fragility Index (SFI) Effectiveness Score which measures the overall health of a
state’s institutions. It is unclear to me why the Effectiveness Score is significant across models while the Le-
gitimacy score is not, considering these two variables are highly correlated with one another (corr=0.77).11
This discreet variable takes on a value from 0 to 13, with 13 indicating a state with “high fragility." To my
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the relationship between the State Fragility Index and terror-
ism, and the nontrivial effect on terrorism predicted by the Effectiveness Score at the 10% level–a one unit
increase in this index increases terrorism by about 20%–is an interesting association that warrants future
investigation. Consistent with most of literature (see Section 3.1) for an overview), I find no significant
relationship between terrorism and GDP per capita.12
Table 2.4 reports estimates using the same explanatory variables but with the dependent variable
now defined as the logged value of the number of suicide attacks carried out in country j in year t . Con-
sistent with the results obtained in Table 2.3, I find a positive, albeit weaker, relationship between SHI
and GG, respectively, on the one hand, and suicide terrorism on the other. Column (2) shows that a one
standard deviation increase SHI, one of the proxies for S&S, bolsters yearly suicide attacks in a country by
11A description of the State Fragility Index variables is provided in Appendix B.
12Inclusion of the regime type measure Polity into the models does not have any qualitative effect on my estimates; results with
the inclusion of this variable are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 in Appendix A. When I include Polity only as a linear term (not
presented), I consistently find that democracy is a positive influence on terrorism. However, when I include a quadratic term of this
variable in the models as well, I find a statistically insignificant, though not entirely nontrivial positive effect of the quadratic term in
many of the models, perhaps indicating an interesting nonlinear effect of regime type on terrorism, a deeper analysis of which goes
beyond the scope of this present study.
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about 14% (p < 0.01), 21 percentage points less than the effect on overall terrorism predicted in Table 2.3.
In Specification (3), a one standard deviation increase in GG increases suicide terrorism by 32% (p < 0.10),
53 percentage points less than that predicted in the preceding table. I again find that the GRI proxy for
S&S has no meaningful impact on terrorism.
Moving to the estimates for the SSP proxies in Table 2.4, I find significant effects on two of my three
proxies, CPI and Refugees/IDP, respectively. Column (4) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in
the CPI (i.e., a decline in corruption) decreases suicide attacks by 20% (p < 0.10), although the coefficient
on this variable loses statistical significance in Column (7). I find in Specification (6) that a one standard
deviation increase in Refugees/IDP increases suicide terrorism by 21% (p < 0.10).
That I find evidence in favor of the relevance of SSP when it comes to suicide terrorism but not in
overall terrorism is an interesting finding, one that I believe is consistent with the theoretical literature.
Berman and Laitin (2008) argue that “as targets [of terrorists] harden conventional attacks are disfavored,
and suicide attacks are increasingly chosen." The authors suggest that, based on the club model of terror-
ism, the types of militant organizations which can thrive in hard-target environments are those with social
service provisions, as social service provision induces the high levels of loyalty required to successfully ex-
ecute high-risk operations like suicide missions. To clarify the economic logic here, the costs of using
the tactic of suicide terrorism (rather than normal insurgency) stem not only from the loss of manpower
that occurs if the attack is successful, but also because the risk of defection is high in these high-stakes
operations. For most organizations, the utility which members could get from defection due to strong
outside options is sufficiently high, so that suicide terrorism will typically not be incentive-compatible
for the group. The organizations which do carry out suicide terrorism, on the other hand, will tend to be
those whose members have worse outside options, implying a lower likelihood of defection. By providing
services to members and their families, groups supply additional motivation not to defect by diminishing
the relative value of outside options. Assuming that proxies in my model are valid exogenous shifters of
the marginal product schedules of S&S and SSP technologies, and thereby impelling groups to adjust their
deployment of the technologies accordingly, the predicted effects in my model of CPI and Refugees/IDP
are perhaps the strongest evidence to date validating the Berman and Laitin hypothesis, “religious radi-
cals can confidently take on high-value targets if they are affiliated with a club that provides local public
goods."
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2.5.2 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, I re-run the above models to include both concurrent and lagged variables
of each proxy. While this does not necessarily mitigate all endogeneity concerns, it helps to cope with
the possible existence of mild endogeneity between terrorism and concurrent state-level characteristics.
Estimates for these models are reported in Tables 2.5 (DV=total terrorist attacks) and 2.6 (DV=total suicide
attacks). These results are largely consistent with those in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, which do not include lagged
variables. For example, in Specification (7) of Table 2.5, while controlling for the concurrent value of SHI,
the lagged value for SHI is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01); a one standard deviation increase
in the previous year’s SHI is predicted to increase terrorism by 24%. The estimate on the lagged S&S proxy
GG is also significant in Column (7). However, none of the SSP proxies have statistical significance. In
Table 2.6, two of the three lagged S&S variables, GRI and SHI, are predicted to have statistically significant
effect on suicide terrorism, although none of the lagged SSP variables are found to be significant. Thus,
the main findings in Section 2.5.1 are generally, although not strongly, robust to the inclusion of variables
controlling for timing and incidence.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, I tested the club good model of terrorism. Using a panel dataset of 147 counties over
the period 2007-2013, I measure the impact on overall terrorism and suicide terrorism of various proxies
for sacrifice and stigma and social service provision. This analysis is unique in the literature in that it is
the first to test the club model using panel, rather than cross-sectional, data.
As my main results, I find (1) evidence that sacrifice and stigma matters generally to overall terrorist
activity and suicide terrorism in particular. Defined as seemingly-gratuitous costly demands required to
join and remain in good standing with many terrorist groups, sacrifice and stigma solves free rider prob-
lems by screening out individuals who lack sufficient commitment. Based on the theoretical assumption
that the marginal productivity of sacrifice and stigma in inducing commitment from members is posi-
tively associated with tension between the group and the general society, I estimate the impact of S&S
using observable proxies which measure societal tension at the state level.
(2) I find that the other commitment inducement technology emphasized in the extant literature,
social service provision, matters to suicide terrorism but not overall terrorism. Groups often provide pub-
lic goods and services (e.g. welfare, schooling, healthcare) to members as a way to signal their compe-
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tence and provide motivation against defection. Social service provision becomes a more valuable tool
to groups when the services offered are relatively scarce in the secular society. As such, I employ proxies
for SSP that inform on 1) the conditions of a state’s market economy in efficiently delivering goods and
services to the population, and 2) the reliability and competence of government institutions in deliver-
ing service to constituents. To my knowledge, the key finding in this study with regard to social service
provision–that it is a determinant of suicide terrorism specifically–is the first time the hypothesis put for-
ward in Berman and Laitin (2008) has been supported by econometric evidence.
As a word of caution, it is important to emphasize the limitations of the club model in explaining
terrorism. It would be imprudent to infer from this research that the two commitment inducement tech-
nologies discussed in this paper, sacrifice and stigma and social service provision, respectively, necessar-
ily reflect true causes of terrorism. What we can say, however, is that, at the very least, these technologies
matter to terrorism, by influencing the level of terrorist activity.
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon, and so I offer only a couple modest counterterrorism pol-
icy advice based on my findings. While easier said than done, an important weapon in a state’s arsenal
to combat these organizations is to promote defection by directly competing with them in the supply
of such public goods as education, health care, and welfare (Berman and Laitin (2008)). By improving
the efficiency of, or in many cases creating, local and national markets in failed states could reduce sui-
cide terrorism in particular by making terrorist group members less dependent on the club’s provision
of public goods, thus increasing to a sufficiently high level the risk of defection so that it is no longer
incentive-compatible for clubs to send operatives on suicide missions. In regions and states with weak
or nonexistent market opportunities (e.g., Gaza, south Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan), a
public goods-providing terror group may be the only game in town, making defection unprofitable even
in high-stakes operations, since many groups incentivize loyalty through payments to imprisoned terror-
ists, and payments to the families of killed terrorists. 13 Berman and Laitin note many historical examples
of terrorist groups being weakened through secular economic development. In the 1950s, feel threatened
by the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in his country, autocratic Egyptian president Gamal
Abdel Nasser combated the Brotherhood not only by imprisoning its leadership, but also by nationalizing
13For example, the so-called “Palestinian Authority Martyrs Fund," operated by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank,
paid out $153.4 million in salaries to imprisoned and released terrorists in 2017, and an additional $191.8 to the families of terrorists
killed in terror and non-terror related incidents. In total, 2017 expenditures by the PA supporting the salaries of terrorists and their
families was about $345 million. This constitutes 7 percent of the PA’s total budget, and about 50 percent of foreign aid received by
the PA. In contrast, the budget for actual (non-terror related) welfare by the PA in 2017, used to pay for families under the poverty
line, tuition exemptions for poor children, medical insurance, and food supplies, was $211.6 million, which is 39 percent less than
the budget supporting terrorism (Kuperwasser (2017)).
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its sophisticated social service provision network, leading to a decline in Islamist terrorism in Egypt for
over two decades. 14
Policies aimed at reducing the efficacy of sacrifice and stigma tools, used by terror groups to screen
out low-commitment members and mitigate defection, is another recommendation inferred from my
analysis, although it is unclear what sorts of geopolitical “policies" could actually succeed in this task. In
many countries rife with terrorism, identity-based conflicts are entrenched in the society and often date
back hundreds or thousands of years, and there is no panacea to diminishing religious or ethnic hatreds
and promoting tolerance, factors which the club model predicts would be necessary to decreasing the
marginal productivities of sacrifice and stigma devices. As the world has come to realize in the years fol-
lowing the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the removal of the Taliban from government power in
Afghanistan, forced democratization or Westernization is generally an ineffective, and sometimes coun-
terproductive, way to truly liberalize a country. Rather, abatement of tribal, ethnic, religious, or racial
hostilities in a society, and government-sponsored persecution of minorities, can really only come about
when there is sufficient demand for it at the grassroots level, as was the case in the American civil rights
movement.
A promising field of future research may be to consider whether the effects of S&S and SSP are het-
erogeneous by the target of terrorism, domestic or transnational. Future research could also empirically
test the club good model at the organizational level, rather than at the state level like in this study. For
example, adding the S&S/SSP proxies used in this paper to the dataset employed by Ray (2018), which
tracks the characteristics over time of over 300 militant organizations, may generate a more direct test of
the club model. Also, this would have the potential to inform whether or not the relationship between
S&S/SSP is heterogeneous by group ideology type; while Berman and Laitin (2008) restrict their analysis
to the use of S&S/SSP by radical religious sects, it is certainly the case that secular groups, who also face
defection risks, employ commitment devices. Finally, controlling for other, potentially confounding, cul-
tural, political, religious, and economic factors, may help to offer more robust evidence in support of the
14The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) offers another interesting example. To give the historical context, from 1970-1971,
the PLO was embroiled in the so-called “Black September" conflict in Jordan, pitting Palestinian fighters against the Jordanian mil-
itary. Following the seizure of the West Bank by Israel in 1967, the PLO set up military bases in Jordan, from which planning and
carrying out attacks against Israel. This created friction between the PLO, which was unable to exert control over various Palestinian
splinter groups acting in its name, and the Jordanian government, which saw its authority being undermined by the militants who
essentially formed a state within a state. In 1970 there were calls by Palestinian groups in Jordan to overthrow the Hashemite gov-
ernment of King Hussein, leading to military conflict between the two sides. Following ceasefire negotiations between King Hussein
and Yasser Arafat in 1970, a new Palestinian terrorist faction, the Black September Organization, was established under the umbrella
of the PLO to carry out further operations against the Jordanians as well as against Israeli and other international targets. Within a
couple years this faction became a liability to the PLO, its parent organization. In 1973 the PLO successfully disbanded the Black
September Organization, buying off the members to lay down arms and move to Beirut, where they were bequeathed a package of
social services, including secular employment, housing, and wives (Berman and Laitin (2008)).
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club framework.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Country j in Year t , (2007-2013)
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
Terrorism
Total terrorist attacks All attacks in Global Terrorism Database 990 43.66 191.36 0 2852
Total suicide attacks All suicide attacks in Global Terrorism Database 990 2.23 14.89 0 273
Sacrifice and Stigma
Government restrictions on religion Pew Forum’s Index of Government Restrictions involving Religion 990 3.35 2.29 0 9.10
Religious hostility in society Pew Forum’s Index of Social Hostilities involving Religion 990 2.89 2.49 0 10
Tension between groups Fragile State Index’s Group Grievance Index 961 6.30 2.07 1 10
Social Service Provision
Actual and perceived structural inequality Fragile State Index’s Uneven Economic Development Index 961 6.74 1.86 1.60 9.70
Population displacement Fragile State Index’s Refugees and IDPs Index 961 5.36 2.37 0.90 10
Corruption Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 980 3.97 2.12 0.80 9.50
Regime Characteristics
Regime effectiveness State Fragility Index’s Effectiveness Score 947 4.28 3.68 0 13
Regime legitimacy State Fragility Index’s Legitimacy Score 947 4.56 3.15 0 12
State Fragility Index SFI Effectiveness Score + Legitimacy Score 947 8.84 6.43 0 25
Regime type (autocracy to democracy) Polity IV Project Polity Score 920 14.02 6.03 0 20
Years since most recent regime change Polity IV Project Regime Durability Score 938 27.17 33.07 0 204
Economic and Demographic Variables
GDP per capita (log) GDP per capita 983 8.44 1.54 5.14 11.54
Population (log) Country population 983 16.30 1.57 12.61 21.03
Country Area (log) Country area in million square kilometers 966 12.19 1.90 5.70 16.61
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Table 2.2: Mean Values for Sacrifice and Stigma/Social Service Provision Proxies, 2007-2013
Country Government Restrictions Social Hostilities Group Grievance Economic Inequality Refugees & IDP Corruption
Afghanistan 7.03 8.20 9.40 8.14 9.06 1.30
Albania 1.40 0.20 5.16 5.59 2.83 3.19
Algeria 6.73 5.33 7.69 6.93 6.61 3.11
Angola 3.91 2.60 6.19 9.07 7.00 2.06
Argentina 1.90 1.11 4.51 5.71 2.01 3.07
Armenia 4.84 3.89 5.63 6.10 7.09 2.97
Australia 1.34 2.01 3.49 4.03 2.40 8.59
Austria 3.16 2.03 3.79 4.57 2.31 7.66
Azerbaijan 6.23 3.13 7.43 6.96 7.86 2.37
Bahamas 2.40 0.11 4.79 6.49 3.17 7.24
Bahrain 5.16 3.51 6.61 5.61 2.91 5.06
Bangladesh 5.20 7.71 9.19 8.59 6.73 2.41
Belarus 6.33 1.80 6.66 6.66 3.89 2.49
Belgium 3.91 1.99 4.37 4.36 1.76 7.30
Belize 1.06 0.00 4.77 7.13 5.17 2.91
Benin 0.36 0.81 3.91 7.27 6.24 3.10
Bhutan 4.57 1.14 7.47 8.30 7.17 5.60
Bolivia 1.09 0.40 7.39 8.71 4.34 3.00
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.94 3.26 8.26 6.90 7.20 3.47
Brazil 0.64 2.49 6.20 8.64 3.61 3.81
Bulgaria 4.53 3.47 4.41 5.83 3.70 3.80
Burkina Faso 0.89 1.97 5.83 8.67 6.13 3.39
Burundi 0.60 1.41 7.57 8.29 8.57 1.99
Cambodia 2.56 0.86 7.17 7.13 5.69 2.03
Cameroon 1.23 0.96 7.41 8.47 7.23 2.39
Canada 1.50 1.36 2.93 4.37 2.36 8.60
Central African Republic 4.10 4.09 8.69 8.93 9.23 2.20
Chad 4.40 2.30 9.44 9.01 9.39 1.79
Chile 1.37 1.33 3.60 4.79 2.33 7.04
China 8.20 2.73 7.97 8.73 5.97 3.67
Colombia 2.03 3.19 7.34 8.39 8.90 3.63
Croatia 2.03 2.10 5.53 5.16 5.86 4.30
Cuba 4.74 0.83 5.24 6.56 5.24 4.31
Cyprus 2.14 2.99 7.70 7.39 4.41 6.26
Czech Republic 1.41 1.64 3.50 3.90 2.77 4.86
DR Congo 1.61 3.11 8.87 9.11 9.51 1.97
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Denmark 3.06 2.43 2.96 1.87 1.91 9.26
Dominican Republic 0.93 0.00 6.00 7.66 5.49 2.96
East Timor 0.74 3.16 7.10 6.83 8.33 2.60
Ecuador 0.90 0.26 6.70 7.80 6.07 2.60
Egypt 8.36 7.39 8.19 7.50 6.53 2.99
Equatorial Guinea 2.24 0.00 6.77 9.00 2.47 1.87
Eritrea 7.40 0.49 5.93 6.33 7.10 2.51
Estonia 1.20 0.46 5.21 4.89 4.14 6.54
Ethiopia 4.01 5.04 8.21 8.31 8.11 2.81
Finland 1.37 0.71 1.27 1.57 1.73 9.11
France 4.07 4.44 5.80 4.99 2.90 7.01
Georgia 2.70 4.33 8.13 6.91 7.41 4.20
Germany 3.59 4.13 4.69 4.69 4.10 7.90
Greece 4.86 4.46 4.36 4.66 2.43 3.94
Guatemala 1.20 0.83 6.97 7.94 5.84 3.06
Guinea 2.11 2.16 8.06 8.49 7.61 2.03
Guinea-Bissau 0.56 0.73 5.60 8.30 6.97 2.10
Guyana 1.09 0.00 5.91 7.54 3.67 2.64
Haiti 1.30 1.51 7.41 8.49 6.53 1.80
Honduras 1.86 0.44 5.33 8.36 3.36 2.57
Hong Kong 2.03 0.74 . . . 8.09
Hungary 1.24 2.07 3.49 5.71 3.13 5.10
Iceland 2.60 0.99 1.00 2.27 1.17 8.51
India 5.21 9.09 7.63 8.63 4.60 3.41
Indonesia 7.74 7.97 6.50 7.66 6.70 2.84
Iran 8.27 5.51 8.00 7.10 8.13 2.40
Iraq 5.49 8.77 9.64 8.64 8.84 1.57
Ireland 1.06 0.90 1.21 2.79 1.60 7.54
Israel 5.37 8.24 9.39 7.53 7.73 6.03
Italy 2.34 3.34 4.54 4.24 3.57 4.37
Ivory Coast 1.94 3.01 9.13 7.93 8.46 2.31
Jamaica 1.46 0.27 4.27 6.39 2.89 3.37
Japan 0.94 2.09 3.79 2.31 1.90 7.59
Jordan 5.67 4.59 6.79 7.14 7.59 4.76
Kazakhstan 5.57 1.93 5.76 6.01 3.66 2.57
Kenya 3.97 5.97 8.37 8.39 8.54 2.30
Kosovo 1.87 4.16 . . . 3.10
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Kuwait 5.23 2.76 4.79 5.89 4.09 4.36
Kyrgyzstan 5.41 4.37 7.61 7.73 5.70 2.10
Laos 5.77 1.74 6.57 5.83 5.73 2.13
Latvia 2.46 0.90 4.83 5.89 4.31 4.71
Lebanon 2.97 5.27 8.89 6.94 8.67 2.76
Lesotho 0.51 0.06 5.13 5.94 4.67 3.74
Liberia 1.23 2.24 6.39 8.16 8.54 3.14
Libya 5.74 2.91 6.17 7.03 4.31 2.20
Macedonia 2.20 2.21 7.49 6.96 4.74 3.81
Madagascar 2.70 0.67 5.21 7.54 4.09 3.03
Malaysia 7.23 2.44 6.20 6.63 4.74 4.76
Maldives 7.59 3.51 4.99 4.91 6.17 2.63
Mali 1.20 2.17 6.37 6.71 5.23 2.90
Mauritania 6.24 1.20 7.81 6.73 6.66 2.67
Mexico 3.83 4.53 5.94 7.91 4.11 3.33
Moldova 4.59 3.77 6.79 6.73 4.57 3.14
Montenegro 1.27 2.69 6.33 4.14 4.24 3.83
Morocco 5.87 2.00 6.67 7.41 6.64 3.50
Mozambique 1.27 0.90 4.77 7.49 3.43 2.77
Myanmar 7.56 5.39 8.94 8.97 8.40 1.51
Nepal 3.69 5.64 8.97 8.84 6.76 2.53
Netherlands 1.29 1.83 4.53 3.14 3.06 8.74
New Zealand 0.47 1.11 3.17 3.94 1.31 9.29
Niger 2.06 1.61 8.27 7.60 6.60 2.87
Nigeria 4.54 7.54 9.60 9.17 5.84 2.49
Norway 2.00 2.11 1.87 2.00 1.73 8.56
Pakistan 6.73 9.17 9.44 8.44 8.84 2.51
Panama 0.96 0.00 4.61 7.51 3.47 3.46
Papua New Guinea 1.09 2.53 7.26 8.99 4.21 2.20
Paraguay 1.11 0.91 6.34 8.03 1.74 2.31
Peru 2.13 0.44 6.83 8.03 4.34 3.61
Philippines 1.10 3.40 7.43 7.23 6.23 2.74
Poland 1.56 2.24 3.43 4.61 3.07 5.20
Portugal 0.77 0.43 2.47 3.69 1.53 6.14
Republic of the Congo 0.69 0.23 6.39 8.09 7.70 2.14
Romania 4.30 4.47 5.69 5.76 3.24 3.90
Russia 6.86 6.71 7.64 7.71 5.43 2.39
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Rwanda 3.39 0.13 8.47 7.36 7.24 4.10
Saudi Arabia 8.31 6.20 7.69 6.84 6.01 4.19
Senegal 1.13 1.16 6.03 7.06 6.04 3.36
Serbia 3.71 3.57 7.81 6.87 6.97 3.60
Somalia 5.67 8.07 9.40 7.94 9.81 1.03
South Africa 0.73 2.59 5.39 8.34 6.71 4.54
South Sudan 2.03 2.20 10.00 8.85 9.95 1.40
Spain 2.34 2.19 5.99 4.77 2.44 6.29
Sri Lanka 4.93 7.41 9.53 8.27 8.86 3.39
Sudan 6.09 6.69 9.96 9.13 9.79 1.50
Swaziland 1.97 1.64 3.90 6.47 4.33 3.49
Sweden 1.93 2.87 1.17 2.04 2.71 9.14
Switzerland 1.83 2.44 3.01 2.59 1.63 8.80
Syria 6.80 5.96 8.53 7.73 9.00 2.36
Taiwan 0.79 0.00 . . . 5.87
Tajikistan 6.29 2.09 6.77 6.93 5.94 2.14
Tanzania 3.23 4.44 6.21 6.57 7.11 3.04
Thailand 3.56 5.04 7.89 7.24 6.39 3.47
Trinidad and Tobago 0.91 0.81 4.81 7.17 3.24 3.59
Tunisia 5.63 3.54 5.71 6.81 3.57 4.16
Turkey 6.30 4.76 8.09 7.71 6.40 4.51
Uganda 3.11 3.64 8.14 8.34 8.79 2.61
Ukraine 3.39 3.11 6.66 6.16 3.16 2.46
United Arab Emirates 4.70 0.90 4.41 5.34 3.13 6.41
United Kingdom 2.74 4.67 4.46 4.30 3.11 7.74
United States 2.46 2.36 3.54 5.33 3.46 7.26
Uzbekistan 7.84 2.23 7.37 8.30 5.51 1.69
Venezuela 3.21 1.29 6.79 7.60 4.91 1.94
West Bank/Gaza Strip 3.63 7.54 9.39 7.53 7.73 6.03
Western Sahara 5.47 0.90 . . . .
Yemen 6.01 7.21 8.16 8.54 8.06 2.19
Zimbabwe 3.30 1.79 8.90 9.27 8.67 2.11
Average (N =147) 3.47 3.07 6.43 6.80 5.51 3.87
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Table 2.3: Effect of Sacrifice & Stigma/Social Service Provision on Terrorism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sacrifice and Stigma variables
Government Restrictions Index 0.009 -0.061
(0.147) (0.138)
Social Hostilities Index 0.354*** 0.336***
(0.097) (0.087)
Group Grievance 0.851*** 0.816***
(0.266) (0.251)
Social Service Provision variables
Corruption Perceptions Index -0.326 -0.082
(0.270) (0.239)
Economic Inequality 0.056 -0.062
(0.244) (0.238)
Refugees/IDP 0.236 0.208
(0.184) (0.160)
Control Variables
Population (log) 1.875 1.946 2.067* 1.890 1.722 1.536 1.990
(1.295) (1.254) (1.209) (1.258) (1.365) (1.284) (1.244)
GDP pc (log) -0.059 0.009 -0.012 0.000 -0.035 -0.061 0.041
(0.385) (0.369) (0.367) (0.385) (0.383) (0.384) (0.344)
SFI Effectiveness Score 0.219* 0.188 0.195* 0.215* 0.219* 0.212* 0.159
(0.123) (0.114) (0.109) (0.120) (0.124) (0.123) (0.102)
SFI Legitimacy Score 0.038 0.033 0.027 0.029 0.032 0.023 0.013
(0.092) (0.087) (0.085) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.080)
N 933 933 926 931 926 926 926
R2 0.859 0.864 0.866 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.871
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by terrorist group. Regressions include state and year
fixed effects, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total terrorist attacks carried
out in state j in year t . The standardized indexes for the Sacrifice and Stigma/Social Service Provision
proxies are used.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Sacrifice & Stigma/Social Service Provision on Suicide Terrorism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sacrifice and Stigma variables
Government Restrictions Index -0.014 -0.024
(0.071) (0.065)
Social Hostilities Index 0.138*** 0.131***
(0.052) (0.049)
Group Grievance 0.323** 0.301**
(0.149) (0.139)
Social Service Provision variables
Corruption Perceptions Index -0.200* -0.105
(0.109) (0.093)
Economic Inequality -0.028 -0.109
(0.110) (0.114)
Refugees/IDP 0.206* 0.206*
(0.117) (0.111)
Control Variables
Population (log) 0.732 0.756 0.834 0.747 0.777 0.500 0.791
(0.746) (0.705) (0.744) (0.727) (0.779) (0.688) (0.709)
GDP pc (log) -0.034 -0.008 -0.031 0.001 -0.035 -0.065 -0.006
(0.232) (0.231) (0.230) (0.230) (0.235) (0.229) (0.225)
SFI Effectiveness Score 0.044 0.032 0.036 0.041 0.044 0.039 0.017
(0.067) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.060)
SFI Legitimacy Score -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.017 -0.011 -0.020 -0.025
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028)
N 933 933 926 931 926 926 926
R2 0.826 0.830 0.831 0.827 0.826 0.828 0.837
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by terrorist group. Regressions include state and year
fixed effects, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total suicide attacks carried
out in state j in year t . The standardized indexes for the Sacrifice and Stigma/Social Service Provision
proxies are used.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Sacrifice & Stigma/Social Service Provision on Terrorism - Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sacrifice and Stigma variables
Government Restrictions Index -0.083 -0.081
(0.133) (0.132)
L.Government Restrictions Index 0.076 0.033
(0.146) (0.136)
Social Hostilities Index 0.027 0.032
(0.096) (0.089)
L.Social Hostilities Index 0.254*** 0.235***
(0.080) (0.069)
Group Grievance 0.703*** 0.628***
(0.208) (0.199)
L.Group Grievance 0.314 0.428*
(0.226) (0.232)
Social Service Provision variables
Corruption Perceptions Index -0.267 -0.092
(0.315) (0.279)
L.Corruption Perceptions Index 0.080 0.189
(0.279) (0.254)
Economic Inequality 0.316 0.299
(0.292) (0.291)
L.Economic Inequality -0.374 -0.412
(0.325) (0.311)
Refugees/IDP 0.295 0.271
(0.277) (0.262)
L.Refugees/IDP -0.026 -0.025
(0.186) (0.188)
N 799 799 793 797 793 793 793
R2 0.872 0.874 0.879 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.883
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by terrorist group. Regressions include state and year
fixed effects, respectively. Control variables not shown. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of total terrorist attacks carried out in state j in year t . The standardized indexes for the Sacrifice and
Stigma/Social Service Provision proxies are used. All explanatory variables are lagged one year.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Sacrifice & Stigma/Social Service Provision on Suicide Terrorism - Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sacrifice and Stigma variables
Government Restrictions Index -0.065 -0.043
(0.068) (0.066)
L.Government Restrictions Index 0.189* 0.172*
(0.096) (0.090)
Social Hostilities Index 0.112* 0.100*
(0.061) (0.056)
L.Social Hostilities Index 0.123* 0.106*
(0.066) (0.057)
Group Grievance 0.452** 0.377**
(0.187) (0.157)
L.Group Grievance -0.131 -0.064
(0.158) (0.146)
Social Service Provision variables
Corruption Perceptions Index -0.364** -0.277**
(0.163) (0.135)
L.Corruption Perceptions Index 0.164 0.131
(0.145) (0.141)
Economic Inequality 0.222 0.182
(0.156) (0.156)
L.Economic Inequality -0.285 -0.267
(0.193) (0.178)
Refugees/IDP 0.303* 0.270*
(0.170) (0.150)
L.Refugees/IDP -0.127 -0.114
(0.106) (0.097)
N 799 799 793 797 793 793 793
R2 0.832 0.834 0.834 0.831 0.829 0.831 0.846
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by terrorist group. Regressions include state and year
fixed effects, respectively. Control variables not shown. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of total suicide attacks carried out in state j in year t . The standardized indexes for the Sacrifice and
Stigma/Social Service Provision proxies are used. All explanatory variables are lagged one year.
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Figure 2.1: Scatter plot showing the cross-sectional relationship between Terror Attacks and Government
Restrictions Index (Sacrifice and Stigma proxy 1) for 25 most populous states. Correlation for sample: 0.18.
Correlation for all states: 0.363.
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Figure 2.2: Scatter plot showing the cross-sectional relationship between Terror Attacks and Social Hos-
tilities Index (Sacrifice and Stigma proxy 2) for 25 most populous states. Correlation for sample: 0.594.
Correlation for all states: 0.621.
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Figure 2.3: Scatter plot showing the cross-sectional relationship between Terror Attacks and Group
Grievance (Sacrifice and Stigma proxy 3) for 25 most populous states. Correlation for sample: 0.395. Cor-
relation for all states: 0.40.
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Figure 2.4: Scatter plot showing the cross-sectional relationship between Terror Attacks and Economic
Inequality (Social Service Provision proxy 1) for 25 most populous states. Correlation for sample: 0.263.
Correlation for all states: 0.244.
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Figure 2.5: Scatter plot showing the cross-sectional relationship between Terror Attacks and
Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons (Social Service Provision proxy 2) for 25 most populous states. Cor-
relation for sample: 0.275. Correlation for all states: 0.367.
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Figure 2.6: Scatter plot showing the cross-sectional relationship between Terror Attacks and Corruption
Perception Index (Social Service Provision proxy 3) for 25 most populous states. Correlation for sample:
-0.269. Correlation for all states: -0.282.
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Appendix A
Table 2.7: Effect of S&S/SSP on Terrorism (additional control variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sacrifice and Stigma variables
Government Restrictions Index -0.016 -0.081
(0.131) (0.128)
Social Hostilities Index 0.352*** 0.339***
(0.099) (0.093)
Group Grievance 0.753*** 0.732***
(0.267) (0.255)
Social Service Provision variables
Corruption Perceptions Index -0.239 -0.013
(0.274) (0.244)
Economic Inequality 0.076 -0.051
(0.229) (0.223)
Refugees/IDP 0.260 0.228
(0.165) (0.154)
Control Variables
Population (log) 1.611 1.627 1.841 1.646 1.427 1.260 1.680
(1.324) (1.280) (1.264) (1.297) (1.356) (1.284) (1.232)
GDP pc (log) -0.115 -0.027 -0.085 -0.061 -0.089 -0.122 -0.034
(0.384) (0.362) (0.367) (0.384) (0.386) (0.384) (0.340)
SFI Effectiveness Score 0.208* 0.187 0.192* 0.206* 0.208* 0.202* 0.166
(0.119) (0.113) (0.110) (0.117) (0.120) (0.118) (0.104)
SFI Legitimacy Score 0.075 0.070 0.058 0.068 0.069 0.059 0.044
(0.095) (0.091) (0.092) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.088)
Polity Score -0.250 -0.229 -0.168 -0.248 -0.248 -0.266 -0.175
(0.212) (0.210) (0.214) (0.217) (0.219) (0.217) (0.203)
Polity2 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Regime Durability -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
N 906 906 899 904 899 899 899
R2 0.849 0.854 0.855 0.850 0.850 0.851 0.860
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by terrorist group. Regressions include state and year fixed ef-
fects, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total terrorist attacks carried out in state j in
year t . The standardized indexes for the Sacrifice and Stigma/Social Service Provision proxies are used.
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Table 2.8: Effect of Sacrifice & Stigma/Social Service Provision on Suicide Terrorism (additional control
variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sacrifice and Stigma variables
Government Restrictions Index -0.025 -0.030
(0.056) (0.052)
Social Hostilities Index 0.141** 0.134**
(0.055) (0.052)
Group Grievance 0.293** 0.271**
(0.144) (0.134)
Social Service Provision variables
Corruption Perceptions Index -0.194* -0.104
(0.114) (0.098)
Economic Inequality 0.009 -0.082
(0.098) (0.102)
Refugees/IDP 0.239* 0.235**
(0.121) (0.117)
Control Variables
Population (log) 0.764 0.769 0.891 0.807 0.759 0.517 0.778
(0.769) (0.731) (0.784) (0.759) (0.787) (0.716) (0.717)
GDP pc (log) -0.004 0.031 -0.008 0.037 -0.008 -0.044 0.016
(0.212) (0.210) (0.212) (0.213) (0.217) (0.207) (0.208)
SFI Effectiveness Score 0.069 0.061 0.064 0.068 0.070 0.065 0.050
(0.076) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.069)
SFI Legitimacy Score 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.015 0.006 -0.003
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033)
Polity Score -0.111 -0.100 -0.076 -0.107 -0.108 -0.124 -0.090
(0.137) (0.132) (0.136) (0.138) (0.139) (0.135) (0.122)
Polity2 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Regime Durability 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
N 906 906 899 904 899 899 899
R2 0.759 0.764 0.764 0.760 0.759 0.763 0.774
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by terrorist group. Regressions include state and year fixed
effects, respectively. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total suicide attacks carried out in state j
in year t . The standardized indexes for the Sacrifice and Stigma/Social Service Provision proxies are used.
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Appendix B
The cumulative State Fragility Index is made up of an Effectiveness Score and a Legitimacy Score, such
that
State Fragility Index= Effectiveness Score+Legitimacy Score (25 points possible).
The total effectiveness score is defined as
Effectiveness Score= Security Effectiveness+Political Effectiveness+Economic Effectiveness+
+Social Effectiveness (13 points possible).
The total legitimacy score is defined as
Legitimacy Score= Security Legitimacy+Political Legitimacy+Economic Legitimacy+
+Social Legitimacy (12 points possible).
I provide here brief descriptions of each of these indicators. On a four point scale, Security Effective-
ness provides a measure of the general security and vulnerability to political violence in a country from,
1992-2016, with a score of 0 denoting a state with the lowest amount of “residual war" and 3 indicating the
highest level of “residual war." Security Legitimacy provides a measure of state repression, 2002-2015.
Political Effectiveness gives a measure of regime/government stability, 2001-2016, taking into ac-
count the following factors: regime durability (based on a state Polity V score), current leader’s years
in office, and the total number of coup events. Political Legitimacy measures regime/governance inclu-
sion. The five indicators used to determine this score are 1) a measure of factionalism in the state; 2) a
measure of a state’s ethnic group political discrimination against 5% or more of the population; 3) political
salience of elite ethnicity; 4) polity fragmentation and 5) exclusionary ideology of ruling elite.
Economic Effectiveness gives a measure of a state’s GDP per capita, 2010-2016 (constant 2005 US
dollars). Economic Legitimacy measures the share of export trade in manufactured goods, 2002-2016.
Merchandise exports include two classes of products, manufactured goods and primary commodities.
A low percentage of manufactured goods indicates a high reliance on primary commodities and foreign
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exchange. The manufacturing percentage of merchandise exports is converted into a four-point fragility
score, where the highest value 3 is given when the percentage is less than or equal to 10.15
Social Effectiveness measures human capital development, 2016, based on the Human Development
Index (HDI), 2016, which is a composite index of life expectancy, education, and per capita income in-
dicators. Finally, Social Legitimacy gives a score for human capital care, 2016, based on a state’s infant
mortality rate.
15The world’s main illegal drug supplying countries, Afghanistan, Burma, and Columbia receive the highest value.
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Appendix C: Summary of methodology used to construct each Sacrifice
and Stigma/Social Service Provision variable
Government Restrictions on Religion (GRI): Sacrifice and Stigma proxy 116
1. Does the constitution, or law that functions in the place of a constitution (basic law), specifically
provide for ‘freedom of religion’ or include language used in Article 18 of the United Nations Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights?
2. Does the constitution or basic law include stipulations that appear to qualify or substantially con-
tradict the concept of ‘religious freedom’?
3. Taken together, how do the constitution/basic law and other national laws and policies affect reli-
gious freedom?
4. Does any level of government interfere with worship or other religious practices?
5. Is public preaching by religious groups limited by any level of government?
6. Is proselytizing limited by any level of government?
7. Is converting from one religion to another limited by any level of government?
8. Is religious literature or broadcasting limited by any level of government?
9. Are foreign missionaries allowed to operate?
10. Is the wearing of religious symbols, such as head coverings for women and facial hair for men, reg-
ulated by law or by any level of government?
11. Was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by any level of government?
12. Did the national government display hostility involving physical violence toward minority or non-
approved religious groups?
13. Were there instances when the national government did not intervene in cases of discrimination or
abuses against religious groups?
16Questions retrieved from Pew Research Center (2011). Refer to that source for an overview on the research objectives, infor-
mation sources and methodology of this index. Also refer to the source to view the various possible answers to each question, the
number and percentage of countries that fall into each category, and how each country scored on each question.
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14. Does the national government have an established organization to regulate or manage religious
affairs?
15. Did the national government denounce one or more religious groups by characterizing them as
dangerous “cults" or “sects"?
16. Does any level of government formally ban any religious group?
17. Were there instances when the national government attempted to eliminate an entire religious
group’s presence in the country?
18. Does any level of government ask religious groups to register for any reason, including to be eligible
for benefits such as tax exemption?
19. Did any level of government use force toward religious groups that resulted in individuals being
killed, physically abused, imprisoned, detained or displaced from their homes, or having their per-
sonal or religious properties damaged or destroyed?
20. Do some religious groups receive government support or favors, such as funding, official recogni-
tion or special access?
20.1. Does the country’s constitution or basic law recognize a favored religion or religions?
20.2. Do all religious groups receive the same level of government access and privileges?
20.3. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources to religious groups?
20.3.a. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious education programs
and/or religious schools?
20.3.b. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious property (e.g., buildings,
upkeep, repair or land)?
20.3.c. Does any level of government provide funds or other resources for religious activities other than
education or property?
20.4. Is religious education required in public schools?
20.5. Does the national government defer in some way to religious authorities, texts or doctrines on legal
issues?
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21. Does any level of government penalize the defamation of religion, including penalizing such things
as blasphemy, apostasy, and criticism or critiques of a religion or religions?
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Social Hostilities Index (SHI): Sacrifice and Stigma proxy 217
1. Were there crimes, malicious acts or violence motivated by religious hatred or bias?
2. Was there mob violence related to religion?
3. Were there acts of sectarian or communal violence between religious groups?
4. Were religion-related terrorist groups active in the country?
5. Was there a religion-related war or armed conflict in the country?
6. Did violence result from tensions between religious groups?
7. Did organized groups use force or coercion in an attempt to dominate public life with their perspec-
tive on religion, including preventing some religious groups from operating in the country?
8. Did religious groups themselves attempt to prevent other religious groups from being able to oper-
ate?
9. Did individuals or groups use violence or the threat of violence, including so-called honor killings,
to try to enforce religious norms?
10. Were individuals assaulted or displaced from their homes in retaliation for religious activities, in-
cluding preaching and other forms of religious expression, considered offensive or threatening to
the majority faith?
11. Were women harassed for violating religious dress codes?
12. Were there incidents of hostility over proselytizing?
13. Were there incidents of hostility over conversions from one religion to another?
17Questions retrieved from Pew Research Center (2011). Refer to that source for an overview on the research objectives, infor-
mation sources and methodology of this index. Also refer to the source to view the various possible answers to each question, the
number and percentage of countries that fall into each category, and how each country scored on each question.
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Group Grievance (GG) Indicator: Sacrifice and Stigma proxy 318
Post-Conflict Response
1. Truth & Reconciliation: Does a Truth and Reconciliation process exist or is one planned, needed?
2. Reintegration: Have groups been reintegrated, if applicable?
3. Reconstruction: Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
4. Compensation for Victims: Are victims of past atrocities compensated or is their a plan to compen-
sate them?
5. War Criminals: Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted? Do the public feel they are properly
punished?
6. Amnesty: Has amnesty been granted?
Equality
7. Distribution of Resources: Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?
Divisions
8. Group Hatred or Tolerance: Are there feelings of or reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance
and/or violence?
9. Group Oppression: Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
10. History: Is there a history of violence against a group or group grievance?
11. Intergroup Relations: How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
12. Religious Persecution or Tolerance: Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by
society? Are there reports of violence that is religiously motivated?
Communal Violence
13. Vigilante Justice: Are there reports of vigilant justice?
14. Mass Violence: Are the reports of mass violence and/or killings? Are there reports of violence that is
racially motivated?
18Questions retrieved from Fund for Peace (2015). Refer to this source for methodology.
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Uneven Economic Development Index (Economic Inequality): Social Service Provi-
sion proxy 119
Economic Equality
1. Economic Equality Gap: Is there a large economic gap?
2. Discriminatory Economics: Is the economic system discriminatory?
3. Economic Justice: Does economic justice exist?
4. Hiring Practices: Are hiring practices generally fair âA˘S¸ legally and the perception of others?
5. Social System: Do equal rights exist in the society?
6. Equal Rights Legislation: Are there laws protecting equal rights?
Economic Opportunity
7. Free Education: Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
8. Equal Education: Is the education provided relatively equal?
9. Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
10. Job Training: Do programs for job training exist?
11. Access to Job Training: Use Do people know about the job training and is it available based on
qualification and need?
Socio-Economic Dynamics
12. Ghettos or Slums: Do ghettos and slums exist?
19Questions retrieved from Fund for Peace (2015). Refer to this source for methodology.
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Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Refugees/IDP): Social Service Provision
proxy 220
Refugees
1. Influx of Refugees: Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
2. Impact of Refugees: Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
3. Increase in Refugee Camps: Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into com-
munities?
4. Violence against Refugees: Are there reports of violence against refugees?
5. Safety of Refugee Camps: Are conditions safe in refugee camps?
Internally Displaced Persons
6. Number of IDPs: How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
7. Increase in IDPs: Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
8. Impact of IDPs: Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?
Response to Displacement
9. Relief Efforts: Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees
and/or IDPs?
10. Relocation & Settlement: Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?
20Questions retrieved from Fund for Peace (2015). Refer to this source for methodology.
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Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): Social Service Provision proxy 321
Methodology
The following steps are followed to calculate the CPI:
1. Select data sources: The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is an aggregate indicator that brings
together data from a number of different sources. Each data source must fulfill the following criteria
to qualify as a source for the CPI:
– Quantifies perceptions of corruption in the public sector.
– Be based on a reliable and valid methodology, which scores and ranks multiple countries on
the same scale.
– Performed by a credible institution and expected to be repeated regularly.
– Allow for sufficient variation of scores to distinguish between countries.
2. Standardise data sources to a scale of 0-100 where a 0 equals the highest level of perceived corrup-
tion and 100 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption.
3. Calculate the average: For a country or territory to be included in the CPI, a minimum of three
sources must assess that country.
4. Report a measure of uncertainty: The CPI is accompanied by a standard error and confidence in-
terval associated with the score, which capture the variation in scores of the data sources available
for that country/territory.
Sources were used to construct the Corruption Perceptions Index 2014:
1. African Development Bank Governance Ratings 2013
2. Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators 2014
3. Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 2014
4. Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings 2014
5. Freedom House Nations in Transit 2013
6. Global Insight Country Risk Ratings 2014
21Description retrieved from Transparency International (1995).
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7. IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2014
8. Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2014
9. Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide 2014
10. World Bank - Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2013
11. World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) 2014
12. World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2014
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Chapter 3
The Linkage Between Terrorism and
Party Politics: An Applied
Microeconomic Case Study Analysis
What is the relationship between party politics and terrorism? In this study I examine the conditions that
lead some political parties to adopt terrorist tactics, and, on the other hand, the conditions that make
terrorist groups transition to electoral politics. Combining economic theory with case studies of mili-
tant organizations in Lebanon, Turkey, Israel, Palestine, Spain, Ireland, and South America, I analyze the
interplay between terrorism and party politics based on the paradigm of rational choice theory. As eco-
nomic agents pursuing political goals, terrorist organizations respond to prevailing political, social, and
cultural incentives by adjusting their behavior accordingly. Thus, in pursuit of their goals rational terror-
ists will weigh the costs and benefits of the various tactics at their disposal, which include both terrorism
and party politics, and will choose a combination of tactics that they expect optimizes political benefits.
Within a supply and demand framework I consider the types of exogenous and endogenous events that
may shift a political group’s marginal costs and marginal benefits of committing violent acts in pursuit of
its goals, and then use a selection of cases that offer valuable insights into the behavior of terrorist groups
and political actors more broadly.
JEL categories: D74; H41; H56; O17; Z12
Keywords: Terrorism, rational choice theory, political parties, counterterrorism policy, democratiza-
tion, political institutions
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3.1 Introduction
“The function of the armed struggle is not to destroy the enemy, for that is utopian, but it is
indeed to force him, through a prolonged war of psychological and physical attrition, to aban-
don our territory due to exhaustion and isolation."
–1978 Policy Pronouncement by the ETA (Basque nationalist terrorist group), quoted in Leta-
mendia (1994) 114
Under what conditions do some nonviolent political parties transform into militant organizations?
Alternatively, what causes some militant organizations to turn away from violence and instead engage
in nonviolent party politics? On the surface, terrorist violence may seem antithetic to electoral politics.
Whereas democratic political activity is generally perceived to signify a healthy state apparatus, terrorist
activity is often assumed to be an absolute rejection of the political process. Although counterintuitive,
the distinction between party politics and terrorism is not always as clear as many in West tend to as-
sume. Terrorism, after all, is fundamentally ideological or political in nature, rather than financial (Na-
tional Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)). As such, voting and
political protest are more accurate analogies for terrorism than crime (Krueger (2007), 4).
Economists have suggested that terrorist behavior can be understood within a paradigm of rational
choice theory (van Um (2015), 2). Rational choice models presume that the rational terrorist has stable
objectives that he wants to accomplish, takes into account costs, benefits, and probabilities of events,
and chooses the best course of action in pursuit of his goals. Economic theory thus has much to offer
in explaining the dynamics involved in the relationship between nonviolent party politics and political
extremism: assuming optimizing behavior, the proposition that violence and non-violence are simply two
types of tactics employed by groups in pursuit of their goals, an organization will use the combination of
violence and non-violence that best helps it attain its objectives.
In Section 3.2 I develop an economic framework of the relationship between party politics and ter-
rorism. The basic economic theory I employ is based on an assumption of political rationality such that
an organized political movement will resort to terrorist tactics only when it perceives that the marginal
benefits of doing so are greater than the marginal costs. As such, I analyze extremism within a market
framework that includes a supply side and a demand side, and describe how events affecting the supply
and/or demand curves may induce an entry into, or exit from, terrorism.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 I then illustrate the dynamics involved in the transformation of organiza-
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tions into or out of terrorism by way of case studies of numerous 20th and 21st century organizations that
have engaged in both militancy and party politics, at times simultaneously. I give detailed accounts of a
variety of organizations across the ideological spectrum, covering three continents and over half a cen-
tury. I examine the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish left-wing separatist military and political
organization that began as a revolutionary socialist mass movement of political protest by Kurdish stu-
dents in the 1970s, but has since then employed both military and political tactics towards its objective
of an independent Kurdish state. I consider the case of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), which began
when the power-sharing political status quo collapsed, leading to religious-based political parties form-
ing armed militias to wage war against poitical adversaries. I then investigate Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Basque separatists in Spain, respectively; the military and political activities of each of these has gone
through complex cyclical patterns, at times focusing energy on violence but when the circumstances dic-
tate strategically transitioning into a party framework that competes for support at the ballot box. Finally,
I examine the case of right-wing Zionist paramilitary organizations that operated in British-controlled
Mandatory Palestine prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The prototype of the secular
political right-wing in Israel, these organizations drew their support from the “Revisionist Zionist" popu-
lar movement in Mandatory Palestine and conducted terror campaigns against the British establishment
and against the Arab population. After the founding of the Jewish state in 1948, these militias went un-
derground and were initially reluctant to surrender their autonomy and merge into the official state-run
military (the IDF). But following a decisive military campaign launched by the IDF to stamp out all rival
Jewish factions in the newly-formed state, these groups, under the leadership of future prime minister
Menachem Begin, unconditionally laid down their arms and transitioned into political parties, establish-
ing the Herut (“Freedom") Party that eventually merged into the Likud party.
3.2 Theory
Figure 3.1 shows the conditions that may encourage a nonviolent political party to become violent,
and, alternatively, the circumstances that may lead a terrorist group to pursue its goals through nonviolent
means. The curves MC0 and MB0 represent the marginal costs and the marginal benefits, respectively, of
engaging in violence, where the optimal level of violence, the intersection of the two curves, is E0. There
exists a threshold, shown on the graph as the vertical line, which signifies the level at which all points to
the right denote a positive optimal level of violence, and all points to the left indicate the optimal level of
108
violence to be zero.
What kinds of factors cause MC0 and/or MB0 to shift, thus affecting the equilibrium quantity of
violence pursued by a group, and potentially leading to a group transforming either into or out of terror-
ism? The marginal cost schedule facing a group is influenced by factors that either raise or lower the costs
of participating in terrorist violence, which primarily includes state law enforcement/counterterrorism
abilities. States that maintain an effective security apparatus are able to raise the costs faced by sub-state
actors of engaging in political violence, thus implying relatively high marginal costs of violence at every
level of terrorism. If the marginal benefit curve stays constant, then a strengthening of a state’s law en-
forcement capabilities will induce a shift from MC0 to MC1; depending on the magnitude of this shift, the
optimal level of violence may lead to a situation in which a violent group no longer considers it optimal
to engage in terrorism (Raynold (2018)).
Because I assume that the objectives of terrorist groups and political parties are both political or
ideological in nature, rather than criminal, an optimizing group will pursue a combination of violent and
nonviolent means such that its objective function is maximized. Assuming that voting is an apt analogy for
terrorism (Krueger (2008), 4), the main factor that should influence the marginal benefits of terrorism in
pursuit of its political objectives is the quality of a state’s political order that promotes non-violent means
of voicing dissent (Krieger and Meierrieks (2011)). Theoretically, democratic political regimes are better
suited to facilitating the peaceful mediation of disputes than autocratic ones (Raynold (2018)), thereby
implying a lower marginal benefit of violence relative to the marginal benefit of party politics as a way
to pursue political goals in democratic states. A strengthening in the integrity of civil institutions so that
dissatisfied entities within a state are able to more effectively express their grievances within the political
structure would lead to, all else equal, a shift in the marginal benefit curve from MB0 to MB1; depending
on the magnitude of the shift, and whether the marginal cost curve also shifts, the optimal level of violence
for a group may become non-positive, as shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: This figure shows the conditions that may encourage a nonviolent political party to become
violent, and, alternatively, the circumstances that may lead a terrorist group to become nonviolent. The
curves MC0 and MB0 represent the marginal costs and marginal benefits associated with conducting
terrorism as perceived by an organization. MC1 and MB1 then denote hypothetical shifts in the costs and
benefits of violence, respectively. The optimal level of violence is positive at the initial equilibrium, E0,
but is non-positive at the new equilibrium, E1.
The events described above that cause shifts in the marginal cost curve (the relative efficacy of a
state’s security establishment in combating violent dissent within the state) and the marginal benefit
curve (whether a state’s political order allows for grievances to be expressed and dealt with in a peace-
ful manner) are only two general factors relevant to a group’s decision whether or not engage in terrorist
activity. I will now turn to a more in-depth discussion of types of exogenous, and endogenous, events that
influence a sect’s decision to either pursue or refrain from violent tactics.
3.3 From Nonviolent to Violent
3.3.1 Economics of the Transformation
There are numerous factors that operate as shifters of the marginal cost and marginal benefit sched-
ules of terrorism. Figure 3.1 suggests that the necessary and sufficient condition under which a political
group perceives that its optimal level of violence is positive, is when the intersection of the supply and de-
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mand curves lies to the right of the minimum violence threshold. For a group whose current optimal level
of violence is non-positive, entry into terrorism can occur when the group experiences 1) a sufficiently
large reduction in the marginal costs of perpetuating terrorism, holding constant the marginal benefit
curve; or 2) a sufficiently large increase in the marginal benefit curve, holding constant the marginal cost
curve. Of course, events that simultaneously affect both curves may also induce transformation from
nonviolence into violence, depending on the relative magnitudes of the shifts (Raynold (2018)).
3.3.2 Methods and Reasons Political Parties Turn to Violence
The transformation from party politics into terrorism will usually take place in one of three ways
(Pedahzur et al. (2008), 41). First, an existing political party may become involved in terrorism. This could
happen if the party itself directly engages in violence, or it could happen if the party indirectly gets in-
volved in violence by establishing a “military wing" that is only loosely affiliated with the central political
apparatus, giving a sense of plausible deniability to the “political wing." An example of this method of
transition includes the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3.3), a sep-
aratist Kurdish organization that began as a party in the 1970s but turned to terror tactics in the 1980s.
Since its founding, the organization has had ties, to varying degrees of closeness, to a sequence of Kurdish
nationalist political parties in Turkey. Another example of a party that established a military wing in the
case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which was established in 1964 as the military
wing of the Colombian Communist Party.
A second way that the transformation from party politics into terrorism can occur is if a radical fac-
tion within a party splits off from the main organization and launches a terror campaign; this will often
occur when the radical faction feels that the party has become too soft or overly-accommodating to its
political opponent. A third way that transition can occur is when political parties incite and encourage
terrorism, but do not directly engage in it (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 41).
Another important factor that may induce transformation from nonviolence into violence, primar-
ily by means of an increase in the marginal benefit of violence, is a change in the nonviolent political
party’s objective function so that party leaders or constituents no longer feel that their interests are be-
ing adequately represented through peaceful party politics (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 18). For example, the
political goals of an ethnic or religious minority group within a state may become more ambitious over
time. Initially, the goals of the group may be limited to things like equality under the law, integration into
the general society, political representation at the national level, or experiencing a certain amount of lo-
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cal autonomy. For these types of goals, participation in regular party politics may adequately meet the
needs of the minority group. However, if the fundamental goals of the group change and become more
ambitious, such as when a group pursues not merely political power or local autonomy but full-scale se-
cession and independence, then the marginal benefit of violence may increase relative to the marginal
benefit of party politics, such that the group transforms into a violent sect. The long history of the Basque
nationalist-separatist movement (discussed in Section 3.4.3) offers an example of how this kind of change
in demand may incentive an organization to pursue a more ambitious terror campaign.
Or, even if this type of revision of group objectives does not increase the marginal benefit curve to
the point where the optimal level of violence is positive, political expression of a minority group may in
itself provoke a response from authorities that could, ironically, trigger additional radicalization among
the minority sect, leading to a further revision of group objectives that includes exacting revenge on the
repressive authorities (Raynold (2018)). This kind of unfortunate downward spiral of violence between a
minority group and the ruling authorities has been witnessed in the Sri Lankan Civil War, an intermittent
insurgency between secessionist Tamil nationalists (led by the Tamil Tigers) and the Sri Lankan govern-
ment which lasted from 1983 to 2009, and also in the case of the Basque conflict (Pedahzur et al. (2008),
18).
3.3.3 The Case of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
This dynamic been seen in the Kurdish struggle for independence in Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) was founded in 1974 by Kurdish students as a Marxist-Leninist political organization advocat-
ing for cultural, linguistic, and political rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority (Joseph (2006), 100) and, until
recently, sought to create an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey and parts of neighboring
countries inhabited by Kurds (Bruno (2007)). Following a military coup in Turkey in 1980, the Turkish
government took aggressive steps to suppress ethnic Kurds, including provisions in the law banning the
spoken and written use of the Kurdish language, leading to the exile, imprisonment, or execution of many
PKK members (Joseph (2006), 100). As a response, the PKK officially launched an insurgency in August
1984 that by the beginning of 2000 had resulted in more than 37,000 deaths, up to 3,000 villages being
destroyed, and up to 3 million people being internally displaced (Joseph (2006), 100).
During the period of its militancy in the 1980s and 1990s, the PKK depended on guerrilla warfare
against the Turkish government, including bombings against government sites, kidnappings of foreign
tourists in Turkey, suicide bombings targeting local governors, police installation and tourism related tar-
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gets, raids on villages, and attacks on Turkish diplomatic offices in Europe (Bruno (2007); START (2015)).
The Turkish military launched a crushing crackdown of the PKK in 1999, leading to the capture and im-
prisonment of its founder and leader, Abdullah Ocalan (Bruno (2007)). Remarkably, in the immediate
wake of the crackdown, instead of inciting their militants to pursue further armed struggle, both Ocalan
and the remaining leaders renounced militancy and attempted to reorganize and rebrand the movement
as a political party (Joseph (2006), 101). At a party Congress in 2002, the PKK changed its name to the
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and proclaimed a commitment to non-violent ac-
tivities in support of Kurdish rights (U.S. Department of State (2005)). The ceasefire lasted for five years,
during which time the group divided into two factions, politically-minded reformists and hardliners who
advocated for renewed militancy (U.S. Department of State (2005)). The hardliners took control of the
party in February 2004, and then on June 1, 2004, the PKK’s hardline military wing, the People’s Defense
Force (HPG), officially called off the self-imposed ceasefire and returned to armed struggle (U.S. Depart-
ment of State (2005)). The subsequent violence reached its peak in 2012, when at least 541 people died
(Tezcür (2013)). This second insurgency continued until the negotiation of a new ceasefire in 2013.
3.3.4 The Case of Lebanon
Another event that may lead to a transformation from nonviolent party politics to terrorism is a crisis
of political disintegration that usually occurs in failing or failed states (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 18). Notable
examples include the Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, and Iraq in the post-American
invasion period. The Lebanese Civil War was a multistage conflict caused when minor sectarian clashes
in 1975 fractured a delicate power-sharing agreement between the various sects (an unwritten agreement
known as the “National Pact") and sparked a chain of events that soon resulted in the breakdown in au-
thority of the national government. The country became sharply divided along sectarian lines, and the
political parties which had previously represented each religious community–Maronite Christian, Sunni
Muslim, Shia Muslim, Druze, and Palestinians–in the national government now formed their own militias,
leading to all-out conflict between the sects. The major sectarian political parties involved, such as the
Phalanges Party (Maronite Christian), Amal (Shia Muslim), Hezbollah (Shia Muslim), Palestine Liberation
Organization (Palestinian), and the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze), each established a military wing
that not only provided protection to the respective communities but also engaged in open conflict with
the other militias and committed terrorist acts against rival communities (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 18).
In the case of Lebanon, then, the events in the 1970s had the effect of increasing both the marginal
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cost and marginal benefit curves of terrorism, explaining the transformation of political parties into mil-
itancy. The weakness of the Lebanese national government and its inability to enforce the rule of law
reduced the marginal cost of terrorism at every level of violence. In addition, the sectarian conflict led to
the radicalization of each religious community that increased the marginal benefit of terrorism at every
level of violence.
3.4 From Violent to Nonviolent
Pedahzur et al. (2008)1 note that there are two principle ways that an organization may transform
from terrorism into peaceful party politics. The first is by following the biblical admonition to “beat their
swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks," that is, completely laying down its arms and
channeling its ideological fervor into electoral politics. Examples of this type of transformation include
the Tupamaros in Uruguay, a left-wing urban guerrilla group active from 1967 to 1972. In response to di-
rect Tupamaro attacks against the Uruguayan military in 1972, the army took action and swiftly destroyed
the movement. Many members fled into exile, while others were caught by the military and either killed or
tortured and imprisoned. When the military dictatorship in the country ended in 1984 and democracy re-
stored, the Tupamaros were granted amnesty, and invited to participate in parliamentary elections, which
they did, reestablishing themselves as a peaceful political actor (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 75). A similar tran-
sition also occurred in the case of the Zionist paramilitary organization, the Irgun, which at the behest
of its commander, Menachem Begin, abandoned its paramilitary character following the establishment
of the State of Israel in 1948 and transformed into the right-wing Herut (“Freedom") political party, the
direct predecessor of the current Likud party (see Section 3.4.4 for a complete discussion of this case).
Another way that an organization may transform from violence into politics is by creating a “political
wing" to complement its military activities. In November 1995, for instance, Hamas launched its political
wing, the “Islamic National Salvation Party," as a way to attain political influence and mobilize support
for its cause (see Section 3.4.2). Similarly, up until 1979 the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
had relied exclusively on violence in pursuit of its Irish unification goals; but in 1979 leader Gerry Adams
proposed the formation of a above-ground legitimate political movement that could mobilize supporters
and gain parliamentary influence, and hence established Sinn Fein. Other militant sects that have added
to their arsenals a political wing include Hezbollah (see Section 3.4.1), the left-wing nationalist “19th of
1p. 75
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April Movement" in Columbia, and Basque separatist ETA organization Basque in Spain (Pedahzur et al.
(2008), pp. 25, 30).
3.4.1 The Case of Hezbollah
The transition from terrorism to party politics may occur in the wake of a transformation of the es-
tablished political order (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 85). The case of Lebanese Shia Islamist group Hezbollah
(“Party of God") provides an example of how adopting party politics often works to legitimize an organiza-
tion internationally and to expand its national constituency (Acosta (2014)). Hezbollah was established in
the early 1980s by the Iranian government in order to form an alternative political movement to the older
Amal, the largest and strongest political party/militia representing Lebanon’s Shia population (Pedahzur
et al. (2008), 86). Hezbollah’s initial agenda, expressed in the issuing in February 1985 of ‘The Open Letter’
manifesto, revolved around abolishing Maronite dominance over Lebanese politics (referred to as “Polit-
ical Maronitism"), and establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon modeled on Iran’s revolutionary Shiism
(Rabil (2012)). In addition to these domestic political goals, Hezbollah also focused on fighting the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon, and punishing Lebanese those in the Lebanese establishment (mostly
Maronites) who collaborated with Israel.
Hezbollah is a example of a pragmatic organization which oscillates between party politics and ter-
rorism based on changes in the Lebanese political climate. While the organization’s main goal, estab-
lishing a revolutionary Shia Islamic order in Lebanon, has remained unchanged over the course of its
existence (Hamzeh (2004)), the instability and unpredictability of Lebanese politics means that the rel-
ative price of political violence, in relation to party politics, fluctuates, leading an optimizing political
actor like Hezbollah to adjust its tactics accordingly. During the political chaos of the Lebanese Civil War
in the 1980s, with central authority in Lebanon nonexistent, the costs perceived by Hezbollah in pursu-
ing its objectives using violent means were extremely low. During this decade, Hezbollah proved to be
an formidable revolutionary militia, successfully establishing itself as a viable political and military al-
ternative to its archrival, the Amal Movement, the other major Shia-dominated political party/militia in
Lebanon. In 1982-83, for example, it carried out operations against US and international peacekeeping
forces in Lebanon, most notably the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, when in a coordinated suicide at-
tack two truck bombs drove into the American and French military barracks, respectively, killing 241 US
marines and 58 French peacekeepers. The modus operandi of this attack, remote detonation of a car or
truck bomb by suicide terrorists, was a tactic that would be one of Hezbollah’s trademarks (Pedahzur et
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al. (2008), 86).
Hezbollah also focused its attention on waging asymmetric warfare against the Israeli military. In
1982, the Israeli military invaded Lebanon in 1982 in a campaign called “Operation Peace for Galilee,"
launched in response to ongoing raids against Israel by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from
its newly-established base in southern Lebanon (Martin (2017), 436).2 The immediate catalyst for the op-
eration was the attempted assassination in London of Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo
Argov, by terrorists from the Abu Nidal Organization.3
Hezbollah’s struggle against the Israel military is notable because of its use of suicide terrorism, a
previously uncommon tactic that Hezbollah popularized during this conflict. Hezbollah has been linked
to 36 suicide attacks in Lebanon between 1982 and 1986, killing 659 individuals, mostly Israeli soldiers
(Pape (2006), 129). The most infamous of these attacks were the 1982-1983 Tyre headquarters bomb-
ings, two suicide bombings, separated by almost exactly one year, against Israeli military headquarters in
Tyre. In these attacks, suicide bombers drove vehicles rigged with explosives into the seven-story building,
killing over 90 people in the first attack and about 60 the following year. Having successfully accomplished
its mission of eradicated the PLO from Lebanon, in early 1985 Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, a
victory celebrated by Hezbollah. Israel continued to occupy a small buffer zone in southern Lebanon,
however, and a war of attrition ensued between the two sides until the total Israel withdrawal in 2000.
The withdrawal by the Israeli forces to the security zone in southern Lebanon, along with the end-
ing of hostilities of the Lebanese Civil War, formalized in the signing in late 1989 of the Taif Agreement
which restored the national political system in Lebanon, prompted Hezbollah to adapt itself to these
changing circumstances by officially entering the “political game" (Ranstorp (1998)). This transition–
referred to internally as the Infitah, ‘opening up’, of Hezbollah to the political scene– did not occur without
2Founded in 1964, the PLO, an umbrella organization consisting of numerous secular Palestinian nationalist resistance move-
ments, relocated to Jordan after Jordan lost control of the West Bank in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. From its base in Jordan, the PLO
carried out cross-border attacks against Israel, who often responded by attacking Jordanian targets. By 1970 King Hussein of Jordan
had become fed up with the PLO’s presence in his country, as the Palestinian fedayeen had essentially set up a state within a state
in Jordan, attempting on a couple of occasions to assassinate the king himself. Following King Hussein’s suppression of the PLO’s
rebellion against him in 1970 in a conflict known as “Black September," the now-displaced PLO, under Yasser Arafat’s leadership, fled
to Lebanon, setting up its headquarters in Beirut, subsequently used as a staging ground for planning raids and airplane hijacking
operations against Israelis and Jews. In addition to being the context for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PLO’s settling
in Lebanon was one of the catalysts for the Lebanese Civil War; its presence in the country had a major destabilization effect on sec-
tarian strife in Lebanon, and the all-out conflict formally began in 1975 with clashes between Maronite Christians and Palestinians
in the streets of Beirut.
3Named after its founder, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was created in 1974 when Abu Nidal split from Arafat’s Fatah faction
of the PLO (ANO is also referred to as “Fatah-The Revolutionary Council"). The split was caused by Abu Nidal becoming disillusioned
with Arafat’s alleged willingness to seek compromise with Israel, as well as for being corrupt. A coalition of radical factions, including
ANO, formed the so-called “Rejectionist Front" in 1974 that accused the PLO of being too moderate in its stance against Israel.
Infighting between the Rejectionist Front and the PLO became intense during the Lebanese Civil War of the 1980s, precipitating
Arafat’s relocation to Tunis in December 1983 (van Um (2015), 83).
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much heated debate amongst the leadership, however, as it realized that by participating in the Lebanese
elections it would be admitting legitimacy to the Lebanese political system that it had previously been
adamant about abolishing (Rabil (2012)). Hezbollah’s leadership formed a committee to assess the merits
of political participation. The committee realized there were many advantages of entering politics, such
as 1) recognition of Hezbollah as a legitimate organization by the state and the Lebanese people; and 2)
the ability to use parliament as a platform to present its Islamist vision and draft legislation furthering its
“resistance" agenda. The committee voted (ten out of twelve) in favor of political participation, believing
that the decision did not ultimately conflict with the movement’s vision for defending the affairs of its
Shia base, and also not in conflict with the priority of jihad, especially concerning resistance against Is-
rael (Rabil (2012)). The reasoning behind Hezbollah’s decision to participate in parliamentary politics was
coherently explained by Ayatollah Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, Hezbollah’s spiritual father. This expla-
nation is instructive because Fadlallah not only describes why the advantages of transition outweigh the
disadvantages, but also attempts to reassure the skeptics in the movement who feared that the transition
would lead to making political concessions on core principles:
Hezbollah should enter the electoral arena if only for the sake of Islamic legitimacy in Lebanon,
which dictates the formation of a parliamentary party. This is not to say that the Islamists have
embraced the parliamentary system, but parliament does provide a forum where they can
express their views and urge others, if not to adopt those views, at least to be more accom-
modating toward them. Participation in this system may enable Hezbollah to realize some
transitional goals. I believe that Hezballah has reached a stage of reasonable political matu-
rity. It has amassed expertise in military, security, cultural, and political affairs, which greatly
enhances its chances of spreading its influence in Lebanon, despite the challenge from the
international American-Israeli campaign against it. It would be very difficult to terminate the
role of Hezballah, because that role has strong grass-roots support and is furthermore well
grounded in its structure, methodology, thought, and political activities (Rabil (2012)).
Thus, without compromising its stated objectives, the group entered politics and presented a “Leban-
onization" program, which was designed to electorally legitimize itself and create a political infrastructure
that could be used as a tool to expand its influence beyond its Shia bases in Dahieh (a Shia-majority south-
ern suburb of Beirut) and areas of southern Lebanon (Rabil (2012); Acosta (2014)). This strategic readjust-
ment, from a “military jihad" to a “political jihad," demonstrates Hezbollah’s flexibility and pragmatism
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(Hamzeh (2004)). It also shows that the main factor dictating the methods employed by the group at any
particular time in pursuit of its goal is the Lebanese political structure, a factor not of course exogenous
to the actions of Hezbollah itself; when the state is strong, as it was following the end of the Civil War in
1990 (i.e., relatively high marginal cost of engaging in political violence), Hezbollah focuses on consoli-
dating power through its political and social infrastructure. When the state is weak (low marginal cost of
engaging in political violence), Hezbollah uses more militant tactics. (Rabil (2012))
This self-awareness of the need to adjust its tactics depending on the current political climate is
encapsulated by a statement made by Muhammad Fannish, a leading member of Hezbollah’s Politbureau,
which was instituted prior to the organization’s decision to participate in the first Lebanese parliamentary
elections after the ending of the Civil War in August-September 1992: “The movement is driven, through
such an understanding, to change the present, develop capabilities, surmount obstacles, and define the
means appropriate for continuing on the road towards objectives" (Ranstorp (1998)).
In Figure 3.2 I illustrate the cost-minimization problem facing a group like Hezbollah that wishes to
efficiently allocate resources between terrorist activity and party politics in pursuit of its goals.4 Assume
that terrorist activity and party politics are the two inputs Hezbollah uses to produce output, which in
this case can be understood as the achievement of political or ideological goals. The isoquant line shows
the combination of terrorist activity and party politics that can produce a given level of output, and the
isocost lines show the combination of these inputs that cost the same amount. Hezbollah maximizes its
“profits" when it chooses the combination of factors that costs the least. Profits are maximized by max-
imizing the level of output produced for a given cost or, equivalently, minimizing costs of producing a
given amount. This is determined by finding the point of tangency between the isoquant and isocost
curves, which at original input prices is shown at Q0, where v0 units of terrorism and p0 units of party
politics are “produced." Suppose this equilibrium illustrates Hezbollah’s behavior during the chaotic pe-
riod of 1980s when the Lebanon’s civil society was in shambles and power was in the hands of sectarian
warlords who settled political disputes by deploying their militias to attack enemies.
Following a hypothetical change in the ratio of the prices of the two inputs, terrorism and politics,
the isocost line shifts from C0 to C1; the absolute value of the slope of the new isocost line has increased,
meaning terrorist activity has now become relatively more expensive for Hezbollah. Historically, this
could understood as the period of time following the cessation of hostilities with the 1989 ratification
4Anderton et al. (2009) (pages 126-155) provide a useful overview of the principles of economic choice and game theory that shed
light on the resource allocation decisions made by terrorists.
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of the Taif Agreement, which restructured the political system in Lebanon and ordered the disarmament
of all sectarian militias (Hezbollah, however, was given a special permission to maintain its militia in or-
der to continue fighting Israel in southern Lebanon). At these new prices, the optimal (i.e., lowest cost)
combination of terrorism and politics that can produce a level of output equal to the isoquant is given by
Q1, where terrorist activity falls to v1 and political activity rises to p1.
Figure 3.2: This diagram illustrates the cost-minimization problem facing a political organization. Assume
that party politics and terrorist activity are two inputs that the organization can use to produce a given
level of “output," such as the achievement of some political or ideological aim. The isoquant line (the
production theory counterpart to the consumer’s indifference curve) shows the combination of these two
inputs that can produce a given quantity of output, where the slope give the marginal rate of technical
substitution, the rate at which one input can be substituted for the other while keeping output constant.
The isocost lines (the counterpart to the budget constraint in consumer theory), C0 and C1, show the
combination of the two factors of production, party politics and terrorism, which cost the organization
the same amount. The slope represents the ratio of the factor prices. At initial factor prices, C0, the point
of tangency between the isoquant line and the original isocost line, Q0, gives the lowest-cost combination
of terrorism and party politics that can produce the output level associated with the isoquant. Following
a hypothetical change in the ratio of the factor prices, the isocost line shifts and the optimal input bundle
becomes Q1.
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Hezbollah’s has also demonstrated its skill with its extensive social welfare programs to its Shia con-
stituents, often surpassing the Lebanese government’s efforts in this regard. Its social service activities
include rebuilding 5,000 homes in 82 villages in the aftermath of Operation Grapes of Wrath, a sixteen-day
campaign by the Israeli military in 1996 attempting to stop rocket attacks on northern Israel by Hezbol-
lah (Ranstorp (1998)). Funded mostly by Iran, its social contributions include “The Martyr Foundation,"
which gives financial compensation to the families of fighters killed by Israeli forces, and “The Islamic
Health Committee," established in 1984, which builds schools, hospitals and pharmacies, and digs wells
(Rabil (2012). These social undertakings have filled a social vacuum in Lebanon, and are a primary rea-
son why the organization enjoys wide-spread grassroots support. It also explains its impressive political
successes in the 1992 1996, 2000, and 2005 Lebanese parliamentary elections (Ranstorp (1998)). In the
2005 elections, the party won 14 parliamentary seats and, for the first time, became a member of the ex-
ecutive authority in Lebanon, making Hezbollah one of the only terror organizations in the world to not
only manage a political party but also wield legitimate power within the government’s executive authority
(Pedahzur et al. (2008), 90).
The major operational changes which Hezbollah initiated in the 1990s–transition into the political
sphere and taking on the role of the most efficient supplier of public goods in Lebanon–should not be
interpreted as indicating a fundamental shift in the group’s preferences, which have always jihad against
Israel and an Islamization of the state. On the surface, it may appear that the radical shifts in tactics
ushered in by Intifah and Lebanonization, such as focusing on developing its network of socio-economic
institutions and winning over the hearts and minds of the populace, points to a transformation into a
benign political actor. However, its true motives remain the creation of a political cover for its dual Islamic
Resistance and anti-Israel mission. “In this respect, Lebanonization and Infitah are not about integrating
the Hydra-like Hezbollah into Lebanon’s political system but it is about a reverse integration, whereby
society and the state would be integrated into Hezbollah’s project" (Rabil (2012)). This shows how skillfully
Hezbollah adapts to changing circumstances, exploiting the political system when it judges this to be a
more efficient tactic than terrorist violence.
3.4.2 The Case of Hamas
Officially founded after the breakout of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987, Hamas (which literally
means “bravery," “zeal," or “courage" in Arabic but is also the acronym for “Islamic Resistance Move-
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ment," the group’s official name) is a direct offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.5 Branches of the
Muslim Brotherhood first appeared in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the 1950s, and in 1971 Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin founded an affiliated organization called Congress (Mujamah) in Gaza. Yassin’s movement
found popular support in Gaza due to the establishment of a vast humanitarian social service network ap-
paratus (dawa), including medical clinics, schools, charities, support for orphans, drug treatment centers,
youth clubs, sports clubs and mosques (Berman and Laitin (2008)).
In contrast to its main rivals, the various factions operating under the PLO banner which are all sec-
ular and tend to have revolutionary socialist and Marxist-Leninist ideological leanings, Hamas combines
Sunni Islamic fundamentalism with Palestinian nationalism.6 Hamas’s official charter emphasizes a rad-
ical, uncompromising, rejectionist stance with respect to Israel’s existence, and the need to destroy Israel
through jihad. Employing traditional anti-Semitic myths to demonize not only Jews but also the Jewish
religion, Hamas therefore interprets the Israel-Palestinian conflict within a radical Islamic worldview, in
stark opposition to the PLO’s secularist orientation (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988)).
The First Intifada broke out in 1987 as a spontaneous uprising against the Israeli occupation when,
on December 8, 1987, a motor accident in Gaza involving an Israeli truck driver that left several Palestini-
ans dead triggered riots (Abu-Amr (1993)). The organization carried out its first attack in 1989, kidnapping
and executing two Israeli soldiers. Israel responded by arresting and imprisoning several high-ranking
Hamas officials, including Yassin (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 91). In 1991, the movement officially established
its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigades, which during the 1990s conducted countless attacks
against Israeli civilian and military targets. Following the abduction and killing of an Israeli police officer
in December 1992 by members of the Izz ad-Din al Qassam Brigades, the Israeli government deported 400
Hamas leaders to Lebanon, where they came into close contact with Hezbollah leaders (Pedahzur et al.
(2008), 91-92). This is consequential, because it was from these Hezbollah leaders that the Hamas mili-
tants received instruction on how to effectively employ suicide tactics, knowledge which they imparted
5The spiritual founder of the modern phenomenon of militant Salafi jihad was Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who was a leading
member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. An Egyptian, he insisted on the violent overthrow of the
secular Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser. While Qutb had spent two years in the United States from 1948-1950 and
despised the West, he had no interest in waging war against it. After he returned to Egypt from the US, Qutb published an essay called
“The America I Have Seen," in which he lambastes secular, materialist American culture. It was only after he returned to Egypt that
Qutb became an outspoken advocate of militant Islamism and the spiritual and intellectual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. The
extent to which Qutb’s experience in the US was an impetus behind his embrace of radical Islamism is debated. His goal was simply
to wage war against the “near enemy," the apostate government in his own country (Sageman (2004), 16). Qutb’s influence spread
throughout Salafi groups in his country, and his disciples strategized on how to effectively implement his vision of establishing an
Islamic government in Egypt. In 1966, he was convicted of conspiracy to assassinate President Nasser and was executed by hanging.
Qutb’s legacy would live on, and it was one of his student’s, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982), who was the head of the
Tanzim al-Jihad terror cell which assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981.
6The PLO includes Fatah, the dominant faction in the PLO (secular, left-wing nationalism); Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (Marxist-Leninist); Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Marxist-Leninist).
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to their associates when they were permitted to return to Israel the following year due to international
condemnation of the expulsion. Between 1993 and 1999, Hamas carried out 18 suicide attacks against
Israel, and then 60 more during the Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada), which began in September 2000
(Pedahzur et al. (2008), 92).
Whether or not the movement should establish and operate a political wing was a contentious and
hotly debated matter within the upper echelons of Hamas starting in 1992. Proponents in favor of the
idea of the political transition argued that it would help Hamas gain political influence and serve as a tool
for mobilizing support for Hamas and its Islamist ideology (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 92). Opponents of the
idea contended that “legitimizing" itself through party politics would inevitably result in the movement
compromising its core jihadist, rejectionist ideals. A party was ultimately established in November 1995,
called “The Islamic National Salvation Party," though it remained a fringe and inconsequential movement
on the Palestinian political scene for over a decade. The party refused to participate in the January 1996
Palestinian general elections, mainly because the Hamas leadership thought that participation would lend
legitimacy to its rival, Arafat’s Fatah party, and lend legitimacy to the Oslo peace process. In addition,
Hamas risked losing significant public support had it participated in the election and lost to Fatah.
The non-military wing of the organization was nevertheless successful in embedding itself within
Palestinian society, especially through its social welfare program (dawa), using the Muslim Brotherhood,
its parent organization, as a model (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993)). Hamas’s annual budget dur-
ing the 1990s ranged from $50 to $150 million, and it has been estimated that about 85% of its expenses
were allocated to social welfare activities (Phillips (2017), 78). Islamic charities loosely affiliated with the
movement run orphanages, kindergartens, health clinics, vocational training, among other services, and
estimates suggest that by 2000 about 40% of social institutions in the West Bank were run by Islamic char-
ities, both officially and unofficially affiliated with Hamas (Shitrit (2015), 71). Further, in 2003 65% of pri-
mary and middle schools in Gaza were Islamic, and it has been noted that at this time Hamas and other
Islamic institutions were providing financial support to at least 120,000 individuals on a monthly basis
(Shitrit (2015), 71). As discussed in (Berman and Laitin (2008)), offering such an extensive social welfare
program works to the strategic advantage of militant groups like Hamas by providing extra motivation to
members not to defect.
By 2005, Hamas had gained enough popular support that the leadership decided it was time to chal-
lenge Fatah in a general election. In the February 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas showed its
political prowess in a landslide victory, winning 74 out of 132 seats in the Legislative Council, decisively
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defeating Fatah, which won only 45 seats (Karsh (2016)). These results were quickly interpreted as the
end of the 40-year domination of the PLO over Palestinian politics, and a clear repudiation of Fatah, the
political party built by Arafat (Erlanger (2006)).
Despite winning over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people through its social welfare net-
work, its transition into politics was not inevitable. After all, its raison d’être continued to be armed resis-
tance in pursuit of all of Palestine, “from the River to the Sea," and by entering the political scene Hamas
risked losing its core base of support who have a preference for violence and may feel that the group would
be betraying its principles by transitioning (Acosta (2014)). What, then, gave Hamas the reassurance that
it could enter politics without compromising its core support base, who have an internal preference for
violence? I argue that this can be understood in terms of a reduction in the marginal benefit for violence
by 2005, precipitated by the partial achievement of its goals. Acosta (2014) contends that partial outcome-
goal achievement (as opposed to no achievement or full achievement) helps a militant group transition to
party politics by putting it in a position to convince its base constituents that it has reached the beneficial
limits of political violence and effort to achieve complete goal fulfillment requires a political transition.
The major political event that preceded Hamas’s participation in the February 2006 Palestinian elec-
tions was the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza. The unilateral Disengagement Plan was the with-
drawal of the Israeli army, the eviction of Jewish residents, and the destruction of all Jewish settlements
from the Gaza Strip in 2005. This was a controversial and contentious plan proposed by Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon in 2003, accepted by the Knesset in February 2005, and executed in August 2005. This was
a historic propaganda victory for Hamas, whose unrelenting terror campaign during the Second Intifada
(2000-2005) was considered by its supporters to be the direct cause of the Israeli retreat. It left Hamas as
the de facto ruler of Gaza, a level of success that bought it leeway with its constituency and allowed it to
soften its stance on political engagement (Acosta (2014)). Exactly six months following the enactment of
the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, Hamas achieved its stunning election victory.
In contrast to Hezbollah (discussed in Section 3.4.1), whose oscillation between violent and nonvio-
lent means can best be explained by the relative health of the Lebanese political structure and the state’s
ability or lack thereof to impose costs on the organization’s attempt to use its military wing as a tool to
challenge the state’s authority and construct a rival power center (i.e., a primarily “supply-side" consider-
ation), I contend that Hamas’s decision to transition into electoral politics, discussed above, is explained
by a mix of “supply-side" and “demand-side" factors. On the supply side, the separation barriers con-
structed by Israel in the wake of the Second Intifada, one along the Green Line, separating the West Bank
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from Israel, and a second along the entire Gaza Strip, have curbed Palestinian terrorism inside Israel-
proper to historic lows. Palestinian suicide bombing terrorism, the dominant form of attack during the
first years of the Second Intifada, quickly declined once the security barriers were constructed (Israel Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs (2008)).7 Avi Dichter, the director of the Israel Security Agency (commonly known
as Shabak or Shin Bet) from 2000 to 2005, remarked in 2006 that “[a]n absolute halt in terrorist activi-
ties has been noticed in the West Bank areas where the fence has been constructed" (National Christian
Leadership Conference for Israel (2008)).
The success of the security fences in preventing Hamas from carrying out traditional attacks in Israel
has induced two major shifts in Hamas’s strategy, both of which stem from increases the organization’s
marginal costs of violence: first, rocket and mortar shell fire from the Gaza Strip became Hamas’s pre-
ferred form of attack in the years following the construction of the separation barriers (Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (2013)), a clear instance of a terror group substituting one tactic for another given changes
in relative costs. In 2007, Israel was hit by 2,433 projectiles from Gaza (including both rocket and mor-
tar attacks), significant increases from prior years (Ahronheim (2018)). In 2008, during “Operation Cast
Lead," the three-week armed conflict between Israel and Gaza militants, terror groups fired 3,557 projec-
tiles, and then in 2012, during Operation Pillar of Defense, an eight-day armed conflict, Israel was struck
by 2,771 rockets (Ibid.). In 2014, coinciding with Operation Protective Edge, Israel was struck by 4,897
projectiles (Ibid.). The second shift in Hamas’s strategy in the past 15 years is Hamas’s increased political
activity, an event which I interpret to be influenced, to a certain extent, by the higher marginal costs at ev-
ery level of violence faced by Hamas due to the success of the security barriers, which effectively prevent
traditional terror activities inside the Green Line.
On the demand side, the ‘partial outcome-goal achievement’ put forth by Acosta (2014) implies a de-
crease in the marginal productivity of violence relative to nonviolent, political approaches, incentivizing
a substitution away from violence towards nonviolent means (Raynold (2018)). Following Israel’s with-
drawal from Gaza in 2005 and Hamas’s takeover of the territory, which was a partial achievement of its
goals, Hamas found itself with enough domestic leverage where it could make the case to its constituents
that it had reached the productive limit of its terror campaign, and effort to accomplish further goals
required an official transition into politics. This is a credible rational choice explanation of Hamas’s tran-
7From a peak of 60 suicide attacks in 2002, the high point of the Second Intifada, with the creation of the security barriers Pales-
tinian suicide attacks in Israel declined to 26 in 2003, 15 in 2004, 5 in 2005, 6 in 2006, and subsequently to a maximum of one or
two per year (Jewish Virtual Library (2008)). Likewise, from a peak of about 457 in 2002, the number of Israeli fatalities from terror
attacks has diminished to never more than a couple dozen per year in the aftermath of the Intifada, which ended in 2005 (Jewish
Virtual Library (2008); Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014)).
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sition to party politics.
An interesting demand-side shock noted in the literature, which has had the effect of inducing short-
term spikes in Hamas’s terrorist activity, is the so-called “spoiler effect”. Proposed by Kydd and Walter
(2002), the idea is that during peace negotiations between a state and a “moderate" militant faction, a rival
“extremist" faction may attempt to sabotage the peace process by engaging in terrorism that undermines
the government’s confidence in the ongoing negotiations. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) finds empirical evi-
dence for this so-called spoiler effect within the context of the Oslo peace process in the 1990s, the set of
agreements between Israel and the PLO that were intended to arrive at a peace settlement between the
two sides. The first Oslo accord was signed in September 1993, and subsequent meetings took place that
aimed to reach a resolution based around the ‘land for peace’ framework. Spoiler violence is expected
to occur prior to, or just after, the major agreements (Bueno de Mesquita (2005)); a list of such spoiler
opportunities is displayed in Table 3.1. Figure 3.3 shows monthly Palestinian terror attacks for the period
between Oslo and the start of the Second Intifada (1993-2001), with the key spoiler opportunities noted.
Figure 3.4 shows monthly attacks for the following decade.
Examining Figure 3.3, we see spikes in violence surrounding many of the events. There is a spike
prior to the Cairo Agreement (which is also the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Oslo Accord).
There are also spikes in violence before and after the Israel-Jordan peace treaty (October 1994). The March
1996 spike, which included the murder of 58 Israelis in the span of one week, was instrumental in the elec-
tion of hawkish Israeli politician Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud Party, defeating left-wing incumbent
Prime Minister Shimon Peres two months later, an event celebrated by Hamas which prefers hard-line
Israeli governments that reject the peace process (Karsh (2016)). Spikes can also be seen before the He-
bron Agreement (January 1997), Wye River Memorandum (October 1998), Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum
(September 1999), and the Camp David Summit (July 2000). There was also a sustained increase in vio-
lence preceding and following the Taba Summit (January 2001), and the February 2001 Israeli elections,
although this coincides with the Second Intifada, which began in September 2000, so it is unclear whether
Palestinian violence at this time was directed specifically at those spoiler opportunities. Either way, the
terror campaign in late 2000 was a boon for the hawkish candidate, Ariel Sharon, who won a landslide vic-
tory in the February 2001 Israeli prime ministerial elections. Sharon suspended peace negotiations with
Arafat soon after. In Figure 3.4, we see a spike preceding the “Road Map" for peace plan (July 2002), and
an overall upsurge in attacks from December 2006 to September 2008, during which time Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas met 36 times.
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Table 3.1: “Spoiler" opportunities in the Israel-Palestinian peace process
Date Event
September 1993 Oslo Accords
May 1994 Cairo Agreement
October 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty
November 1995 Oslo II
February 1996 Palestinian legislative election
May 1996 Taba negotiations (delayed) and Israeli general election
January 1997 Hebron Agreement
October 1998 Wye River Memorandum
May 1999 Israeli general election
September 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum
July 2000 Camp David Summit
January 2001 Taba Summit
February 2001 Israeli prime ministerial election
July 2002 “Road Map" for peace
December 2006-September 2008 Israeli-Palestinian talks
September 2010 Israeli-Palestinian direct negotiations
Figure 3.3: Palestinian terror attacks, with key “spoiler" opportunities noted.
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Figure 3.4: Palestinian terror attacks, with key “spoiler" opportunities noted.
3.4.3 The Case of the Basque Separatist Movement
“We know that ETA cannot destroy the Spanish State...But the Spanish State cannot destroy
us either."
–1988 interview by an ETA spokesman describing the group’s strategy of undertaking a “war
of attrition" against the Spanish state, quoted in Unzueta (1988), 251.
The history of Basque terrorism, and its association with nonviolent political activities, is highly
complex and only a brief summary will be provided here. As a case study, however, the story of the in-
terplay between politics and terrorism by the Basque movement is compelling because its intricacies of
the plot–which include adapting to different Spanish regime changes, several internal splits, changes in
strategy, negotiations with almost every democratic government in Madrid, several ceasefires with the
Spanish government, and many military defeats at the hands of Spanish forces (Sánchez-Cuenca (2009))–
exemplify the strategic planning undertaken by each side in a long-running separatist insurgency.
The Basques are an ethnic group indigenous to Basque Country (Euskal Herria), a small region (cur-
rently with a population of about 2.1 million people) located in northern Spain and southern France.
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The modern Basque nationalist-separatist movement, which dates back to the 1890s, has as a common
denominator a focus on the cultural, political, and ethnic unity of the Basque people, and the claim to
Basque Country as their legitimate homeland. Basque nationalism emerged as a reaction to two signif-
icant historical events: 1) the wave of industrialization in the late 19th century, which precipitated mass
immigration to Basque Country from other regions of Spain (Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)); this had the effect
of making the native Basques more self-aware of their unique culture and language (Pedahzur et al. (2008),
97). And 2) the defeat of Basque traditionalists/monarchists, known as Carlistas in the Third Carlist War
(1872-1876); this resulted in the loss of local political, economic, and cultural autonomy for the Basques
(referred to in Spanish as fueros) (Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)).
Basque political violence finds its roots in the period of the Franco regime (1939-1975). The Basques
suffered persecution under Franco, who attempted to suppress all expressions of Basque culture, includ-
ing its distinctive language (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 97). The ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, meaning “Basque
Country and Freedom") was founded in 1959 by a group of students dissatisfied with the moderate, pas-
sive policy promoted by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), organized in 1892, which was and still is the
dominant political party in Basque Country. The PNV has always been internally divided between a mod-
erate faction that promotes autonomy within Spain, and a radical faction that fights for full independence
(Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)).
Before it embarked on a serious terrorism campaign against the Spanish regime, however, the ETA
organized several assemblies during which it debated its precise ideology, goals, and methods. There were
two main factions. First, there were the “culturalists" (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 98) who understood the
conflict primarily as an ethno-nationalist struggle for independence, a nationalist ideology similar to its
counterparts in Northern Ireland, Palestine, etc. And second, there were the “Marxists" who understood
the conflict as a class struggle. There was also an internal debate over the tactics that should be used
in the struggle, whether peaceful protest or terrorism. The advocates for armed resistance won, and the
ETA launched its first major attack in 1968, beginning a spiral of violence that lasted for over four decades
(Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)).
In 1968 the ETA set out on a terrorism campaign with the goal of provoking a response from the
Franco regime, which obliged. Repression by the Spanish government had the intended effect of con-
solidating popular support for the militarist faction of the ETA, which was still in the midst of a heated
internal debate with the moderate faction that promoted a nonviolent political strategy to achieving au-
tonomy. The government response included a highly-publicized trial against ETA militants in 1979 (the
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so-called Burgos trial) that triggered international solidarity and won local support for armed struggle
(Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)). This seems to be an unambiguous example of the way in which violence per-
petrated against a minority group can lead to a desire for revenge and hence an increase in the perceived
marginal productivity of violence (Raynold (2018)). As discussed in Section 3.2, if the marginal cost curve
is not affected, then whether a nonviolent group becomes violent depends on the magnitude of the shift
in the marginal productivity curve, which in the case of the Basques seems to have occurred. As noted in
Pedahzur et al. (2008)8 concerning the Burgos trial where fifteen of the sixteen defendants were convicted,
“[t]he striking thing about this episode is that ETA earned widespread support among Basques because of
Franco’s willingness to invoke martial law and the repressive apparatus of an authoritarian state."
The most important split in the ETA’s history occurred in 1974, a split caused by disagreement over
whether politics or armed struggle should be the focus of the group following the death of Franco, who
by this time was very ill (Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)). At this time, the movement divided into two different
organizations, one called ETA political-military, referred to as ETA(pm), that sought to pursue its goals
through a combination of violent tactics and political tactics, and the other ETA military ETA(m), that in-
sisted that political participation would distract from the goals of the movement and hence would be ul-
timately counterproductive (Sánchez-Cuenca (2009)). In 1975 a democratic government was established
in Spain following Franco’s death. This not only led to the legalization of political parties, but, critically,
implied a decentralization of the central government that gave the Basques extensive regional autonomy
in Basque Country.
Despite (or because of) the improved political situation that allowed for the formation of a Basque
political party system, leading many in the ETA to conclude that armed struggle was henceforth unnec-
essary, the hardline ETA(m) stepped up its military activity during this time. While on the one hand the
moderate ETA(pm) voluntarily disarmed in the early 1980s, its members turning their complete attention
to nonviolent political action (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 101), on the other hand the ETA(m) embarked on a
prolonged war of attrition against the Spanish government that lasted for the next few decades (LaFree
et al. (2012)). This somewhat paradoxical phenomenon, namely the escalation of violence by ETA(m) fol-
lowing the 1975 democratization of Spain, can be logically explained by the theory put forth by Bueno de
Mesquita (2005), who posits that
[a] terror group composed exclusively of extremists engages in more terror than one com-
posed of both moderates and extremists...When the government offers concessions, only the
8p. 99
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moderates are willing to accept. This leaves the extremists in control of the terrorist organi-
zation. Once the influence of the moderates is removed, the extremists choose to direct more
of the available resources toward terrorist activities.9
ETA’s war of attrition would continue for the next few decades, with sporadic cycles of intense vio-
lence against the state interspersed with periods of dialogue and negotiation with the state. Its preferred
means of attack were bombing operations all over Spain, assassinations of politicians, and kidnappings.
Like Hamas, Hezbollah, IRA, and 19th of April Movement (among others), the ETA operated a political
wing, Herri Batasuna (HB), which was eventually outlawed by Spain’s Supreme Court in 2002 for its asso-
ciation with ETA.
When it was all said and done, ETA killed 829 people, including 340 civilians, between 1968 and 2010
(Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España (2010)). Despite its impressive durability and longevity, the
ETA’s armed struggle accomplished nothing in terms of achieving full Basque independence in Basque
Country. This is in contrast to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, whose persistent insurgencies against
the Israeli military in southern Lebanon and Gaza, respectively, can be credited with having compelled
Israel to retreat from these regions. The 1978 statute granting local autonomy to Basque Country ushered
in a status quo deemed reasonable by most but which the ETA(m) found to be wholly unacceptable, re-
mains in effect today. Unlike “The Troubles" in Northern Ireland, a conflict that bears a resemblance to
the Basque conflict due to the similar war of attrition military strategy employed by both IRA and ETA,
the ETA and HB never managed to reach a political settlement with Spain like the agreement achieved
between the Provisional IRA/Sinn Fein and the Northern Ireland Assembly (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 103).
After several declared ceasefires over the years, in May 2018 the ETA announced that it has completely dis-
mantled all its structures, both political and military, thus bringing to a close Western Europe’s last major
armed insurgency (Reuters (2018)).
3.4.4 The Case of the Irgun and Revisionist Zionism
In the decades leading up to the independence of the State of Israel in 1948, there existed numer-
ous Zionist paramilitary organizations which fought on behalf of the Jewish population in Mandatory
Palestine. These groups differed from one another in terms of ideology and goals. Zionism, the political
9This model also explains the increase in violence by the extremist factions Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad which coin-
cided with the decision by the relatively moderate PLO to negotiation with Israel in the Oslo peace process of the 1990s. When the
moderates accept concessions from the state, they were drawn away from violence, leaving the extremists in control of the armed
struggle.
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and nationalist movement of the Jewish people seeking the re-establishment of a sovereign Jewish na-
tion in what is now Israel, traces its history to the Austro-Hungarian journalist Theodor Herzl. In 1897,
in response to rising anti-Semitism in Europe and Russia, Herzl published a book entitled “The Jewish
State," in which he encouraging the Jews of Europe to immigrate to (what was then) Ottoman Palestine
and pursue Jewish national self-determination within the borders of the biblical Land of Israel. The Jewish
immigrant population in Palestine grew steadily throughout the first half of the 20th century.10
From the start the Zionists were perceived as a threat to the Palestinian Arabs’ own political am-
bitions, who conducted raids against the Jews in retaliation (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 79). This was the
catalyst for the Jews to form their own paramilitary forces which would protect the Jewish settlements
and kibbutzim from Arab attacks. The first such Jewish self-defense organization was Bar-Giora, founded
in 1907. This group was supplanted within a couple years by HaShomer (“The Watchman") organization,
which lasted until the outbreak of WWI; neither organization consisted of more than 100 members. The
culmination of these self-defense efforts was the Haganah (“Defense"), founded in 1920 shortly after the
establishment of the British Mandate of Palestine.
The Haganah, the largest Jewish paramilitary force and the direct forerunner of the IDF, was domi-
nated by secular, socialist ideologues and was the military wing of the left-wing Jewish political establish-
ment in Palestine. The Haganah operated according to an official policy of Havlagah, “restraint," meaning
its fighters were directed to only defend Jewish settlements in self-defense and to not take any offensive
action against Arabs. This self-imposed policy of passivity was strongly objected to by many within the
Haganah, who in the aftermath of the 1929 Arab Riots which left 133 Jews killed, sought a more aggressive
and militarist approach in responding to Arab attacks against Jews. In 1931 the militant elements of the
Haganah split off and founded the Irgun (the Hebrew word for “Organization"; the group is also referred
to as Etzel, the acronym of the group’s official name “The National Military Organization in the Land of
Israel.") In opposition to the dominant, socialist “Labor Zionism" ideology of the Haganah, the Irgun had
a distinctively right-wing, secular, nationalist ideology, the “Revisionist Zionism" branch of the Zionist
movement founded by Irgun commander Ze’ev Jabotinsky.
In response to the 1936-1939 Great Arab Revolt, a violent Arab nationalist uprising against the Jew-
ish population that was aimed at reversing the British policy of permitting mass Jewish immigration to
10In 1922, the first year for which accurate census data exist, the Jewish population of Palestine was 83,790 (12.91% of total pop-
ulation), compared to a Muslim population of 486,177 ((74.91% of total)). A decade later, 1932, the Jewish population had risen
to 192,137 (19% of total population), by 1942 the Jewish population was 484,408 (31% of total).Palestine and of Inquiry on Jewish
Problems in Palestine (1946)
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Palestine, the Irgun initiated a terrorist campaign against the Palestinian population and the British Army,
launching around 60 attacks during the period of the three-year revolt (Perliger and Weinberg (2003)). In
1939 the organization then began carrying out terrorist attacks against the British establishment in Pales-
tine, with the goal being a complete British withdrawal from Palestine, in response to the “White Paper of
1939," a policy publication issued by Neville Chamberlain’s government that restricted Jewish immigra-
tion to Palestine to 75,000 for 5 years. The most notorious attack carried out during this campaign by the
Irgun was the July 22, 1946 King David Hotel bombing which left 91 people dead and 46 wounded.
In 1940, a radical faction within the Irgun, led by Avraham (“Yair") Stern, split off and formed an or-
ganization called Lehi (acronym for “Fighters for the Freedom of Israel"). In 1940, the Irgun’s commander,
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, decided to cease the campaign against the British and actively support the British in its
fight against the Nazis. Yair Stern and his followers objected, however, considering the British an even
greater foe to the Jews than the Nazis due to British restrictions against the Jews in Palestine. Lehi’s pri-
mary goal was thus the expulsion of the British by violent means; its most notable terrorist attack to this
end was the assassination in Cairo in 1944 of Lord Moyne, British Minister Resident in the Middle East.
The subsequent history of these two ultra-nationalist, militarist Zionist organizations, Irgun and
Lehi, sheds light on the conditions under which a transformation from terrorism to party politics may
take place. In May, 1948, the State of Israel gained its independence, and efforts then arose among the
political establishment to integrate into a single military all the rival paramilitary factions. Creating a uni-
fied army to represent the new state was seen as essential in successfully fending off the numerous Arab
state armies which had declared war against Israel following independence. In light of the unwilling-
ness of the two hawkish organizations, Irgun and Lehi, to cede their independence and accept integration
into the national army, the Israel Defense Forces (the successor to the Haganah), the Israeli government,
headed by David Ben-Gurion, began a campaign to quash all rival Jewish paramilitary faction in the state.
The Irgun was suppressed through the Altalena Affair, when the IDF bombarded and sank the Altalena, a
ship carrying Irgun members smuggling into Israel weapons from France, off the coast of Tel Aviv. Sub-
sequently, the IDF forcibly disbanded the remaining paramilitary elements of the Irgun and the Lehi,
integrating its members into the IDF (Pedahzur et al. (2008), pp. 83-84).
Rather than covertly continuing its clandestine militarism, former members of these Revisionist
Zionist groups transitioned into party politics. The leader of the Irgun from 1943 until its demise in 1948,
Menachem Begin, established the Herut (“Freedom") political party in 1948. This party was the most
influential political representative of the secular right-wing nationalist hawkish constituency in Israel.
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In the 1949 Parliamentary elections, Herut won 14 seats and was the fourth largest party in Parliament,
and starting in the late 1950s it was the second largest party, after Labor (Pedahzur et al. (2008), 85). In
1973, Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, in an alliance with other right-wing parties including Herut,
formed the Likud party, which in 1988 assumed total control of the alliance when the other parties offi-
cially merged into it. The Likud first won a majority of seats in Parliament in 1977 (also marking the first
time a right-wing party had won a plurality of votes) with Begin elected as prime minister.
3.5 Conclusion
This study argues that, contrary to some popular perception, the distinction between terrorism and
party politics is not always sharply defined. As we have seen, the two often operate in close proximity
to one another. For example, political parties directly create a terrorist group when the need arises, as
in the case of the Lebanese Civil War. Another type of relationship is the reverse, when a terrorist group
establishes a political wing that is uses as a tool to advance their cause at the ballot box, as has been the
case with Hamas, Hezbollah, PKK and the ETA. In many examples, including Hamas, Hezbollah, PKK, and
ETA, the connection between a terrorist group and a political party is characterized by a cyclical pattern,
where the organization adjusts its tactics based on changing incentives.
The theoretical framework developed in Section 3.2 describes the economics at play in transforma-
tions between terrorism and politics. Consistent with rational behavior, an organization can be expected
to engage in terror activities if and only if it perceives its optimal level of violence is positive. As such, the
interplay between terrorism and party politics for any historical case ought to be examined by considering
the exogenous (or endogenous) forces at work that shift the marginal benefit and/or marginal cost curves
in ways that affect the optimal level of violence.
To minimize as much as possible the extent to which political organizations resort to violence in
pursuit of their goals (assuming this is an objective of policy-makers), states ought to focus on preventing
certain catalysts that may lead to a positive optimal level of violence. The integrity of state institutions,
as well as the rule of law, are probably the most important factors determining whether a political or-
ganizations finds it beneficial to engage in terrorism. On the supply side, states should concentrate on
maintaining an effective law enforcement apparatus that imposes high costs on terrorist activity while re-
specting civil rights. On the demand side, states can raise the opportunity costs of terrorism by improving
civil and political institutions that generate non-violent means of political expression. In addition, states
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should be wary of needlessly provoking a minority sect, as this often has the adverse effect of radicalizing
the group, which may then seek revenge through a terrorist campaign.
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